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INTRODUCTION 
In October 200 1 ,  President George W. Bush authorized the National 
Security Agency ("NSA") "to intercept the international communications of 
people with known links to al Qaida and related terrorist organizations."l 
Four years and two months later, news of the program became public. 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales defended the Commander-in-Chiefs 
power to ignore warrants otherwise required under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act or Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act.2 Congress itself had authorized the President to "use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the 911 1  attacks.3 For 
Gonzales, this meant that the President was acting "at the zenith of his 
powers" under the tripartite framework set forth by Justice Jackson in 
Youngstown v. Sawyer.4 
This was not the first time Article II claims backed surveillance 
programs designed to protect the United States from attack. In the midst of 
the Cold War, the NSA ran Operations SHAMROCK and MINARET. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") orchestrated COINTELPRO and 
amassed over 500,000 dossiers on American citizens. The Central 
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") oversaw Operation CHAOS and built a 
database that tracked 300,000 people. Routine counterintelligence 
operations disrupted everything from women's liberation to the civil rights 
movement. 
However, in 1 978, Congress introduced the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act ("FISA") precisely to prevent unchecked executive 
surveillance of American citizens. And congressional interest in ensuring 
1 President's Radio Address, 41 Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 1 88 1  (Dec. 1 7, 2005), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/2005 1 2 1 7  .html. 
2 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-5 1 1 ,  § 1 02, 92 Stat. 1 786 
( 1 978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1 801 - 1 1 (2000)); Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-35 1 ,  tit. 3, 82 Stat. 2 12 (codified at 1 8  U.S.C. §§ 2 5 10-20). 
3 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 1 07-40, §2(a), 1 1 5  Stat. 224, 224 
(2001)  (reported as a note to 50 U.S.C. § 1 541). 
4 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 2 (2006) (discussing 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 ( 1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)). 
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oversight did not end there: in 1 991  Congress amended the 1 947 National 
Security Act to require the President to keep the congressional intelligence 
committees "fully and currently informed" of surveillance programs 
underway, including any "significant anticipated intelligence activity."s 
According to Rep. Jane Harman, instead of telling the full committees 
in both houses about the recent NSA's domestic spy program, the executive 
branch only gave notice to the "Gang of Eight"-the majority and minority 
leaders of both houses, and the chairs and ranking members of the 
congressional intelligence committees.6 Although this would have 
constituted sufficient notification for covert action (which excludes 
activities aimed at acquiring information), Harmon claimed it stopped short 
of the statutory requirement. 
Wherever one falls in this debate, the NSA program represents only 
one of many expansions in executive surveillance since 9/1 1 .  Legal 
controls previously introduced to protect citizens' privacy and to prevent 
the misuse of surveillance powers have been relaxed. What makes the 
situation qualitatively different now is not just the lowering of the bar: 
digitization and the rapid advancement of technology mean that the type 
and volume of information currently available eclipse that of previous 
generations. And the issue is not confined to the United States. Despite the 
incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights into British 
law, the United Kingdom also appears to be losing privacy in its battle 
against terrorism. 
Part I of this article looks at the American institution of legal controls 
on the executive branch and their subsequent erosion post-9fl l .  It explores 
three changes incorporated in the USA PATRIOT Act: alterations to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; the introduction of Delayed Notice 
Search Warrants; and the expansion of National Security Letters. Outside 
of this legislation, the weakening of the Attorney General guidelines 
increased the FBI's  ability to collect information. The article highlights the 
Department of Defense's  ("DOD") movement into the domestic 
surveillance realm. It discusses a number of operations both inside and 
outside the DOD, such as TALON, Echelon, Carnivore, Magic Lantern, 
TIPS, and the use of watch lists. Part I concludes with a discussion of the 
data mining efforts underway. The article argues that Total Information 
5 Fiscal Year 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 1 02-88 (current version at 
50 U.S.C. §§ 413- 13(b» (amending the National Security Act of 1 947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 
§§ 501 -03, 61 Stat. 495 ( 1 947» . 
6 Letter from Jane Harman, Representative from Cal., to George W. Bush, President of 
the United States (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/harmanJpress/releases/ 
2006/0 I 04PRnsaprogram.html. 
2006] PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE 1 063 
Awareness, ADVISE, and other projects catapult surveillance into another 
realm. Moreover, while any one program, such as the NSA initiative, may 
be considered on narrow grounds, the sheer breadth of current powers raises 
important concerns. 
Part II notes that, until recently, no laws governed police and 
intelligence service information-gathering authorities in the UK. 
Extraordinary stop and search powers for terrorist-related offences, and 
warrants for police interference with property provided exceptions. But 
physical searches of property conducted by the intelligence services, the 
interception of communications by law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies, the use of covert surveillance or "electronic bugs," and the 
running of covert human intelligence sources operated under the legislative 
and judicial radars. Beginning in the mid-l 980s, the European Court began 
to raise objections to the lack of safeguards and statutory framework. But 
each time the Court handed down a significant finding against the United 
Kingdom, the state responded not just by, at least on the surface, meeting 
the demands of the European Convention of Human Rights, but, it appears, 
by expanding executive surveillance authorities. Moreover, the warrant 
system introduced retained control within the executive branch. Not subject 
to judicial review, the standard applied is reasonable suspicion­
considerably less robust than probable cause. Like the United States, 
Britain draws on new technologies; the country leads the world in its use of 
public surveillance systems. 
Having laid out legal developments on both sides of the Atlantic, Part 
III moves to policy concerns: it begins by briefly exploring the substantive, 
political, legal, social, and economic risks posed by such measures. It then 
considers six approaches that would help to mitigate the risks. First is the 
possibility of creating a property right in personal information. The second 
centers on the regulation of access, transfer, use, and retention of data. 
Such efforts would satisfy demands for accountability and transparency in 
both the public and private sector. A third possibility centers on scaling 
back the existing powers of the state. Fourth, both countries may 
contemplate placing limits on what constitutes national security. Fifth, 
alternative safeguards and oversight structures deserve attention-such as 
reporting requirements, random audits, the creation of ombudspersons, the 
insertion of the judiciary, and (in the UK) allowing intercepted 
communications to be used as evidence. Sixth, preventing countries from 
introducing ever greater powers of surveillance under the claim that they 
are only temporary in nature would force legislatures to consider the long­
term impact of provisions beyond the immediate terrorist threat. 
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I. SURVEILLANCE AND THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
In 1 920, Frank Cobb, the editor of New York World wrote, "[t]he Bill 
of Rights is a born rebel. It reeks with sedition. In every clause it shakes its 
fist in the face of constituted authority . . . .  [I]t is the one guarantee of 
human freedom to the American people. ,,7 Cobb had a point: the first of all 
the amendments puts a bullet in the heart of British licensing practices and 
the legacy of the Star Chamber, claiming the right to freedom of speech, 
assembly, and religion. The Fourth Amendment assured, "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures."g This provision flew in the face of 
British writs of assistance, which had been used against the colonists with 
reckless abandon.9 But rebellion did not stop there. The Fifth Amendment 
made a rude gesture towards state agencies that might contemplate torture, 
demanding that no person "be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself."lo And due process, in the same clause, provided a 
bulwark against state violations of individual rights. I I 
While notable in their attempt to limit state power, in none of these 
measures did the Bill of Rights, on its face, create a general right to privacy. 
Instead, the Supreme Court considered specific interests to fall under the 
remit of the Fourth Amendment. "Papers" included letters sent via pOSt. 1 2  
7 Frank Cobb, L a  Follette's Magazine ( 1 920), http://www.zaadz.comlquotes/ 
Frank_I_Cobb (last visited June 9, 2006). 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
9 The American Revolutionist James Otis declared such writs, "the worst instrument of 
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of 
law, that ever was found in an English law book." Boyd v. United States, 1 16 U.S. 616,625 
( 1886) (quoting THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WmCH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 368 (The 
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ed., 1 998) ( 1883». According to Otis, such writs placed "the 
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer." Id. John Adams later declared 
Otis's statement to be the "first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of 
Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born." Id. 
IO U.S. CaNsT. amend. V; see also Boyd, 1 16 U.S. at 629. 
II U.S. CaNsT. amend. V. 
12 Accordingly, the 1 792 Postal Act forbade postal employees from opening mail, unless 
they could not be delivered. Postal Act, Feb. 20, 1 792. By 1878, the Supreme Court 
recognized, 
[lletters and sealed packages . . . in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and 
inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties 
forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to 
be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus 
closed against inspection, wherever they may be. 
Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1 878). 
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The only way to reach them would thus be by a warrant, "issued upon 
similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as 
is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household.,, 1 3  
Similarly narrow analysis held for "persons" and "effects." Over time, 
however, the Judiciary expanded its reading of the Constitution to include a 
more general right to privacy. 
Part I briefly presents the development of this right in relation to state 
surveillance. What emerges is a story marked by the expansion of 
executive power as a way to address national security threats, followed by 
efforts by the Judiciary and Legislature to check the third branch. Post-9f1 1 
augmentations, however, present something different in kind: even as 
counterterrorism has lowered the protections citizens have against 
unwarranted state surveillance, new technologies have catapulted state 
power into an entirely new realm. We have yet to grapple with what the 
loss of anonymity and movement into psychological surveillance means for 
the liberal, democratic nature of the state. 
A. REASONABLE EXPECT A nON OF PRIVACY 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is well-trodden territory. While it is 
not the intent of this paper to analyze the central cases, a brief exposition 
will help to calibrate deviations from ordinary criminal law, which have 
been introduced to address terrorist crime. 
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court ruled that papers and 
effects obtained unconstitutionally could not be admitted as evidence in a 
court of law. 14  In 19 14, the Supreme Court expanded this "exclusionary 
rule" to deter law enforcement from violating the Constitution, to prevent 
the courts from being accomplices, and to increase public trust in the state. 15 
13 Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733. 
14 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 ( 19 14); Boyd, 1 16 U.S. at 616 .  
1 5  Weeks, 232 U.S .  383 .  Government officers, without a warrant, broke into Weeks's 
home and seized "all of his books, letters, money, papers, notes, evidences of indebtedness, 
stock, certificates, insurance policies, deeds, abstracts, and other muniments of title, bonds, 
candies, clothes, and other property." Id. at 3 87. Justice Day, writing for the Court, 
admonished, 
[t ]he effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal 
officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the 
exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This 
protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not. 
Id. at 391 -92. To allow evidence taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment would, in 
effect, put the judiciary in the position of endorsing unconstitutional behavior. /d. at 394; 
see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1 07-08 (4th ed. 2004). 
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In the late 19th century, Thomas Cooley began to expand the argument to a 
right to privacy writ large for criminal law investigations. 1 6  At the core of 
such privacy lay the "right to be let alone.,, 17  Two years later in the 
Harvard Law Review, Louis O. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren called for 
greater protection of individual privacy. IS It took more than a decade, 
however, for American courts formally to address the right to privacy. 
The first shot across the bow came in 1 904. New England Life 
Insurance Company published an advertisement in the Atlanta Constitution 
which featured two pictures: text under the first man, Paolo Pavesich, 
expressed his delight at buying life insurance. Text under the second photo, 
of a wretched-looking chap, bemoaned his lack of foresight in purchasing 
the same. 19  In deciding for Pavesich, who had actually never bought life 
insurance from the company, the Georgia Supreme Court suggested that the 
right to privacy derived from natural law and could be ascertained from 
authoritative legal texts.20 Until consciously waived, the right to privacy 
remained.2 1  
Just over two decades later, the Supreme Court addressed whether the 
Bill of Rights implied a right to privacy for criminal law investigations, but 
the case swam upstream against Prohibition and the moral majority. A 
multi-million dollar operation in Seattle imported and distributed alcohol 
throughout the country. For months, federal law enforcement officers 
tapped the phone lines of people involved in the operation?2 The evidence 
implicated everyone from Roy Olmstead, the "leading conspirator" (general 
manager), to the Seattle police, who received kickbacks in return for turning 
16 "[I]t is better sometimes that crime should go unpunished than that the citizen should 
be liable to have his premises invaded, his desks broken open, his private books, letters, and 
papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the misconstructions of ignorant and suspicious 
persons." ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 332 ( 1 967) (citing COOLEY, supra note 9). 
17 DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LmERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 5 1 6  
(2002) (citing COOLEY,SUpra note 9 ,  at 29). 
18 "The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have 
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influences of 
culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become 
more essential to the individual." Samuel D. Warren & Louis O. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 1 96 ( 1 890). With the Bill of Rights apparently silent on the 
issue, the authors found the locus for this right in common law, which included protections 
of privacy in relation to nuisance, and doctrines of relevance and necessity in the discovery 
phase of trial proceedings. See Prince Albert v. Strange, ( 1849) 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (Ch.); 
WESTIN, supra note 16. 
19 Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S .E. 68 (Ga. 1 905). 
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 ( 1 928). 
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a blind eye. The majority found that because the information had been 
obtained via auditory means, and no entry of the defendant's house or 
offices had occurred, the state had not conducted a search. This placed 
phone taps outside constitutional protection?3 
Brandeis, who by now had secured a place on the Court, wrote a 
scathing dissent, in which he claimed that privacy lay implicit in the Fourth 
Amendment. This measure, moreover, must be adapted to evolving 
technologies because '''time works changes, brings into existence new 
conditions and purposes.' Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading 
privacy have become available to the government.,,2 4 By the turn of the 
century, the telephone had become an integral part of the fabric of society.25 
It differed from the post in terms of the "evil incident to invasion" of 
privacy: "Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at 
both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations between them upon 
any subject, and although proper, confidential, and privileged, may be 
overheard.,,26 In comparison, writs of assistance served as "but puny 
instruments of tyranny and oppression . . . .'>27 Brandeis went on to reiterate 
his ideas from the earlier article, penning one of the most famous passages 
in American constitutional law: 
The makers of our Constitution . . . .  [C]onferred, as against the government, the right 
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government 
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal 
proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the 
Fifth?8 
If the legislature wanted to change the law, and make an effort to 
protect telephone conversations from being intercepted without a warrant, it 
could. After a series of bills that failed to pass congressional muster, the 
1 934 Communications Act made the interception of communications and 
wiretap evidence inadmissible in a federal criminal trial. 29 
23 !d. at 464-65. 
24 Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
25 About.com, Privateline.com Home Page: Welcome!, 
http://inventors.about.com!?once=true&site=http://www.privateline.com! (last visited June 9, 
2006). 
26 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475-76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
27 Id. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
28 Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
29 Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 
1103-04 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000)). 
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Critically, for our present purposes, this legislation underestimated the 
strength of the national security claim-an incessant refrain that, despite 
being subject to occasional judicial setbacks, accompanied the steady 
expansion in surveillance through the turn of the 21 st century. The 1934 
Act became the first of a series of legislative casualties. For although, 
"(t]aken at face value the phrase 'no person' comprehends federal agents, 
and the ban on communication to 'any person' bars testimony to the content 
of an intercepted message," the FBI, concerned about the communist threat, 
crafted its own understanding of the statute and continued to wiretap.3o It 
interpreted the legislation as requiring both the interception and disclosure 
of information in order for the statute to be violated; and it determined that 
communication within the Executive, a unitary branch, did not count as 
"divulging" information. 31 
The Bureau's somewhat creative interpretation forced the court to 
revisit the issue in the late 1930s. This time, the justices overturned 
Olmstead and declared that federal officials did not operate above the law.32 
Moreover, because the evidence excluded from trial reflected congressional 
concern that the inclusion of such information would be "inconsistent with 
ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty,,,33 any indirect use 
would also be barred.3 4 
In early 1940, Attorney General Jackson responded to the decision by 
reinstating the general ban on wiretapping. But within months President 
Roosevelt overturned Jackson's policy. A May 21, 1940 memorandum 
indicated that "in the President's view the Supreme Court did not intend to 
have its decision apply to grave matters involving the defense of the 
nation.,,35 He directed the Bureau to return to its wiretap operations for 
national security. In 1946, Truman affirmed the use of wiretaps for all 
cases "vitally affecting" the same.36 
30 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15 ,  at 328-29. 
3 1 Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1 986). 
32 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 ( 1939); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 
379, 380 (1937). 
33 Nardone, 302 U.s. at 383 .  
34 Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340-41 (quoting Gouled v.  United States, 255 U.S. 298, 307 
(1921». 
35 Socialist Workers Party, 642 F. Supp. at 1 3 90. 
36 [d. Before going further, it is important to distinguish between wiretapping and 
bugging: the fonner centers on the interception of electronic communications, whereas the 
latter involves placing a microphone or recording device at a specific location to pick up in­
person conversations. While the Court applied the Communications Act to limit 
wiretapping, it considered electronic bugs to fall outside legislative intent. In 1942, for 
instance, the Court found the warrantless use of a detectaphone-a sort of stethoscope that 
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The next three decades steadily narrowed the circumstances under 
which wiretapping for criminal law purposes would be allowed. Two 
important cases reached the Supreme Court: in the first, Silverman v. United 
States, Washington, D.C. police used a "spike mike" to monitor a gambling 
ring meeting in a row house next door. The foot-long microphone, inserted 
under a baseboard and into the wall, hit some sort of solid object that served 
as "a very good sounding board.'')? The Court found the physical 
penetration of this device into the wall, and its contact with what appeared 
to be the heating duct, to constitute a search. 38 
The second case, argued three months later, arose from early 20th 
century counterterrorist efforts. And it spurred the Court to recognize the 
right to privacy as equal to other rights secured by due process. Over­
zealous police officers, waving a paper they claimed was a warrant, broke 
into Miss Dollree Mapp's home. 39 She grabbed the "warrant" and hid it in 
her bosom; but the police retrieved it, placed her in manacles, and searched 
the premises. In a locked trunk in the basement they discovered material 
unconnected to communists and bomb-throwers-"lewd and lascivious 
books, pictures, and photographs"-ownership of which counted as a crime 
under Ohio law. 40 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule for warrantless searches applied to states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.4 1 
These cases lent momentum to recognition of a broad, private realm. 
Then, just four years later, a case involving medical advice provided by a 
doctor to a husband and wife reached the highest court. Connecticut law 
made it illegal to provide information to anyone about contraceptive 
devices.4 2 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated, "[t]his law . . .  
operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their 
physician 's role in one aspect of that relation.'.4 3 Douglas noted that a 
could be placed on partition walls to pick up sound waves on the other side-to be outside 
the scope of the statute. Goldman v. United States, 3 1 6  U.S. 1 29, 133 ( 1942). 
37 Silvennan v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 ( 1 961) .  
38 !d. at 509. Although not part of the holding of the court, another important aspect may 
have been the role the case played in bringing the justices face to face with emerging 
electronic technologies, such as parabolic microphones and sonic wave surveillance. In 
dicta, the Court referred to these and other "frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted 
marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society." Id. 
39 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 ( 1 961). 
40 !d. 
41 Id. at 655. 
42 Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 1  U.S. 479, 480 ( 1 965) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-
32, 54-1 96 (1 958)). 
43 Id. at 482. 
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broader right to privacy existed as part of the First Amendment, such as the 
right of parents to choose their children's school, or the right to study 
German.4 4 Other cases recognized "privacy in one's associations." 
Douglas continued, "[i]n other words, the First Amendment has a penumbra 
where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.'.45 The Court 
came full circle and embraced Brandeis' view.46 
By the mid-1960s then, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, dominated 
by the "trespass doctrine," had begun to take form. To be unconstitutional, 
actual, physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area had to 
occur. "'[P]ersons,' [included] the bodies and attire of individuals; 
'houses,' [included] apartments, hotel rooms, garages, business offices, 
stores, and warehouses; 'papers, ' such as letters; and 'effects, ' such as 
automobiles.,,47 Whether wiretapping and electronic bugging for criminal 
law purposes, however, constituted a physical search remained far from 
settled. 
In 1967, the Court revisited whether electronic bugging constituted 
physical trespass. By then, the telephone had completely integrated itself 
into daily American life. (In 1970, more than sixty-nine million main 
telephone lines were in use.) Charles Katz, a small-time gambler, used a 
public phone down the street from his boarding house to place bets. The 
FBI attached an electronic bug to the outside of the phone booth and 
recorded his calls to bookkeepers in Miami and Boston. 
In a seismic shift, the Supreme Court issued a new edict: "[T]he Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places." Justice Stewart, writing for the 
majority, continued, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
44 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 5 1 0  ( 1925) (schooling); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 ( 1923) (German language); see also Griswold, 381  U.S. at 48 1 -82. 
45 Griswold, 381  U.S. at 483 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 ( 1958». 
46 Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of 
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his 
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found 
in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let 
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. 
Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.  438, 478 (Brandeis, J. dissenting». 
47 LAFAVE et aI., supra note 1 5, at 127-28 (citing See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 
( 1 967) (warehouses); Schmerber v. Calfiornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (bodies); Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89 (1964) (attire); Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 58 (1964) (apartments); Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel rooms); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 ( 1964) 
(automobiles); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 ( 1932) (garages); United States v. 
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 ( 1932) (business offices); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 3 1 3  
( 192 1 )  (stores); Ex parte Jackson, 9 6  U.S. 727 ( 1878) (letters». 
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even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.'. 48 Although the 
phone booth admittedly was constructed of glass, Katz shut the door.49 The 
"presence or absence of a physical intrusion" suddenly mattered naught in 
consideration of the Fourth Amendment.50 
The court thus replaced the "trespass doctrine" with one based on a 
"reasonable expectation of privacy." Justice Harlan concurred and refined 
the holding with a two-prong test to determine whether such an expectation 
exists: "[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. ,,,5 1 In this manner, neither 
conversations nor activities exposed to the "'plain view' of outsiders" 
would be considered protected. 52 Similarly, actions that took place in an 
open field, outside the curtilage of the home, would be fair game. 53 
Justice White in his concurrence, and particularly relevant to our 
current inquiry, emphasized that the presumption against warrantless 
searches could be overcome by pressing need. In a rather broad 
interpretation of footnote twenty-three, where the majority had written only 
that the case did not address the issue of national security, White suggested 
that the court had actually acknowledged, "that there are circumstance [sic] 
in which it is reasonable to search without a warrant.',5 4  White continued, 
[w]iretapping to protect the security of the Nation has been authorized by successive 
Presidents . . . .  We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's 
judgment if the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney 
General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized 
electronic surveillance as reasonable. 55 
48 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 35 1  ( 1 967) (citation omitted). 
49 Id. at 352. 
50 !d. at 353 (emphasis added). 
51 !d. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Many of the subsequent cases zeroed in on what 
was reasonable. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1 969) (holding that in the 
absence of a search warrant, police can only search the area within the arrestee's immediate 
control). 
52 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
53 The Court carved out an additional exception for hot pursuit. See Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
54 Katz, 389 U.S. at 358. The text of footnote twenty-three reads, "[w]hether safeguards 
other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a 
situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case." Id. 
55 Id. at 363-64 (White, J., concurring). 
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Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan, objected to White 's 
assertion. He pointed out a certain conflict of interest: "Neither the 
President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they 
believe national security may be involved they are not detached, 
disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be.,,56 The 
constitutional responsibility of the Executive is to "vigorously investigate 
and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute those who violate 
pertinent federal laws.,,57 Douglas concluded, 
[s]ince spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs 
are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when the 
President and Attorney General assume both the position of adversary-and-prosecutor 
d d· . d I . 58 an Ismtereste , neutra magistrate. 
The national security issue proved a contentious one, and a sort of de 
facto double standard evolved. According to the Court, physical 
surveillance and electronic bugging became subject to a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" test. But wiretapping, and surveillance where 
"national security" might be involved found themselves on a different side 
of the legal ledger-a side where much looser considerations would satisfy 
the demands of Article II. 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE 
Prior to the 20th century, the use of surveillance for national security 
reasons appears to have been limited to times of actual war. In 1776, for 
instance, the Committee (later Commission) for Detecting and Defeating 
Conspiracies collected information on suspected spies and sympathizers for 
the British government. 59 The Continental Congress regularly intercepted 
and opened mail sent by Tories.6o The Sons of Liberty themselves evolved 
into the "mechanics," gathering intelligence for the revolutionists. The 
drafting of the Constitution halted many of these efforts, and by the start of 
the Civil War, intelligence-gathering efforts had so stagnated that neither 
the North nor the South had organized or reliable information on 
subversives.61 In 1865, Secretary of State William H. Seward attempted to 
56 Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
57 Id. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
58 Id. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
59 See NAT'L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CTR., A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE READER: 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO POST-WORLD WAR II 2 (Frank J. Rafalko ed., 2004), available at 
http://www . fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci 1 /ch 1 a.htrn. 
60 Id. 
61 NAT'L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 59, at 43, available at 
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rectify the matter. He detained scores of individuals and created the Secret 
Service-a surveillance network that operated across the United States and 
Canada.62 Just four months before the end of the war, the Confederacy 
established a Secret Service Bureau. The extent of its activities, however, 
remains lost to history; Seward 's counterpart, Judah Benjamin, burned all 
the records.63 Like the Revolutionary War, the end of the Civil War 
brought with it a lapse in information-gathering operations within the 
United States. As the 20th century dawned, however, the Red Scare, and 
the fear that anarchists, communists, and Bolsheviks lurked in every 
shadow, heralded the peace-time use of surveillance for national security 
purposes. 
1. The Red Scare 
The story of the expansion of domestic intelligence gathering powers 
for national security purposes is one marked by periodic efforts by 
Congress and the Judiciary to block executive expansion, followed by 
determined efforts by the Executive to continue on its path. Even the 
beginning of the Red Scare echoes this refrain: in May 1908, Congress 
barred the Department of Justice ("DOl") from employing the Secret 
Service in an intelligence-gathering function. Two months later, Attorney 
General Charles Bonaparte created Special Agents to conduct 
investigations. The following year Attorney General George Wickersham 
formalized the decision in the creation of the Bureau of Investigation 
("BI,,).6 4 Over the next decade, large scale acts of violence-some 
engineered by anarchists, others by ordinary criminals-increased.65 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer took the lead. With J. Edgar 
Hoover 's assistance, he initiated a series of purges, arresting and deporting 
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/cildocs/ci l /ch2a.htm. 
62 See id. (citing FREDERICK BANCROFT, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 260 ( 1990». 
63 Id. 
64 History of the FBI: Origins 1 908- 1 9 1 0, http://www.fbi.gov/libreflhistoric/history/ 
origins.htm (last visited June 9, 2006). The BI did not become known as the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation until 1 932. History of the FBI: The New Deal 1 933-Late 30s, 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/newdeal.htm (last visited June 9, 2006). 
65 On May Day 19 19, for instance, thirty-six bombs entered the postal system, addressed 
to prominent Americans. A month later, one found its way to then Attorney General A. 
Mitchell Palmer's home. In 1 920, a wagon bomb exploded in lower Manhattan, killing over 
thirty people and injuring hundreds more. The attack caused some two million dollars in 
damage. House of Morgan Bombed, http://pbskids.orglbigapplehistorylbusiness/ 
topic 1 5.html (last visited June 9, 2006). 
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thousands of "undesirable aliens." In one day alone, the feds rounded up 
some 4,000 people in 33 cities.66 
Palmer 's zealotry could hardly be overstated. In 1920 he wrote an 
article in Forum making The Case Against the "Reds ": 
Like a prairie-fire, the blaze of revolution was sweeping over every American 
institution of law and order a year ago. It was eating its way into the homes of the 
American workmen, its sharp tongues of revolutionary heat were licking the altars of 
the churches, leaping into the belfry of the school bell, crawling into the sacred 
corners of American homes, seeking to replace marriage vows with libertine laws, 
burning up the foundations of society. 67 
Palmer castigated Congress for failing to act. 
Having mistaken the ends of the anarchist movement for the start of an 
American Revolution, however, Palmer soon found himself the butt of 
jokes and popular disdain. Experts later put the estimated number of 
Communist Party USA members at the time at some 26,000-a drop in the 
bucket of the more than 106 million people who lived in the United 
States-hardly a blaze of revolution "burning up the foundations of 
society.,,68 Nevertheless, the extraordinary use of executive power during 
peace time set a precedent-one not lost on Hoover. 
The Justice Department came off the Palmer raids with a less than 
pristine reputation. In 1924, Harlan Fiske Stone replaced Palmer as 
Attorney General. Determined to clamp down on domestic intelligence 
gathering, Stone demanded the BI Director's resignation, initiated an 
immediate review of all people working at the agency, and insisted that 
only "men of known good character and ability"-and preferably legal 
training-be given positions.69 He appointed Hoover as the new BI 
Director. The Bureau, however, retained the extensive dossiers it had built 
up from 1916 to 1924. Under pressure from the highest levels of the 
executive branch, the policy soon was reversed, allowing the FBI to 
continue wiretapping for national security reasons.70 
66 ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1 9 19-1920, at 213  
(Greenwood Press 1980) ( 1955). 
67 A. Mitchell Palmer, The Case Against the "Reds, " 63 FORUM 1 73, 1 74 ( 1920), 
available at http://chnm.gmu.edulcourseslhist409/palmer.html. 
68 THEODORE DRAPER, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 1 89 ( 1957) (CPU SA 
membership numbers). Population figure reflects U.S. Official Census Estimate for 1 920, 
http://www .tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttxlcensus.html (last visited June 9, 2006). 
69 Memorandum from Harlan Fiske Stone, Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to J. Edgar 
Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (May 13,  1 924), cited in NAT'L 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 59, at 1 57, available at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/ops/ci/docs/ci l /chap4.pdf. 
70 In 1 930, the Treasury Department's Bureau of Prohibition ("BP") merged with the BI. 
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On August 24, 1936, President Roosevelt met with Hoover to discuss 
"the question of the subversive activities in the United States, particularly 
fascism and communism.,,7 1 He wanted the Bureau to provide him with "a 
broad picture of the general movement and its activities as may affect the 
economic and political life of the country as a whole." Hoover sent a letter 
to all field offices ordering them "to obtain from all possible sources 
information concerning subversive activities being conducted in the United 
States by Communists, Fascists, representatives or advocates of other 
organizations or groups advocating the overthrow or replacement of the 
Government of the United States by illegal methods."n He established a 
procedure that provided for the systematic collection and reporting of 
information. Hoover emphasized the importance of secrecy, "in order to 
avoid criticism or objections which might be raised to such an expansion by 
either ill-informed persons or individuals having some ulterior motive." 
Wary of the legislative branch, he continued, "[cJonsequently, it would 
seem undesirable to seek any special legislation which would draw 
attention to the fact that it was proposed to develop a special counter­
espionage drive of any great magnitude.,,7 3 
Field offices, carefully shielding the Bureau's surveillance program 
from public scrutiny, obtained data from "public and private records, 
confidential sources of information, newspaper morgues, public libraries, 
employment records, school records, et cetera.,,7 4 Some information related 
to entirely lawful (and constitutionally-protected) activities. Child care 
centers, political re-election campaigns, Christian organizations, and the 
National Association for Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") all 
merited attention.75 
Although the BI at the time had halted its wiretapping, BP, which frequently intercepted 
electronic communications, continued to do so after the merger. The BI then changed its 
policy to bring the rest of the bureau into line with BP practices. Socialist Workers Party v. 
Attorney Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1 390 ( 1986). 
71 Socialist Workers Party, 642 F. Supp. at 1 375-76 (citing Memorandum from J. Edgar 
Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to all FBI field offices (Aug. 24, 1 936)). 
72 NAT'L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 59, at 1 6 1 ,  available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci l lchap4.pdf (citing Memorandum from J. Edgar 
Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to all FBI field offices (Sept. 5, 1 936)). 
73 ld. (citing Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 
enclosed with letter from Cummings to the President (Oct. 20,1938)). 
741d. at 179, available at http://www .fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci l lchap4.pdf (citing 
Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to all field offices 
(Dec. 6, 1 939)). 
75 See generally id. at 1 80-8 1 ,  available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci l l  
chap4.pdf. 
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As the Iron Curtain descended, Congress renewed its debate on the use 
of wiretaps. But communist fever had swept the U.S. By 1945, the Dias 
Committee, formed to look into subversive elements within the United 
States, had turned into a permanent standing Committee on Un-American 
Activities. And so bills attempting to regulate electronic wiretaps met with 
little success. When a prominent espionage case burst onto the national 
scene, Hoover's tactics appeared warranted. The case also brought into 
sharp relief the disparity between the requirements of criminal law 
surveillance and national security claims. Efforts by the Judiciary, 
however, to reign in the Executive met with little practical effect. 
Judith Coplon, the defendant in the case, embraced all things Soviet.76 
Upon graduation from Barnard College, she took a position with the Justice 
Department. DOJ quickly promoted her to the foreign agent registration 
department, where she had access to FBI reports on suspected subversives. 
Coplon began funneling the Bureau reports to the KGB. Her reports 
demonstrated uncanny insight into the Soviet Union. Hoover became 
suspicious and placed her under surveillance. The FBI arrested her with 
classified materials in her handbag and charged her with treason. 
Coplon's trial attracted national attention. Few bought her story on the 
stand: that Valentin Gubitchev, her KGB handler, had seduced her, while 
she, innocent in the ways of the world, fell victim to his attentions. The 
presence of classified documents she attributed to pressure from work and 
the need to catch up in the evenings. Sentenced to ten years, Coplon 
immediately flew to Manhattan for a second, joint conspiracy trial with 
Gubitchev. It quickly became clear that the FBI had conducted illegal 
wiretaps, and destroyed evidence, in violation of federal law. Although 
convicted and sentenced to fifteen years, the appeals court determined that 
the wiretap evidence against Coplon could not be admitted, and that her 
arrest without a warrant violated federal law. The court dismissed all 
charges. 
On the one hand, the case underscored the presence of subversives. 
On the other hand, it exposed Hoover's surveillance to the eye of the courts. 
But such judicial oversight proved ineffective. The Bureau continued to 
wiretap. 77 
Once again, in the early 1950s, the conflict between personal privacy 
and the Red threat came to a head. Outrage at inroads into the former, 
76 The following account is drawn from MARCIA MITCHELL & THOMAS MITCHELL, THE 
Spy WHO SEDUCED AMERICA: LIES AND BETRAYAL IN THE HEAT OF THE COLD WAR-THE 
JUDITH COPLON STORY (2002); Judith Coplon: American Spy for Soviets, 
http://www.angelfire.comlozilspy/Coplon.html (last visited June 9, 2005). 
77 WESTIN, supra note 1 6, at 177 .  
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expressed in the highest court in the land, however, fell on deaf ears. 
Justice Jackson wrote: 
Science has perfected amplifying and recording devices to become frightening 
instruments of surveillance and invasion of privacy, whether by the policeman, the 
blackmailer, or the busybody. That officers of the law would break and enter a home, 
secrete such a device, even in a bedroom, and listen to the conversation of the 
occupants for over a month would be almost incredible ifit were not admitted.78 
Herbert Brownell, who had become Attorney General in 1 953, 
responded to Jackson's remarks with a memorandum to the Director of the 
FBI that again illustrated executive disregard for the Judiciary: "I recognize 
that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations 
of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, 
may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest." 79 
Brownell then went one step further, announcing that new "emergency anti­
Communist" legislation would legalize electronic surveillance.8o The 
House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the matter, and the following 
year the Eisenhower Administration presented its bill. The Republican 
leader of the House, Charles Halleck, threw the gauntlet-all "loyal" 
citizens would see the Administration's proposal as an "anti-traitor bill.,,81  
2. Title III 
Despite executive efforts to steamroll Congress, concern at the extent 
to which law-abiding citizens (read legislators) fell subject to executive 
branch surveillance spurred a series of hearings. The Moss Subcommittee 
and the Senate Judiciary Committee led the charge. Then in 1 964, the 
Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures, headed 
by Senator Edward V. Long, began hearings. As evidence emerged, 
outrage swept the nation, and (although the private sale of surveillance 
devices soared) a consensus emerged from radical left to hard right that 
some sort of control ought to be imposed.82 President Johnson issued an 
unpublished memorandum, banning wiretapping; but, once again, he carved 
out an exception for national security.8 3 
78 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 1 28, 132 ( 1954). 
79 Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1391  ( 1986). 
80 WESTIN, supra note 1 6, at 1 8 1 .  
81 [d. at 1 82. 
82 [d. at 1 99-200. 
83 The Presidential memorandum, issued June 30, 1965, authorized wiretaps "in 
connection with investigations related to national security." Socialist Workers Party, 642 F. 
Supp. at 1 3 9 1 .  
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In 1967, the United States Supreme Court again weighed in on the 
issue. The Court struck down a New York surveillance statute on the 
grounds that it failed to include, inter alia, a requirement that the officer 
applying for the warrant believe that a particular offence had been or was 
about to be committed, or that the officer describe the property involved or 
conversations to be intercepted.84 
Six months later, the Court again spoke, creating a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.85 The Executive jumped on the bandwagon, giving 
lip service to the Court 's concern. But once again, it retained for itself the 
very exception that had led to such widespread use of wiretaps: national 
security. President Johnson announced in his 1967 State of the Union 
address: 
We should protect what Justice Brandeis called the 'right most valued by civilized 
men'-the right of privacy. We should outlaw all wire-tapping-public and private­
wherever and whenever it occurs, except when the security of the nation is at stake­
and only then with the strictest safeguards. We should exercise the full reach of our 
Constitutional powers to outlaw electronic "bugging" and "snooping.,,86 
The following year Congress introduced Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act. 87 
Title III, which went beyond the Supreme Court's decision, continues 
to govern the use of wiretaps for ordinary criminal law investigations. It 
created prior judicial authorization and established the circumstances under 
which an intercept order could be issued. The legislation required probable 
cause that a crime had been or was about to be committed. The 
communications to be intercepted had to be relevant to the particular 
offence. The officer applying for the warrant had to specify the person, 
location, description of communications, name of person requesting, and 
length of time, with a thirty day limit. Any extensions would be subject to 
earlier restrictions.88 Title III limited wiretaps to twenty-six specified 
84 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 4 1  ( 1967). The Court suggested that "roving" wiretaps 
would be unacceptable, that a warrant would have to be executed promptly, pursuant to a 
showing of probable cause and that the order would need to include a formal termination 
date so as not to leave the decision to the discretion of the officer. Id. at 59-60. The Court 
also suggested that exigent circumstances might be able to overcome the notice requirement. 
Id. at 60. 
85 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
86 President Lyndon Johnson, State of the Union Address (Jan. 1 0, 1 967), available at 
http://www .janda.orglpolitxts/State%200fOIo20Union%20Addresses/1 964-1 969%20Johnson/ 
LBJ67.html (emphasis added). 
87 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-3 5 1 ,  tit. III § 
802, 82 Stat. 2 12  (codified as amended at 1 8  U.S.C. §§ 25 10-20 (2000)). 
88 Id.;  see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, at 333. 
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crimes: including, inter alia, murder, kidnapping, extortion, gambling, 
counterfeiting, and drugs-all, coincidentally, activities associated with 
terrorist organizations. Importantly, Title III made wiretaps harder to obtain 
than ordinary search warrants. The warrant had to indicate that normal 
investigative procedures would not suffice. Nevertheless, and relevant to 
our current discussion, Congress specifically excepted national security, 
leaving such investigations firmly in the executive domain.89 
In a landmark decision handed down four years later, and another 
attempt by the Judiciary to reign in the executive branch, the Supreme 
Court held that Title III did not authorize the Executive to engage in 
electronic surveillance for national security purposes; rather, it simply 
reflected congressional neutrality.90 This left the Court open to consider 
whether warrantless domestic wiretapping for national security fell within 
the constitutional remit of the Executive. The Court determined that it did 
not. While the duty of the state to protect itself had to be weighed against 
"the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual 
privacy and free expression,'.91 such "Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot 
properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted 
solely within the discretion of the executive branch.,,92 
Justice Jackson, again writing for the Court, recognized that executive 
officers could hardly be regarded as neutral and disinterested: "Their duty 
and responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prosecute . .  
. . [T]hose charged with this . . .  duty should not be the sole judges of when 
to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.,,93 He 
highlighted the dangers: "[U]nreviewed executive discretion may yield too 
readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential 
invasions of privacy and protected speech.,,9 4 Domestic security 
surveillance thus did not fall under one of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement under the Fourth Amendment. 95 Jackson rejected the 
government's suggestion that national security matters were "too subtle and 
complex for judicial evaluation.,,96 Nor did he accept that "prior judicial 
approval will fracture the secrecy essential to official intelligence 
89 Omnibus Crime Control Act, § 802 (codified as amended at 1 8  U.S.C. § 25 1 1 (3)); see 
also PHILIPPA STRUM, PRIVACY: THE DEBATE IN THE US SINCE 1945 141-44 ( 1 998). 
90 United States v. U. S.  Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972). 
91 Id. at 3 14- 15 .  
92 Id. at 3 16- 17 .  
93 Id. at 3 1 7  (internal citation removed). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 320. 
96 /d. 
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gathering.,,97 The former would suggest that such surveillance might not be 
warranted in the first place; the latter had long been an aspect of ordinary 
criminal activity. 
Once again, the executive branch largely ignored this decision. 
Wiretapping of domestic individuals and organizations under the guise of 
national security continued. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, National 
Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and Department of Defense 
all held their course. While much has been written about the executive 
excesses that occurred during this time, I briefly discuss a handful to 
underscore the breadth and depth of the abuses that occurred under the 
Executive's  Article II claims. 
3. Executive Excess 
The salient point to be drawn from the excesses that principally 
occurred between 1 945 and 1 975 is that surveillance, conducted under the 
auspices of national security, became an instrument of political power. 
Each operation began as a limited inquiry and gradually extended to capture 
more information from a broader range of individuals and organizations. 
Each targeted American citizens. And each remained insulated, until the 
Church hearings, from congressional or judicial oversight. 
a. NSA: Operation SHAMROCK and MINARET 
Operation SHAMROCK began in World War II, when the military 
placed censors at RCA Global, ITT World Communications, and Western 
Union International. Keen to maintain the flow of intelligence at the close 
of the war, DOD told the companies to continue forwarding intercepts, 
assuring them that they would be exempt from criminal liability or public 
exposure as long as Truman remained in the White House. From 1 949 until 
1 975 the project continued (from 1952 under the control of the National 
Security Agency) without the knowledge of subsequent Presidents. To 
keep the project under the radar, NSA deliberately refrained from 
formalizing the relationship in any sort of (traceable) document.98 By the 
1 970s, from the magnetic tapes that recorded all telegraph traffic, the NSA 
was selecting approximately 1 50,000 messages per month for its analysts to 
read and circulate. 
97 Id. 
98 See Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Agencies, 94th Congo Vol. 5 ( 1975) [hereinafter Church Committee 
Vol. 5]. 
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Operation SHAMROCK put the government in the position of asking 
private industry to break the law, not execute it. The United States Code 
prohibited the interception or decryption of diplomatic codes or messages.99 
It also outlawed the transfer of information "concerning the communication 
intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government" to 
unauthorized persons. 100 The law required the President to designate 
individuals engaged in communications intelligence activities. Yet from 
1949 forward, no President was even aware that the companies and their 
executives surveilled all telegraphs entering, leaving, or circulating within 
the United States. The project also stands out in creating a political interest 
in the companies to guarantee that certain administrations remained in 
office, thus ensuring that criminal prosecution would not follow. 
While Operation SHAMROCK represented a broad, information­
gathering effort, NSA also undertook a project that placed particular 
"individuals or organizations involved in civil disturbances, anti-war 
movements, [or] demonstrations" under surveillance.101 Project MINARET 
maintained a Top Secret classification, named agents only. The charter 
specified that although NSA instigated the project, it would not be 
identified with the operation.102 
The evolution of this program demonstrates the tendency of 
surveillance operations to expand. Initially, NSA focused on American 
citizens traveling to and from Cuba. The agency expanded the list to 
individuals believed to threaten the President. The FBI added domestic and 
foreign entities, saying that they were "extremist persons and groups, 
individuals and groups active in civil disturbances, and terrorists. ,, 103 The 
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs expanded the remit to include 
"the abuse of narcotics and dangerous drugS."I0 4 In 1 97 1 ,  the executive 
branch specifically requested that the NSA monitor international 
terrorism. 105 And so by 1 97 1 ,  the program extended to all criminal activity, 
99 An Act for the Protection of Governrnent Records, ch. 57, 48 Stat. 1 22 ( 1 933), (current 
version at 1 8  U.S.C. § 952 (2000)). 
100 An Act to Amend Certain Titles of the U.S. Code, Ch. 655, § 24(a), 65 Stat. 7 1 9  
( 1951)  (codified as amended at 1 8  U.S.c. § 798). 
101 Church Committee Vol. 5, supra note 98, at 150 (Charter for Sensitive SIGINT 
Operation Minaret (C)). 
102 [d. 
103 [d. at 1 2  (emphasis added). 
104 !d. (Memorandum from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to Dir., Nat'l 
Sec. Agency Fort George G. Meade, Md., Request for COMINT of Interest to Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ("BNDD")). 
105 [d. at 14. 
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as well as foreign support for or basing of, subversive activity.lo6 In 
October 1973, NSA tenninated the program, having placed hundreds of 
thousands of Americans engaged in constitutionally-protected political 
protest under surveillance. 107 
What makes this vast, expensive machinery of particular note is that it 
appears to have been relatively ineffective. When pressed repeatedly 
whether acts of terror in fact had been prevented, General Allen testified in 
Congress that only one event had been so disrupted. lOS Moreover, rather 
than information coming bottom-up (from the surveillance being conducted 
to concluding what threats faced the state), considerable pressure ran top­
down to find something linking foreign organizations to civil 
disturbances.109 Such pressure became a refrain played through many major 
intelligence gathering operations. 
b. FBI: COINTELPRO and the Security IndexiADEX 
NSA was not the only federal agency conducting surveillance. 
Without either the President or Attorney General 's knowledge, Hoover 's 
Federal Bureau of Investigation ran an operation code-named 
COINTELPRO.110 From 1 936 through 1 976, the FBI disrupted domestic 
organizations. I I I  In autumn 1 956, Hoover approved COINTELPRO­
CPUSA, under which the Bureau conducted more than 1,300 operations.112 
Six years later, FBI Headquarters initiated COINTELPRO-SWP, which 
106 Id. at 1 56 (Memorandum from Noel Gayler, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Nat'l Security 
Agency Director, to Sec'y of Defense and Attorney Gen. (Oct. I ,  1 973)). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 12-13 .  
109 Id. 
In the area[] of . . .  terrorism . . .  the emphasis placed by the President on a strong, coordinated 
Government effort was clearly understood. There also was no question that there was 
considerable Presidential concern and interest in determining the existence and extent of foreign 
support to groups fomenting civil disturbances in the United States. 
Id. at 13 (statement of General Allen). 
1 10 See Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Agencies, 94th Congo ( 1975); Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports 
of the Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans: Book III, Final Report of the 
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 
94th Congo ( 1976) [hereinafter Final Report]; see also COINTELPRO: THE FBI's SECRET 
WAR ON POLITICAL FREEDOM (Cathy Perkus ed., 1975). 
III Socialist Workers Party V. Attorney Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1376, 1 384, 1396 
(S.D.N.Y. 1 986). 
1 12 Id. at 1384-85. 
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carried out 46 operations. I 13  And in 1968, COINTELPRO-New Left began, 
introducing a further 285 operations. I 14 
These programs involved a wide range of activities aimed at left­
leaning organizations and the anti-war movement: the FBI provided 
leaders' past criminal records and "derogatory material regarding . . .  
marital status" to the media; it sent anonymous letters to exacerbate racial 
tension; and, it made false claims about members of the organizations. I I S  
The Bureau distributed fake newspapers on campuses. It contacted the 
Better Business Bureau in New York City with untrue allegations to 
interrupt organizations' fundraising efforts. 116 The FBI "caused antiwar 
activists to be evicted from their homes; disabled their cars; intercepted 
their mail; wiretapped and bugged their conversations . . .  prevented them 
from renting facilities for meetings; incited police to harass them for minor 
offenses; sabotaged and disrupted peaceful demonstrations; and instigated 
physical assaults against them.,,1 \7 The FBI conducted interrogations to 
"enhance the paranoia in [Leftist] circles and . . . to get the point across 
there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox."l l s The organization extended 
its interviews to the workplace, where it questioned supervisors, as well as 
religious organizations and neighborhoods. 
These disruptive actions complemented general surveillance of groups 
considered a threat to the state. As with Operations SHAMROCK and 
MINARET, the number of people targeted gradually expanded. Initially 
the FBI focused on just CPUSA. The list soon grew to include the Socialist 
Workers Party. In 1964, the Bureau added the KKK and other Aryan 
organizations. By 1965, the civil rights movement had become a focus, 
with leading figures such as Martin Luther King, and organizations such as 
the NAACP coming within the Bureau's remit. In the late 1960s, the FBI 
further extended its list to include "Black Nationalist" groups, such as the 
Southern Christian Leadership Council, the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee ("SNCC"), and the Nation of Islam. I 19 Prominent 
1 13 [d. 
1 14 [d. at 1 384. 
1 1 5 [d. at 1385-88. 
1 16 [d. at 1 388. 
1 17 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION 
ACT OF 1 798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 490 (2004). 
1 1 8  Socialist Workers Party, 642 F. Supp. at 1389. 
1 19 The Southern Christian Leadership Council was founded in 1 957 and led by Martin 
Luther King. In 1 960, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee formed and began 
focusing on non-violent actions, particularly in the south, to protest white domination. See 
Clayborne Carson, Civil Rights Movement, http://liberationcornrnunity.stanford.edui 
clayarticles/enc_oCam_const.htm (last visited June 9, 2006). Clayborne Carson, Civil 
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leaders-H. Rap Brown (a member of the SNCC and later member of the 
Black Panthers), Elijah Muhammad (a member of the Nation of Islam), and 
Malcolm X (a member of the Nation of Islam until his 1964 founding of the 
Organization of Afro-American Unitykame under twenty-four/seven 
observation. The FBI also became suspicious of all "dissident" parties 
within the Democratic block, such as Students for a Democratic Society 
(SDS). 1 20 Although, after an extensive investigation, the Bureau concluded 
that the Communist Party was not behind the anti-war movement, the FBI 
continued to attend and record teach-ins and anti-war rallies. 1 2 1 
Successive presidential directives provided general authority for the 
FBI to conduct investigations into espionage and sabotage. However, the 
manner in which the Bureau carried out such investigations involved 
outright violations of American law. The Socialist Workers ' Party 
("SWP"), which first came under Hoover 's eye in 1940, provides a salient 
example. 
The SWP based its political aims on the writings of Karl Marx, V.1. 
Lenin and Leon Trotsky.1 22 Article II of its constitution called for "the 
abolition of capitalism through the establishment of a Workers and Farmers 
Republic.,,12 3 The organization sought what it considered a democratically 
elected government: a series of elected local councils which would then 
elect the central government. The organization supported the freedom to 
form political parties. It also advocated "basic individual rights and 
freedoms such as freedom of speech and religion and due process of 
law.,,1 2 4 This put the organization at odds with Trotskyist and Marxist 
organizations in the Soviet Union, which the SWP faulted for adopting a 
totalitarian regime. While the organization embraced the current electoral 
process as the mechanism for reform, the ultimate goal was to bring about a 
revolution, where the ruling classes would use violence, forcing those 
Rights Movement, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 41 1 - 12  (Leonard W. 
Levy et al. eds. 2000). Nation of Islam was a black, religious organization, founded in 1930 
and led by Elijah Muhammad. See Claude A. Clegg, Message from the Wilderness of North 
America: Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam, c. 1 960, I 1. MULTIMEDIA HIST. I 
(1988), available at http://www .albany.eduljmmh/vol l nollelijahmuhammad.html. 
120 Tom Hayden founded SDS in 1 959. It symbolized the break and creation of the 
"New Left." A Kent State protest led by the SDS gave rise to severe National Guard actions 
that further divided the country. After a number of splinter groups broke off from the 
organization, a power struggle for control emerged. By 1 972, the organization ceased to 
operate. See Old American Red Groups, http://reds.linefeed.orglpast.html (last visited June 
9, 2006). 
12 1 See STONE, supra note 1 17, at 488. 
122 Socialist Workers Party, 642 F. Supp. at 1364. 
123 !d. at 1369. 
124 Id. at 1369-io. 
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subjected to take up arms in defense--essentially, a transformation of the 
state. 
This goal, however, did not mean that the organization was engaged in 
violence. SWP leaders stated in court that terrorism contradicted their 
central philosophy, as "it distracts attention and efforts from the 
development of a mass movement, and also subjects the militants to police 
action and loss of life.,,125 The SWP repeatedly criticized terrorist attacks, 
such as the 1972 Black September attack on Israeli Olympians, and the 
assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister two years later. It did not 
undertake violent actions. In more than thirty years of intense surveillance, 
not one prosecution of any member occurred. On the contrary, a 
considerable amount of evidence indicated that the organization spent 
extensive time discussing and debating Marxist economic and social theory, 
the war in Vietnam, the plight of agricultural workers in California, and the 
civil rights movement. As the district court noted, "[a]ll of the above are 
unquestionably lawful political activities, which a group such as the SWP 
has a clear constitutional right to carry out.,,126 
For thirty-six years the Bureau kept the SWP under strict surveillance. 
In the process the FBI committed more than 204 burglaries. Agents broke 
into SWP and Young Socialist Alliance offices in New York, Newark, 
Chicago, Detroit, Boston, and Milwaukee, as well as members ' homes in 
Detroit, Newark, Hamden (Connecticut), and Los Angeles. 1 27 "Black bag" 
jobs-the Bureau's short-hand for break-ins in which they stole or 
photocopied papers-yielded 9,864 documents. 128 These contained 
information that ranged from the group 's activities, finances, and legal 
matters, to members ' personal lives. These break-ins also allowed the FBI 
to hide surveillance devices. Between 1943 and 1963, agents conducted 
approximately 20,000 wiretap days and 12,000 electronic bug days on the 
SWP alone.129 The FBI clearly knew that the break-ins violated the law. 
An internal memorandum dated July 19, 1966 noted: 
We do not obtain authorization for 'black bag' jobs from outside the Bureau. Such a 
technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal; therefore, it would be impossible to 
obtain any legal sanction for it. Despite this, 'black bag' jobs have been used because 
they represent an invaluable technique in combating subversive activities of a 
clandestine nature aimed directly at undermining and destroying our nation. 1 30 
125 Id. at 1 373. 
1 26 Id. at 1 375. 
127 Id. at 1 394. 
128 Id. at 1 393. 
129 Id. at 1 389. 
130 Id. at 1 394. 
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In order to get past the legal issues, the FBI followed what it called a 
"Do Not File" procedure : the Special Agent in Charge prepared an infonnal 
record of all black bag operations, which he placed in his personal safe. 
Bureau Inspectors would then read the memorandum and destroy it.131 
Outside of direct surveillance, the FBI ran approximately 1,300 
infonnants, most of who were paid to gather additional infonnation. 132 The 
Bureau obtained some 12,600 additional documents in this manner. These 
papers included membership lists, financial records, financial budgets and 
projections, minutes of meetings, mailing lists, and correspondence. 133 
Infonnants further provided the Bureau with records on what occurred at 
the meetings, and personal infonnation on the members and their families, 
such as "marital or cohabitational status, marital strife, health, travel plans, 
and personal habits.,,13 4 In more than thirty years, out of 1,300 sources, and 
thousands of reports and documents, not a single informant reported any 
instance of "planned or actual espionage, violence, terrorism or [efforts] to 
subvert the governmental structure of the United States.,, 135 Nevertheless, 
the FBI paid SWP members to disrupt operations, directing them to 
discourage recruitment, lower dues, and diminish contribution levels.136 
In 1973, the SWP filed suit against the Attorney General. Complicated 
by the DOl's efforts to maintain strict secrecy under the claim of national 
security, the case took thirteen years to reach the Supreme Court. Much of 
the information about these programs has emerged in the years since. At 
the time they were being conducted, the public had no idea of their extent 
until the Citizens' Commission to Investigate the FBI (an anti-war group) 
broke into an FBI office and took roughly one thousand pages of 
confidential information.137 In April 197 1, Hoover announced the cessation 
of COINTELPRO. Despite this announcement, and the FBI's claim that it 
had tenninated "domestic security" break-ins, such actions continued.138 
131 Id. at 1395. The Bureau also maintained a "JUNE mail" system, where documents 
were placed in a "Special File Room." See Athan G. Theoharis, FBI Surveillance: Past and 
Present, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 883, 888 ( 1984). 
132 Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 444 U.S. 903, 903 (1979) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
133 Socialist Workers Party, 642 F. Supp. at 1 382. 
134 /d. at 1 379. 
135 Id. at 1380. 
136 Id. at 1382. 
137 STONE, supra note 1 17, at 494-95. 
138 Theoharis, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 884-85. In 1 978, for example, criminal prosecutors 
indicted previous Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray, Acting FBI Associate Director W. 
Mark Felt, and FBI Assistant Director Edward Miller for authorizing burglaries during the 
Bureau's investigation of the Weather Underground. At the trial, memos encouraged the use 
2006] PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE 1087 
The Bureau complemented COINTELPRO with other programs. 
Starting in 1940, the FBI maintained a list of citizens for potential detention 
without trial. In 1943, Attorney General Francis Biddle, aware of the 
absence of any congressional authorization for the list, ordered its 
termination. Hoover, however, ignored the Attorney General and simply 
renamed the Custodial Detention List the "Security Index."J39 In 1949, the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense agreed to an Emergency 
Detention Plan based on the directory. Although Congress specifically 
passed legislation in 1950 to govern the potential detention of American 
citizens at a time of national emergency, 1 40 the Attorney General told 
Hoover to ignore the new law. The FBI 's list, which by then numbered 
some 19,577, went well beyond the limits established by Congress.1 41 And 
it had important and very real consequences: every forty-five days the FBI 
interviewed the landlords and employers of every person on it. 1 42 This 
created social pressure on those suspected of disloyalty-not only an inroad 
into individual privacy, but an act with important implications for citizens' 
freedom of speech, movement and association. In 1971, the DOJ renamed 
the Security Index the "Administrative Index" ("ADEX"). It broadened the 
number of names on it to include anyone involved in civil disturbances. 
The Church Hearings in 1976 uncovered the existence of ADEX, prompting 
the FBI to discontinue it. 
c. CIA: Operation CHAOS 
Like the NSA and the FBI, the CIA also ran a domestic 
counterintelligence project, code-named Operation CHAOS. It grew from 
pressure placed by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations to find a link 
between the anti-war movement and overseas actors. 1 43 Although the CIA 
issued four formal reports to Johnson and one to Nixon, denying any 
connection, political pressure to find ties between domestic and foreign 
entities continued.l 4 4 In the process of gathering data, the CIA placed more 
than 300,000 American citizens under surveillance. 1 45 An average of one 
of "innovative techniques"-a euphemism, the government admitted, which meant break­
ins. Id. at 884-85. 
139 Final Report, supra note 1 10. When Truman took office, the FBI told the new 
Attorney General, Tom Clarke, about the file. He offered no objection. Socialist Workers 
Party, 642 F. Supp. at 1 395. 
140 Emergency Detention Act, 50 U.S.C. tit. II §§ 8 1 1-26 (2000). 
141 Socialist Workers Party, 642 F. Supp. at 1 395. 
142 !d. at 1 395. 
143 Church Committee Vol. 5, supra note 98; see also STONE, supra note 1 1 7, at 488. 
144 STONE, supra note 1 17, at 490-91 .  
145 THE ROCKEFELLER COMM'N, REpORT TO TH E  PRESIDENT B Y  TH E  COMMISSION ON CIA 
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thousand individual reports per month flowed from the CIA to the FBI. 
The CIA also shared specific information with the White House. Like the 
FBI with respect to "black bag" jobs, the Agency was entirely aware that its 
actions pushed legal bounds. In the midst of the operation, Director of 
Central Intelligence Richard Helms wrote to the White House, "this is an 
area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how 
extremely sensitive this makes the paper.,,1 46 Nevertheless, the Attorney 
General consistently claimed that, under his Article II authority, the 
President had the power to authorize electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens 
without court order. 1 47 Efforts to challenge Operation CHAOS in court hit a 
brick wall: because the information had been classified at the highest level, 
claimants could not gain access to demonstrate that particular individuals 
had been targeted. 1 48 
CHAOS was only one of a variety of surveillance programs run by the 
CIA at that time. For example, in 1967, Project MERRIMAC, aimed at 
protecting CIA employees and facilities against anti-war protestors, 
infiltrated and monitored a number of anti-war organizations, such as SDS 
and the Women's Strike for Peace. The same year Project RESISTANCE 
began to compile information on radical organizations in the United States, 
bringing more than 12,000 individuals, mostly students, under 
surveillance. 1 49 
d. DOD: Operation CONUS 
The military, for its part, also conducted surveillance. Operation 
CONUS maintained files on more than 100,000 political activists and 
orchestrated data exchange between some 350 military posts. The list of 
targets included Senators Adlai Stevenson, III, J. William Fulbright, and 
Eugene McCarthy, Congressman Abner Mikva, singer Joan Baez, and civil 
rights leader Martin Luther King, as well as civil liberties organizations, 
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES ( 1975). 
146 STONE, supra note 1 1 7, at 493. 
147 The government claimed, e.g., that: 
[A Jny President who takes seriously his oath to 'preserve and protect' and defend the 
constitution will no doubt determine that it is not unreasonable to utilize electronic surveillance 
to gather intelligence information concerning those organizations which are committed to the use 
of illegal methods to bring about changes in our form of government and which may be seeking 
to foment violent disorders. 
JASON EpSTEIN, GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL 1 1 1 - 1 2  ( 1970). Epstein goes on to paraphrase the 
government's claim that where national security is at stake, it is the Executive, not the 
Judiciary, which interprets the law. Id. 
148 See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1 982). 
149 STONE, supra note 1 1 7, at 49 1 .  
2006] PRIVA CY AND SURVEILLANCE 1089 
such as the ACLU, Americans for Democratic Action, the NAACP, the 
American Friends Service Committee, and the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference.150 Army intelligence agents attended meetings and 
submitted reports to headquarters, describing the name of the organization, 
date of the gathering, speakers, attendees, and whether a disorder occurred. 
The army drew from open sources and law enforcement databases. The 
substance of the reports ranged from targets ' political views to their sex 
lives and financial conditions. 15 1 
In early 1970, the Senate weighed in. The Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held 
hearings on the degree to which the military engaged in domestic 
surveillance. As Congress turned up the heat, the army began its own, 
internal review, the result of which was the suspension ofthe blacklist. 1 52 
In 1972, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of this 
program. 153 Chief Justice Berger, writing for the Court, indicated that 
surveillance alone, particularly when drawn from open source material, did 
not prove a chilling effect on First Amendment activities. The claimants 
had not demonstrated any illegal wiretap or electronic bugging, breaking 
and entering, or concrete damage.15 4  Justice William O. Douglas, in a 
vigorous dissent, wrote: 
The act of turning the military loose on civilians even if sanctioned by an Act of 
Congress, which it has not been, would raise serious and profound constitutional 
questions. Standing as it does only on brute power and Pentagon policy, it must be 
repudiated as a usurpation dangerous to the civil liberties on which free men are 155 dependent. 
CONUS used undercover agents to infiltrate civilian groups and open 
confidential files. Stealth and secrecy, coupled with cameras and electronic 
ears, allowed the army to gather information, which it then distributed back 
to civilian law enforcement agencies. Douglas thundered, 
[t]his case involves a cancer in our body politic. It is a measure of the disease which 
afflicts us . . . .  The Constitution was designed to keep government off the backs of 
the people. The Bill of Rights was added to keep the precincts of belief and 
150 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. I ( 1 972); STONE, supra note 1 1 7, at 493. 
15 1 STONE, supra note 1 17, at 487; see also ATHAN THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: 
POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE FROM HOOVER TO THE HUSTON PLAN (1978). 
152 Laird, 408 U.S. at 7-8 (discussing the letter from the Under Secretary of the Army to 
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 
announcing a change in army policy). 
153 See id. at 1-40. 
154 Id. at I I . 
155 Id. at 24 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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expression, of the press, of political and social activities free from surveillance. The 
Bill of Rights was designed to keep agents of government and official eavesdroppers 
away from assemblies of people. The aim was to allow men to be free and 
independent and to assert their rights against government. There can be no influence 
more paralyzing of that objective than Army surveillance. 156 
CONUS did not represent the first time the military had gathered 
extensive information on civilians. An amicus curiae filed by a group of 
former army intelligence agents claimed that "[a]rmy intelligence has been 
maintaining an unauthorized watch over civilian political activity for nearly 
thirty years." The brief referred to the Corps of Intelligence Police actions 
from 19 17 to 1924, when a massive surveillance operation "involved the 
use of hundreds of civilian informants, the infiltration of civilian 
organizations and the seizure of dissenters and unionists, sometimes 
without charges.,, 1 57 The agents continued, "[t]hat activity was opposed­
then as nOW-by civilian officials on those occasions when they found out 
about it, but it continued unabated until postwar disarmament and 
economies finally eliminated the bureaucracy that conducted it.,, 158 
4. The Church Committee 
The programs described above do not represent the only surveillance 
operations underway. For instance, in 1969, President Richard Nixon, 
concerned that tax-exempt funding assisted anti-government groups, 
pressed the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to create its own surveillance 
arm to "collect relevant information on organizations predominantly 
dissident or extremist in nature and on people prominently identified with 
these organizations.,, 1 59 By 1974, the Activist Organizations Committee 
(renamed the Special Services Staff) had 2,873 organizations and 8,585 
people on file. The IRS distributed this information to the FBI, Secret 
Service, Army Intelligence, and the White House. The IRS conducted 
targeted audits and investigations of those on its list. 160 
In 1970, the Treasury Department initiated a program to obtain 
citizens' library records. What began as a single Treasury visit to the 
Milwaukee Public Library to determine who had read books on explosives 
soon burgeoned into similar moves in Richmond, California, Cleveland, 
156 Id. at 28 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
157 Id. at 27 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for A Group of Former Army 
Intelligence Agents as Amici Curiae at 29-30, Laird, 408 U.S. 1 (No. 7 1 -288)). 
158 Id. at 27-28 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for A Group of Former Army 
Intelligence Agents, supra note 157). 
159 STONE, supra note 1 17, at 493. 
160 Id. 
2006] PRIVA CY AND SURVEILLANCE 1091 
Ohio, and Atlanta, Georgia. The American Library Association ("ALA") 
Executive Board immediately issued a statement affirming its commitment 
to keeping records confidential. 161 It directed librarians to resist federal 
trawling missions until a court of competent jurisdiction found good cause. 
The ALA later extended confidentiality to "database search records, 
interlibrary loan records, and other personally identifiable uses of library 
materials, facilities, or services.,,162 Although the FBI continued to try to 
access library records, the ALA stood firm.16 3 In support of the ALA, 
thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia passed statutes to prevent 
the Executive from gaining access to readers ' records.l6 4 
As rumors about these and other projects began to circulate, Congress 
entered the ring. Between 1965 and 1974, the legislature held forty-seven 
hearings and issued reports on privacy-related issues.165 Senator Frank 
Church's hearings between 1973 and 1976 stood out amongst these, 
becoming symbols of the era. From assassination to covert operations, the 
proceedings shed light on the darkest comers of the executive branch. 
Not everyone, though, felt such inquiry to be appropriate. In words 
that echo today's counterterrorist discussions in Congress, Senator Tower 
asserted, 
we are confronted in this world by a very powerful adversary that would not hesitate 
to resort to military means to achieve its political objectives. A powerful adversary 
that itself, through its clandestine activities and overt activities, generates military 
activity all over the world . . . thereby jeopardizing the peace and security of 
everybody . . . .  [W]e cannot draw this in strict terms of war and peace, in terms of 
whether or not the United States is actually at war. We are in effect in a war of 
sorts. 166 
Indeed, the tone of the hearings was, at times, almost apologetic for daring 
to ask questions. Concern centered on attempting to "balance the right to 
privacy against the need for national security.,,167 
161 OFFICE FOR INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, AM. LIB RARY ASS'N, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
MANUAL 1 54-55 (5th ed. 1996) [hereinafter ALA MANUAL] ; see also HERBERT FOERSTAL, 
SURVEILLANCE IN THE STACKS: THE FBI ' s  LIBRARY AWARENESS PROGRAM ( 1991). 
162 AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, POSITION STATEMENT ON THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF LIBRARY 
RECORDS, available at http://www.ala.org/alaJaasVaasIProftOOIS/Positionstatements/aasi 
positionstatementconfidentiality.htm. 
163 The "Library Awareness Program" was an FBI effort to recruit library staff to aid in 
surveillance of Soviet use of technology information in libraries. See Anne Klinefelter, The 
Role of Librarians in Challenges to the USA PATRIOT Act, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 2 1 9, 223 
(2004). 
164 STRUM, supra note 89, at 1 5 1 .  
165 Id. at 1 50-5 1 .  
166 Church Committee Vo!' 5, supra note 98, at 64. 
167 Id. at 65. 
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While cognizant of these reservations, the Church Committee 
persevered. It found that the Executive had undertaken covert surveillance 
of citizens purely on the basis of political beliefs, even when such ideas 
posed no threat of violence or illegal actions.168 
The Executive responded to the Church Committee 's findings with a 
series of actions to curb surveillance. In 1976, President Ford banned the 
NSA from intercepting telegraphs. He also forbade the CIA from 
conducting electronic or physical surveillance of American citizens. The 
new FBI director, Clarence Kelly, publicly apologized for the Hoover 
era.169 Attorney General Edward Levi, like Harlan Fiske Stone after the 
Red Scare in 1920, introduced guidelines that required the FBI to have 
"specific and articulable facts" indicating criminal activity before opening 
an investigation. Although they lacked legal force, the guidelines could 
serve in a judicial setting as a way to calibrate the organization's actions.I7O 
Each one of these protections has now been eliminated. I will return to this 
in Part J.D. 
Although the Executive also made noise about wanting to protect 
privacy more generally, subsequent legislation introduced by the Nixon 
Administration, to put it mildly, lacked teeth.17 I The Privacy Act ostensibly 
regulated the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of citizens' 
personal data.172 The statute allowed the CIA to exempt its files from any 
legal requirement to provide citizens access.173 Any agency with law 
168 The Committee continued, 
[t]he Government, operating primarily through secret informants . . .  has swept in vast amounts 
of information about the personal lives, views, and associations of American citizens. 
Investigations of groups deemed potentially dangerous-and even of groups suspected of 
associating with potentially dangerous organizations-have continued for decades, despite the 
fact that those groups did not engage in unlawful activity . . . .  FBI headquarters alone has 
developed over 500,000 domestic intelligence file. 
Final Report, supra note 1 10, at 5-6. 
169 STONE, supra note 1 17, at 496. 
170 James Q. Wilson, The Case/or Greater Vigilance, TIME, May I ,  1995, at 73; see also 
STONE, supra note 1 1 7, at 496-97. 
171 During the Church Hearings, President Nixon appointed a Domestic Council 
Committee on the Right of Privacy. He gave the committee four months to draft "direct, 
enforceable measures." Vice President Ford, who chaired the committee, objected strongly 
to a number of Senators' calls for the creation of a Federal Privacy Board. Instead, he 
backed the conclusions of a 1973 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare report, 
"Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens," which proposed a "code of fair 
information practices." STRUM, supra note 89, at 1 52-56. 
172 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
173 GINA MARIE STEVENS, AM. LAW Drv., PRIVACY: TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS 
PROGRAMS AND RELATED INFORMATION ACCESS, COLLECTION, AND PROTECTION LAWS 6 
(2003). 
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enforcement, prosecution, or probation activities could exempt 
identification information, criminal investigative materials, and reports 
assembled between arrest and release. 17 4 Moreover, any national security 
information held by any agency could be exempted, as well as any Secret 
Service files, or law enforcement material. 175 The statute allowed data to be 
shared within and between government agencies.176 Although the kind of 
information that could be obtained had to be gathered for a lawful purpose, 
what constituted a "lawful purpose" was left up to the agency. Citizens 
could request information about files on themselves, but the legislation 
failed to include any timeframe for a response. Congress left the 
implementation of the legislation to an understaffed, under-funded Office of 
Management and Budget ("OMB,,).177 
With these gaping holes, not surprisingly, a commission appointed in 
1977 by President Jimmy Carter found that the difficulty with the Privacy 
Act was "that agencies have taken advantage of its flexibility to contravene 
its spirit.,, 178 The review added, "[t]he Act ignores or only marginally 
addresses some personal-data record-keeping issues of major importance 
now and for the future.,, 179 Consequently, the legislation "has not resulted 
in the general benefits to the public that either its legislative history or the 
prevailing opinion as to its accomplishments would lead one to expect.,,180 
In 1986, the United State 's General Accounting Office ("GAO") similarly 
reported on the poor implementation of the Privacy ACt.181 The DOJ noted 
in 2004, "[t]he Act 's imprecise language, limited legislative history, and 
somewhat outdated regulatory guidelines have rendered it a difficult statute 
to decipher and apply. Moreover, even after more than twenty-five years of 
administrative and judicial analysis, numerous Privacy Act issues remain 
unresolved or unexplored.,, 182 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b); see also Stevens, supra note 1 73, at 7. 
m STRUM, supra note 89, at 1 53. 
178 PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE REpORT OF THE PRIVACY 
PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION (transmitted to President Jimmy Carter on July 12, 1977), 
available at http://www.epic.orglprivacy/ppscI 977report! c l .htm. 
179 Id. at 4. 
1 80 Id. 
181 STRUM, supra note 89, at 1 53-54. 
182 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (2004), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foialI974intro.htm; see also STRUM. supra note 89. at I54-56. 
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5. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
As the extent of the domestic surveillance operations emerged, 
Congress attempted to scale back the Executive's  power while leaving 
some flexibility to address national security threats. I S3 The legislature 
focused on the targets of surveillance, limiting a new law to foreign 
powers, and agents of foreign powers-which included groups "engaged in 
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.,,1 84 Congress 
distinguished between U.S. and non-U.S. persons, creating tougher 
standards for the former. 1 85 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
("FISA") considered any "acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other 
surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication," as 
well as other means of surveillance, such as video, to fall under the new 
restrictions. 186 Central to the statute's  understanding of surveillance was 
that, by definition, consent had not been given by the target. Otherwise, the 
individual would have a reasonable expectation of privacy and, under 
ordinary circumstances, the Fourth Amendment would require a warrant. I S7 
FISA provided three ways to initiate surveillance: Attorney General 
Certification, application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
("FISC"), and emergency powers. Of these, the second serves as the 
principal means via which surveillance is conducted. 1 8s 
183 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1 978, Pub. L. No. 95-5 1 1 , tit. 1 ,  § 1 02, 92 
Stat. 1 786 ( 1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.c. §§ 1801- 1 1  (2000» . 
1 84 50 U.S.C. § 1 801(a)(4). An agent of a foreign power is anyone, other than a U.S. 
person who, inter alia, "knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or 
activities that are in preparation therefore, for or on behalf of a foreign power." [d. § 
1 80 1 (b)(2)(C). "International terrorism" incorporated three elements: (a) acts dangerous to 
human life and in violation of criminal law; (b) the intent to influence government policy or 
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; and (c) acts that "occur totally outside the 
United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in 
which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum." [d. § 1 80 1 (c)(1 )-(3). 
185 The former included citizens and resident aliens, as well incorporated entities and 
unincorporated associations with a substantial number of U.S. persons. Non-U.S. persons 
qualified as an "agent of a foreign power" by virtue of membership--e.g., if they were an 
officer or employee of a foreign power, or if they participated in an international terrorist 
organization. /d. § 1 801(i). U.S. persons had to engage knowingly in the collection of 
intelligence contrary to U.S. interests, the assumption of false identity for the benefit of a 
foreign power, and aiding or abetting others to the same. [d. § 1 80 1 (b). 
186 [d. § 1 801(f)(1); see also id. § 1 80 1(f)(4); DANIEL BLINKA, ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE: COMMENTARIES AND STATUTES (2004). 
187 50 U.S.C. § 1 80 1  (f)( 1 )-(4). 
1 88 Under the first, the President, through the Attorney General, has the authority to 
collect information related to foreign intelligence---,.without judicial approval-for up to one 
year. The Attorney General must attest in writing, and under oath, that the electronic 
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Under this mechanism, to open surveillance on a suspect, the executive 
branch applies to FISC, a secret judicial body, for approval. 189 The 
application must provide the name of the federal officer requesting 
surveillance and the identity of the target (if known), or a description of the 
target. 1 90 It must include a statement of facts supporting the claim that the 
target is a foreign power (or an agent thereot) and that the facilities to be 
monitored are currently, or expected to be, used by a foreign power or her 
agent. 1 9 1  Probable cause must be presented that the individual qualifies as a 
foreign power and will be using the facilities surveilled. 1 92 The application 
must describe the "nature of the information sought and the type of 
communications or activities to be subjected to the surveillance." 
Importantly, the court is not required to determine that probable cause 
exists as to whether any foreign intelligence information will be 
uncovered. 193 The application requires a designated national security or 
surveillance will be directed at communications between foreign powers or from property 
under their control, that "no substantial likelihood" exists that a US person will be party to 
the communications, and that every effort will be made to minimize the acquisition, 
retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons. Id. § 1 802(a)(1 ), (h)(1 ), 
(a)(2). Under the third approach, emergency powers, where the Attorney General reasonably 
determines that "an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic 
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information," she must inform a judge that the 
decision has been made to engage in the activity. The Attorney General has twenty-four 
hours from the initiation of authorization to submit a full application. In the event that the 
application is ultimately denied, an exclusionary rule applies to any information gathered in 
the interim. Although the law requires that, in the event that the application is denied, notice 
be given to the target of emergency surveillance, such notice may be suspended for ninety 
days and, thereafter, indefinitely, subject to an ex parte showing of good cause. Id. § 
1 805(f), (j); id. § 1 8 1 1 .  
189 Following 9/1 1 ,  Congress expanded FISC, which initially consisted of seven United 
States' district judges from different circuits, to eleven judges, three of whom had to reside 
in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. 50 U.S.C. § 1 803(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004). The judges 
serve a maximum of seven years. Id. § 1803(d). Consistent with the original statute, three 
additional judges, all chosen by the Chief Justice, constitute a special review panel. Id. § 
1 803(b). Writs of certiorari can be submitted from this court to the Supreme Court. Id. 
Although initially only the President or Attorney General filed applications, in 1 979 
President Jimmy Carter issued an Executive Order extending the number of officials 
authorized to certify the application to the court to include the Secretary of State, Secretary 
of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence. Exec. Order No. 12 , 139, 44 Fed. Reg. 30,3 1 1  ( 1979). 
190 50 U.S.C. § 1 804(a)( I ), (3). 
191 Id. § 1 804(a)(4). 
192 Id. § 1 805(b). 
193 /d. § 1 804(a)(6). Here the FISA procedures depart from regular criminal law, which 
requires probable cause that the information sought will be obtained. See LAFAVE, supra 
note 15, at 364-65. 
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defense officer to certify that the information is related to foreign 
intelligence, and that "such information cannot reasonably be obtained by 
normal investigative techniques.,, 1 94 It must specify how the surveillance is 
to be affected (including whether physical entry is required). 195 It includes 
all previous applications involving the "persons, facilities, or places 
specified in the application, ' and actions taken by the court on these cases 
must accompany the app1ication. 196 The form includes an estimate of time 
required for surveillance and requires an explanation as to why authority 
should not terminate at the end of the requested period. 1 97 Finally, if more 
than one surveillance device is to be used, the applicant must address the 
minimization procedures and describe the range of devices to be 
employed. 198 In addition to this information, the judge may request 
additional data. 199 
In 1994, Congress amended the statute to allow for warrantless, covert 
physical searches (not just electronic communications' intercepts) when 
targeting "premises, information, material, or property used exclusively by, 
or under the open and exclusive control of, a foreign power or powers.,,200 
The statute requires that there be no substantial likelihood that the facilities 
targeted are the property of a U.S. person. 20 1 Applications must include the 
same information as for electronic surveillance.202 Twice a year the 
Attorney General informs Congress of the number of applications for 
physical search orders, the number granted, modified, or denied, and the 
number of physical searches that ensued?03 
In addition to the above powers, FISA provided the authority for the 
installation and use of pen register and trap and trace devices for 
international terrorism investigations.z°4 The Attorney General, or a 
designated attorney, must submit an application in writing and under oath 
either to the FISA court or to a United States Magistrate Judge specifically 
appointed by the Chief Justice to hear pen register or trap and trace 
194 Id. § 1 804(a)(7). 
195 ld. § 1 804(a)(8). 
196 ld. § 1 804( a )(9). 
197 Id. § 1 804(a)( lO). 
198 Id. § 1 804(a)(1 l ). 
199 Id. § 1 804(d). 
200 Id. § 1 82 1 (a)(I)(A)(i). 
201 !d. § 1822(a)(I)(A). 
202 Id. § 1 823. 
203 Id. § 1 826. 
204 Pen registers obtain the number dialed from a particular phone; trap and trace devices 
act as a caller ID record. Id. § 1 842(a)( l). 
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applications on behalf of the FISA COurt.205 The application must include 
information to show that the device has been, or will in the future be, used 
by someone who is engaging or has engaged in international terrorism or is 
a foreign power or agent thereof.206 Thus, a U.S. citizen, thought to be 
engaged in international terrorism, may be the target of the pen register or 
trap and trace device. No notice is required for individuals targeted under 
this power. The order can be granted for up to ninety days, with an 
additional ninety-day extension?07 As with electronic surveillance, in the 
event of an emergency the Attorney General can authorize the installation 
and use of a pen register or trap and trace device without judicial 
approva1.208 A proper application must be made to the appropriate authority 
within forty-eight hours?09 Information thus obtained can be used in court 
proceedings, although reasonable effort must be made to inform the target 
that the government "intends to so disclose or so use such information.,,2 10 
Despite the safeguards included in the requirements for FISA 
applications, a legitimate question could be raised · as to whether the court 
merely serves as a rubber stamp function. Between 1 979 and 2003, FISC 
only denied three out of 1 6,450 applications submitted by the executive 
branch. 2 1 1  Federal officials claim that this simply reflects the 
professionalism of the executive branch; an application that would not pass 
muster would simply be stopped before reaching the court.2 1 2  While this 
205 Id. § I S42(a)-(b). As with the application for electronic surveillance, the applicant 
must include the official's name seeking surveillance, as well as certification that "the 
infonnation likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence or 
international terrorism investigation." Id. § I S42(c)(I )-(2). 
206 Id. § I S42(c)(A). 
207 Id. § I S42(e). 
208 Id. § I S43(a). 
209 Id. § I S43(a)(2). 
210  Id. § I S45(c). Following the 9/1 1  attacks, Congress relaxed the requirement for 
factual proof: the applicant no longer must demonstrate why she believes the telephone line 
will be used by an individual engaged in international terrorism. Instead, the applicant must 
only demonstrate that the infonnation likely to be gained does not directly concern a U.S. 
person and that the infonnation will be relevant to protect against international terrorism. 
This provision, hotly contested by civil libertarians, was scheduled to sunset Dec. 3 1 ,  2005. 
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Proving Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act"), Pub. L. No. 1 07-56, § 2 15 ,  
1 1 5 Stat. 272 (codified as  amended at 50  U.S.c. § I S6 1  (2000 & Supp. 2001»  [hereinafter 
USA PATRIOT Act]; I S  U.S.c. § 2 14  (2000). Instead, Congress made it pennanent. See 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 1 09-1 77, § 1 02, 120 
Stat. 192 (2006). 
2 1 1  See generally Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, http://fas.orglirp/agency/doj/fisa 
(last visited June 9, 2006). Statistics compiled by author. 
212 Interview with Department of Justice officials, in S.F., Cal. (2003); in San Jose, Cal. 
1098 LA URA K. DONOHUE [Vol. 96 
ratio does not significantly depart from the number of requests denied for 
ordinary wiretap applications, considering the lowered standards of proof 
required, and the increasing tendency to use FISA for U.S. persons and 
criminal investigations, it presents trou1;>ling issues. 
Also of concern is the increasing use of these powers. Between 1 978 
and 1 995, the Executive made just over five hundred new applications per 
year. Since 1 995, however, the numbers have steadily grown, with a 
sudden burst in the post-9/1 1 era: in 2002, the number leapt to 1228 and in 
2003 to 1 727 applications. For the first time in history, in 2002 and 2003, 
DO] requested more wiretaps under FISA than under ordinary wiretap 
statutes. This suggests a significant shift in the executive government's 
strategy for gathering information. Under FISA, law enforcement must 
cross a much lower threshold, and is not subject to the same Fourth 
Amendment restrictions as in the ordinary criminal code. I will return to 
this in considering the impact of the USA PATRIOT Act and DOl's use of 
FISA as a tool in ordinary criminal prosecution. 
While FISA pushed back on the worst excesses of the McCarthy era, 
efforts by the Executive to obtain personal information continued. The next 
section details further expansions in the powers available. 
c. THE INFORMATION AGE 
The 1 970s signaled a sudden acceleration of telephony and digital 
technology. Public unease at inroads into privacy continued, but the 
Executive steadily chipped away at FISA.213 Under the banner of 
counterterrorism, the 1 994 Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act and the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act provided the state even 
greater access to information?14 
(2004); in N.Y., N.Y. (2005). 
2 1 3  See, e.g., Privacy and 1984: Public Opinions on Privacy Issues: Hearing Before a 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Congo 38 (1 984) (Southern 
New England Telephone submission) (citing increasing public concern with computer threat 
to privacy: 1974 = 38%, 1976 = 37%, 1977 = 41%, 1 978 = 54%). 
214 The 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act brought new technologies under 
the rules previously applied to telephones: the Wiretap Act, which extended authorities to 
cellular technologies, the Pen Register Act, and the Stored Communications Act. Pub. L. 
No. 99-508, 1 00 Stat. 1 848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18  U.S.c.). 
Two minor statutes provided some additional protection of personal data: the 1988 Video 
Privacy Protection Act prohibited video service providers from releasing data without either 
!i court order or consent from its customers. 1 8  U.S.C. § 27 1 0. The same year, the 
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act required that federal agencies create 
procedural agreements and Data Integrity Boards before exchanging information. 5 U.S.C. § 
552a. 
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1. 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
With the breakup of Ma Bell and the spread of digital technology and 
fiber optic networks, the FBI became increasingly concerned that it would 
not be able to trace or intercept certain forms of private communications.2 1 5  
In 1 99 1 ,  1 992, and 1993, the ACLU, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, and more than twenty 
communications companies, successfully beat back efforts by the FBI to 
introduce a Digital Telephony law.216  The FBI's Advanced Telephony Unit 
fought back, estimating that, by 1 995, some forty percent of intercepted 
communications would be encrypted.2 1 7  The GAO viewed the Bureau's 
initiative as unneeded and potentially detrimental to American 
competitiveness.2 1 8 In addition to general privacy concerns, numerous 
groups expressed concern that back doors would open the way for hackers 
to enter otherwise secure systems.2i9 But in 1994, the FBI triumphed. The 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") 
required telecommunication companies to create special access for the 
government. 220 
The FBI immediately tried to strengthen its new tool. Within a year, 
for instance, the FBI announced plans to require telecoms to be able to 
wiretap one out of a thousand calls in the U.S., and one out of hundred calls 
in major U.S. cities simultaneously.22l Fierce opposition erupted, forcing 
the Bureau to adopt a scaled-back capacity requirement. 222 The FBI called 
for cellular telecommunications companies to be able to pinpoint the precise 
location of a customer in less than a second.223 This regulation contradicted 
the plain language of the statute, which exempted from call-identifying 
215 From the 1 970s forward, the telephony field witnessed an accelerating trend towards 
electronic switches, digital processing, and optical transmission. As of 1 993, eighty percent 
of the switches were digital. These switches made it difficult for law enforcement to trace 
calls. See WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, Pruv ACY ON THE LINE : THE POLITICS OF 
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION ( 1 998); OFFICE OF TEcH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE, OTA-BP-ITC-149, at 29-30 ( 1 995). 
216 STRUM, supra note 89, at 1 6 1 .  
217 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 2 15, at 1 83.  
218  !d. at 1 84. 
219 !d. 
220 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.c. § 1 002 (2000). 
221 FBI Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 
Initial Notice, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,643 (Oct. 16,  1995); see also STRUM, supra note 89, at 1 62; 
DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 2 15, at 1 97. 
222 FBI Implementation of Section 1 04 of the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act, Final Notice of Capacity, 63 Fed. Reg. 12,2 1 8  (Mar. 1 2, 1 998); See also 
STRUM, supra note 89, at 1 62. 
223 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 2 1 5, at 1 97. 
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information any data "that may disclose the physical location of the 
subscriber (except as can be determined from the telephone number).,,224 
Left and Right in Congress agreed: the FBI was overreaching. In 
March 1 998, Republican Representative Bob Barr introduced a bill to delay 
CALEA's implementation.225 He complained that Congress intended the 
FBI to have "only a consultative role in the implementation of CALEA" 
and that the telecommunications industry "develop the technical standards 
necessary.,,226 The FBI, however, had stepped outside its consultative role, 
simultaneously trying to expand its power. Moreover: 
The capabilities proposed to be included by the FBI are costly, technically difficult to 
deploy or technically infeasible, and raise significant legal and privacy concerns . . . .  
The FBI is now threatening enforcement action and the denial of appropriate cost 
reimbursement to the industry if its proposed capabilities are not deployed by the 
. d 227 In ustry. 
In 2003, the FBI informed the FCC that Voice-over Internet Protocol 
("VoIP") consumed an increasing percentage of Internet traffic. Unwilling 
to risk the public wrath that would accompany even more inroads into the 
electronic realm, in March 2004, the FBI petitioned the FCC for expedited 
rulemaking, which would have expanded CALEA to the Internet. 228 In a 
joint statement that brought together such diverse bedfellows as the ALA, 
Sun Microsystems, Americans for Tax Reform, and the ACLU, those 
opposed asserted that it would be unlawful, unwise, and unnecessary to 
grant law enforcement' s  demands.229 The FCC tried to "compromise," by 
suggesting that CALEA only be applied to "managed" VoIP systems. In 
224 47 U.S.C. § 1 002(a)(2)(B). 
225 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act Implementation Amendments 
of 1 998, H.R. 3321 ,  1 05th Congo (2d Sess. 1 998), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi­
biniquery/z?c l 05 :H.R.332I .IH:. 
226 144 Congo Rec. H850 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Barr). 
227 Id. 
228 The document requested that the agency issue a Declaratory Ruling "that broadband 
access services and broadband telephony services [and push-to-talk 'dispatch' service) are 
subject to CALEA." Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve Various Outstanding Issues 
Concerning the Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement 
Act III (proposed Mar. 10, 2004) (submitted by John G. Malcom, Patrick W. Kelley, and 
Robert T. Richardson). 
229 Joint Statement of Industry and Public Interest, before the Federal Communications 
Commission, Washington, D.C., in the matter of Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve 
Various Outstanding Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, at 1 (proposed Apr. 27, 2004) (submitted by James X. 
Dempsey, John B. Morris, Jr., Lara M. Flint, and Bruce J. Heiman). The changes, moreover, 
would mean a significant alteration of the structure of the Internet. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, 
supra note 2 15, at 19. 
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addition to issues o f  privacy and precedent, this "solution" penalized 
companies jumping in the game early-a dynamic hitherto critical for the 
growth of the Internet. 
2. 2001 USA PATRIOTAct 
Six days after the 9/1 1  attacks, Representative James Sensenbrenner, 
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, stepped out of the shower at his 
home in Wisconsin and overheard a familiar voice on the television: John 
Ashcroft calling on Congress to pass the Administration' s  antiterrorism 
legislation within a week. Sensenbrenner, for whom this came as 
something of a surprise, immediately got on the telephone to demand a 
copy of the bill. The draft, which arrived by fax, numbered hundreds of 
pages and included, inter alia, the indefinite suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States. Sensenbrenner, sitting on his porch, put 
a red line through the measure.230 The next six weeks became an exercise 
in high politics.23 1  
Even as the executive branch sought significantly broader powers, it 
insisted on haste: in the Senate, the bill bypassed committee markup and 
went straight behind closed doors. The House held only one hearing, at 
which the Attorney General served as the only witness.232 At 3 :43 a.m. on 
the morning of the vote, the final bill reached print. Legislators, many of 
whom were even unable to read the text because of the anthrax scare, were 
given only the opportunity to vote thumbs up or thumbs down-with no 
chance of further amendment. 233 The Speaker ruled the one legislator who 
tried to debate parts of the act out of order.234 Throughout this process the 
Executive made it very clear that either one supported what the 
Administration proposed or one was pro-terrorist. Attorney General 
Ashcroft announced to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
[t]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is 
this: your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our 
resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's 
friends. They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil.235 
230 Interview with Rep. James Sensenbrenner, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Spring 2003). 
231 See Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 1 145 (2004). 
232 Jim Dempsey, Ctr. for Democracy and Tech., D.C., Guest Lecture at Stanford 
University Law School (Jan. 24, 2005). 
233 Interview with Rep. James Sensenbrenner, supra note 230. 
234 Dempsey, supra note 232. 
235 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107th Congo 1 07-50 (2001)  (statement of 
Attorney General John Ashcroft). 
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The 200 1 USA PATRIOT Act did have an immediate and far-reaching 
impact on civil liberties, despite Ashcroft's admonition. To make the 
statute more palatable, Congress placed sunset provisions on some of the 
most intrusive powers, setting them to expire December 3 1 , 2005. But in 
July 2005, the House of Representatives voted not just to renew them, but 
to make fourteen out of sixteen of the new measures permanent-narrowly 
defeating an effort to limit the provisions to another four years.236 
The House version clashed with the Senate's renewal bill, which 
offered greater protection for individual rights. In autumn, the proposed 
texts met in conference. By December 8, Representative Sensenbrenner 
was able to submit the report to the House of Representatives where, six 
days later, it passed 25 1 to 1 74.237 Legislators twice extended the deadline, 
first to February 3, then to March 1 0, to give both Houses the opportunity to 
discuss the measures in more depth.238 
In the end, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005 made all but two of the temporary surveillance powers in the USA 
PATRIOT Act permanent; roving wire taps under FISA, and FBI authority, 
with a court order, to obtain tangible items (books, records, papers, and 
documents) for foreign intelligence and international terrorism 
investigations became subject to a four-year sunset provision.239 The 
Improvement Act incorporated some protections for individual rights?40 
The legislation also introduced new counterterrorist powers, as well as anti­
drug measures aimed at preventing the bulk purchase of ingredients used in 
the manufacture of methamphetamine. 241 
As President Bush signed the Improvement Act into law, he credited 
the earlier legislation for breaking up terror cells in Ohio, New York, 
Oregon and Virginia.242 He implied that it assisted in the prosecution of 
236 House Approves Renewal of Patriot Act: Critics Voice Concern over Civil Liberties, 
CNN.COM, July 22, 2005, http://www.cnn.comJ2005IPOLITICS /0712I1patriot.act 
[hereinafter House Approves] 
237 Roll no. 627, Dec. 1 4, 2005. 
238 See S. Res. 2 1 67, 1 09th Congo (2005) (enacted); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Key Senators 
Reach Accord on Extending the Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2006, at A14. 
239 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 
tit. I §§ 102-03, 1 20 Stat. 1 92 (2006). 
240 See, e.g., id. at § 1 1 5  Gudicial review of national security letters), § 1 19 (audit of use 
of national security letters). 
241 Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109- 1 77, tit. VII, 1 20 
Stat. 1 92 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1 8  U.S.C.). 
242 Press Release, White House, President Signs USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act The East Room (Mar. 9, 2006) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2006/03120060309-4.html. 
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terrorists in California, Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, Washington, and North 
Carolina.243 And he welcomed the continuation and expansion of the 
previous powers as part of the war on terror.244 This section looks at three 
of the most significant authorities addressed in the original legislation and 
renewal measures: FISA alterations, delayed notice search warrants, and 
national security letters. 
a. FISA Alterations 
The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act made two important changes to FISA: 
It allowed applications where foreign intelligence constituted only "a 
significant purpose" for the investigation, and it authorized the state to 
obtain tangible objects. 
In the former area, where previously FISA applications required that 
the gathering of foreign intelligence be the reason for search or surveillance, 
the new legislation allowed for applications when foreign intelligence 
provided merely a significant reason.245 The Attorney General quickly 
seized on this and issued guidelines that said such authorization could be 
sought even if the primary ends of the surveillance related to ordinary 
crime?46 These guidelines effectively collapsed the wall between the FBI's  
prosecution and intelligence functions, allowing the organization to go 
around the Fourth Amendment. 
Although FISC had operated for nearly three decades in complete 
secrecy, in May 2002, it published its opinion for the first time to protest 
Ashcroft's guidelines.247 The court required that the state re-build the wall 
between the Bureau's  prosecution and intelligence functions. FISC 
centered its directive on the statutory minimization requirement. The court 
raised concerns about abuse: it noted, for instance, that in September 2000, 
the government had admitted that it had made "misstatements and 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 2 1 8, 1 1 5 Stat. 272 (codified as amended 
at 50 U.S.c. §§  1 804(a)(7)(B), 1 823(a)(7)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2001 )); see also id. §§ 201 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. § 25 1 6), 207 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.c. § 
1 805(e)( l )), 805 (codified as amended at 1 8  U.S.c. § 2339A). 
246 Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft, to the Dir. of the Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, the Assistant Attorney Gen., the Criminal Div. Counsel for Intelligence Policy, 
and United States Attorneys (Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/agency/dojlfisa/ag030602.html ("[The USA PATRIOT Act] allows FISA to be used 
primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as long as a significant foreign intelligence purpose 
remains. "). 
247 In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2 1 8  F. Supp. 
2d 6 1 1 , 621 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002). 
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omissions of material facts" in some seventy-five of its counterterrorism 
applications?48 The court recognized the reasons a wall had been placed 
between intelligence and criminal investigations. It suggested that "the 
2002 procedures appear to be designed to . . .  substitute FISA for Title III 
electronic surveillances and Rule 41 searches. ,,249 FISC expressed concern 
that: 
[C]riminal prosecutors will tell the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps when they lack 
probable cause for a Title III electronic surveillance), what techniques to use, what 
information to look for, what information to keep as evidence, and when use of FISA 
can cease because there is enough evidence to arrest and prosecute?50 
Such measures did not appear to be reasonably designed "to obtain, 
produce, or disseminate foreign intelligence information.,,25 1  And so, the 
court imposed conditions. 
For the first time in the history of FISC, the government appealed. 
The Executive argued that Congress' intent in changing the wording from 
"the" to "a significant" reason was, precisely, to eliminate the wall between 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The legislative history did not 
support the primary purpose test. 252 The executive branch claimed, 
moreover, that attempts to impose minimization were so intrusive as to 
"exceed the constitutional authority of Article III judges. ,,253 
Six months later, the three-judge appellate court appointed by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist issued its first opinion.254 The decision reversed the 
lower court's  ruling.255 It suggested that FISA was never meant to apply 
only to foreign intelligence information relative to national security, but that 
it could also be used for ordinary criminal cases.256 And it went even 
further: the appeals court interpreted the USA PATRIOT Act to mean that 
the primary purpose of the investigation could, indeed, be criminal 
investigations, "[s]o long as the government entertains a realistic option of 
dealing with the agent other than through criminal prosecution . . . .  
,,257 
248 Id. at 620. 
249 Id. at 623. 
250 Id. at 624. 
251 Id. at 625. 
252 In re Sealed Case Nos. 02-001 ,  02-002, 3 1 0  F.3d 7 1 7, 722 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 
Rev. 2002). 
253 Id. 
254 !d. 
255 In re All Matters, 2 1 8  F. Supp. 2d at 746. 
256 In re Sealed Case, 3 1 0  F.3d at 727-39. 
257 Id. at 735 (emphasis added). 
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Stopping a conspiracy, for instance, would suffice.258 To reach this 
conclusion, the court rejected the Fourth Circuit's  finding in United States 
v. Troung, which rejected warrantless search and surveillance once a case 
crossed into a criminal investigation.259 The appeals court suggested that 
Troung may even have been at fault for contributing "to the FBI missing 
opportunities to anticipate the September 1 1 , 200 1 attacks. ,,260 The court 
added that "special needs" may provide further justification for departing 
from constitutional limits.261  Ashcroft hailed the decision, which reversed 
two decades of court policy, as "a giant step forward.,,262 
This shift raises deeply troubling constitutional issues.263 The Fourth 
Amendment requires a warrant to be issued by a neutral and detached 
magistrate, a finding of probable cause that a particular crime has been 
committed, and the designation of which places will be searched or which 
items will be seized.264 The way FISA previously withstood challenge was, 
precisely, the purpose for which it was directed; this purpose allowed it to 
fall outside the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.265 By 
eviscerating purpose from the equation, the appeals court eliminated the 
basis on which the statute passed constitutional muster. 
The second significant change to FISA rested on the type of 
information that could be obtained by the Executive. While FISA granted 
258 Id. 
259 United States v. Troung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1 980). 
260 In re Sealed Case, 3 1 0  F.3d at 744. 
26 1 Id. at 745. 
262 Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the 
Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1 234, 1 244 (2002). 
263 See O'Connor, supra note 262, at 1249 ("Searches conducted pursuant to these 
provisions, which are not primarily for foreign intelligence purposes, cannot pass 
constitutional muster. The conclusion to the contrary by the FISCR in In re Sealed Case is 
predicated upon internally inconsistent logic, selective editing and application of judicial 
decisions and statutory language, and a disregard for the legislative history of FISA."); see 
also Peter Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 1306 (2004). 
264 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
265 O'Connor, supra note 262, at 1260 (under Keith, "criminal surveillance for any 
purpose other than foreign intelligence, even for a purpose that directly implicates national 
security, cannot escape the constraints of the Fourth Amendment"). Criminal surveillance 
must either satisty the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements, or fall 
under an exception-namely, foreign intelligence. Moreover, the decision flies in the face of 
judicial and Congressional history. The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, 
Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits all previously understood FISA to be for foreign 
intelligence or international terrorist purposes. These interpretations were consistent with 
the actual text of the statute. See In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court., 2 1 8  F. Supp. 2d 6 1 1 , 625 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002). 
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broad access to electronic surveillance, it did not specifically empower the 
state to obtain business records. Following the Oklahoma City bombing, 
Congress expanded FISA orders to include travel records.266 The USA 
PATRlOT Act provided further access to any business or personal 
records.267 It also changed the standard under which FISC would be 
required to grant the order. Where previously specific and articulable facts 
had to demonstrate that the target represented a foreign power (or an agent 
thereof), the legislation eliminated the need for a particularized showing.268 
Thus, under the USA P ATRlOT Act, the person seeking the records only 
has to say that the "records concerned are sought for an authorized 
investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities." What constitutes an investigation is wholly within 
the domain of the executive branch-a definition that Ashcroft relaxed 
following the passage of the USA PATRlOT Act (a preliminary 
investigation is now sufficient.) This means that FISA can be used to 
gather records of individuals who are not themselves the target of any 
investigation, nor an agent of a foreign power. In fact, entire databases 
could be obtained in this manner, as long as "an authorized investigation" 
exists.269 
Not only did the USA PATRlOT Act make these changes to FISA, but 
the manner in which the Executive obtained authorization for surveillance 
also shifted. As discussed above, applications to the FISA court are not the 
only way to initiate surveillance of non-U.S. persons. In the first twenty-
266 Replies by Peter P. Swire, Patriot Debates: A Sourceblog for the USA PATRIOT 
Debate, http://www.patriotdebates.comlsections-21 4-and-2 1 5  (last visited June 9, 2006). 
Just two months before the Oklahoma City attack, President William J. Clinton issued 
Executive Order 12,949, which expanded the use of FISA for physical searches. See Exec. 
Order 12,949, 60 Fed. Reg. 8 1 69 (Feb. 13 ,  1 995). 
267 Under Section 501 , 
(a)( l )  The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose 
rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make an application for an 
order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, 
documents, and other items) for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities. 
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 1 07-56, § 501,  1 15 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. § 1 86 1  (2000 & Supp. 2001) .  This measure, assumedly, allows FISA to "trump" 
privacy laws that govern the dissemination of records. Swire, supra note 263, at 1 33 1 .  
268 [d. 
269 The statute added a rather insignificant stipulation drawn from the original FISA, that 
such an order could only follow if the "investigation of a United States person is not 
conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the 
Constitution." This, of course, left open the possibility of an investigation based 
"substantially" or "largely" upon protected activities. USA PATRIOT Act, § 501(a); see 
also Swire, supra note 263, at 1335. 
2006] PRIVACY AND SUR VEILLANCE 1 107 
three years of the statute's  existence, attorneys general sporadically made 
use of the emergency category: in total, approximately fifty-five such orders 
issued. In the eighteen months following 9/1 1 ,  however, this number 
dramatically increased: in 2002 alone, Ashcroft signed more than 1 70 
emergency foreign intelligence warrants.270 
b. Delayed Notice Search Warrants 
One of the most concerning innovations in the USA PATRIOT Act 
affected the notice requirement for physical searches. Section 2 1 3,  which 
applies to all federal criminal investigations-not just those conducted for 
counterterrorism---eliminates the "knock and announce" requirement long 
considered integral to determining whether or not a search warrant is 
deemed reasonable. In delayed notice, or "sneak and peek" search 
warrants, the government must only demonstrate reasonable cause to 
believe that notice may cause an adverse result, in order to prevent an 
individual from learning that the state appropriated their property or placed 
them under surveillance. While delayed notice was already provided by the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECP A") and by the Second and 
Ninth Circuits Courts of Appeal, the USA PATRIOT Act allowed an 
indefinite suspension in notice. This provision is not subject to a sunset 
clause. 
Like roving wiretaps, the USA PATRIOT Act was not the first time 
delayed notice search warrants appeared on the legislative stage.271 
Proposed in anti-drug bills, and then attached to a Bankruptcy Bill, 
Congress rejected the FBI's  efforts to make it law. 9/1 1 ,  however, 
presented another opportunity. Accordingly, the provision in the USA 
PATRIOT Act is not limited to terrorism; law enforcement can use it now 
for any crime on the books. Since the statute's  passage, the state has used it 
to break into a judge's  chambers, to look into health care fraud, and to 
investigate check swindling.272 In July 2005, the Justice Department told 
270 Dan Eggan & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., U.S. Steps Up Secret Surveillance: FBL Justice 
Dept. Increase Use of Wiretaps, Records Searches, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2003, at AI ,  
available at  http://www. ashingtonpost.comJac2/wp-dynJA1 6287-2003Mar23; see also 
James Bovard, Surveillance State: Since September 11, A Flood of Federal Legislation Has 
Reduced American Freedom Without Increasing Our Safety, AM. CONSERVATIVE, May 1 9, 
2003, at I ,  available at http://www.amconmag.comJ05 _19 _ 03/cover.html. 
271 Roving wiretaps are authorized in the USA PATRIOT Act § 206 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1 805(c)(2)(B)). Through April 2005, the powers had been used 
forty-nine times. Gary Fi & Anne Marie Squeo, Bipartisan Fixfor Patriot Act Takes Shape: 
Both Parties in Congress Share Misgivings About Provisions on Libraries, Searches, 
Wiretaps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2005, at A4. 
272 American After 9111 :  Freedom Preserved or Freedom Lost? Hearing Before the S. 
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the House Judiciary Committee that only twelve percent of the 1 53 sneak 
and peek warrants it received were related to terrorism investigations.273 
What was illegal in the break-ins conducted under COINTELPRO has now 
become legal. 
In its 2006 renewal of the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress added 
"enhanced oversight" of these powers. The legislation requires the 
judiciary to report to the Administrative Office of the courts, within thirty 
days of issuing a delayed notice search warrant: (a) the fact of the warrant 
application; (b) whether it was granted as applied, modified, or denied; (c) 
the length of the delay in notifying the subject of the search and the number 
and duration of any extensions; and, (d) the offense specified in the warrant 
or application.274 Beginning in September 2007, this information will be 
provided to Congress.275 
c. National Security Letters 
The USA PATRIOT Act augmented the FBI's  ability to bypass 
warrant requirements-under Title III or FISA--entirely.276 Section 505, 
innocuously entitled "Miscellaneous National Security Authorities," 
enhanced the amount and type of information that could be obtained via 
national security letters ("NSLs"), bringing Internet Service Providers 
("ISPs") within its remit and expanding the type of information that could 
be obtained to include credit card records, bank account numbers, and 
information pertaining to Internet use (such as protocol addresses and 
session times).277 Importantly, the statute p laced a gag order on anyone 
served with such administrative sUbpoenas.278 It also broadened the range 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Congo (2003) (statement of James X. Dempsey, Executive 
Dir., Ctr. for Democracy & Tech.) available at http://www.cdt.org/testimony/ 
03 1 1 1 8dempsey.pdf. (referencing a Department of Justice letter of Oct. 24, 2003 to Senator 
Stevens detailing the use of § 2 1 3  for non-terrorism-related purposes). 
273 Letter from Rep. James Sensenbrenner to the Chairman of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary (July 1 2, 2005), available at http://www .house.gov/judiciary_democrats/ 
responses/dojpatriothrgquestionresp71 205.pdf. 
274 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109- 1 77, 
§ 1 14, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). 
275 /d. 
276 The district court found the lack of subsequent judicial process to be unconstitutional 
as applied, making it unnecessary to consider a facial challenge to § 2709 on Fourth 
Amendment grounds. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 47 1 ,  475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The 
non-disclosure provision was unconstitutional on its face for failing to pass First Amendment 
muster. [d. 
277 USA PATRIOT Act § 2 1 0  (codified as amended at 1 8  U.S.c. § 2703(c)(2) (2000 & 
Supp. 200 1)). 
278 National Security Letters draw their authority from one of four sources: The 1 947 
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of officials who could request the information.279 Where previously 
requests for information had to provide specific and articulable facts that 
established the target as a foreign power (or agent thereof),28o the new NSL 
powers merely had to be relevant to any "authorized investigation to protect 
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.,,281 The 
Bush Administration quickly attempted to make NSLs available to the CIA 
and Pentagon, without intervention of the DOJ.282 
National Security Act authorizes investigative agencies to request financial records and 
information, consumer reports, and travel records for individuals with access to classified 
information, where such individuals are under investigation for sharing the information with 
foreign powers. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2000). The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act provides for the FBI and certain government agencies to obtain consumer 
information in the course of investigations into international terrorism. Fair Credit 
Reporting Act of 1970, 15  U.S.C. § 1 68 1 .  The 1 978 Right to Financial Privacy Act allows 
for the FBI to obtain financial records as part of their investigation into international 
terrorism and espionage. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.c. § 3401-22. 
And, prior to 9/1 1 ,  the Electronic Communications Privacy Act empowered the FBI, in the 
course of investigations into international terrorism or espionage, to request electronic 
communication related to agents of a foreign power from banks, credit agencies, and internet 
service providers. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 1 8  U.S.C. § 2709. 
Although the Fourth Amendment applies to administrative subpoenas, because they are 
constructive searches, courts have not in the past required either a warrant or probable cause 
for them to be issued. Instead, the subpoena must only be "reasonable": that is, it falls 
within the agency's remit, the request is finite, and information is relevant to an appropriate 
inquiry. What makes such subpoenas constitutional, however, is that the party subpoenaed 
must have the opportunity to "obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand 
prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply." See Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (2004) 
(quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 ,  544-45 ( 1967» . Even if granted after they are 
issued, a neutral tribunal can determine whether their issuance is compatible with the Fourth 
Amendment. Unlike NSLs, most administrative subpoenas do not require secrecy, or they 
limit secrecy to particular circumstances. Id. at 485. 
279 Section 505 expanded who could request the information from requiring that the 
request be made by an FBI official at the level of Deputy Assistant Director or above, to 
allowing any FBI Special Agent in charge of a field office to issue NSLs to obtain consumer 
reports, financial records, or electronic communications. Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, 
Nat'l Security Law Unit, Fed. Bureau of lnvestigation, to All Field Offices National Security 
Letter Matters, Ref: 66F-HQ-AI255972 Serial 1 5  (Nov. 28, 2001), available at 
http://sccountyOI .co.santa-cruz.ca.uslbds/govstreamlBDSvDatainon _legacylMinutes/2003/ 
20030429IPDF/084.pdf [hereinafter FBI Memorandum]. 
280 1 8  U.S.C. § 2709(b)(l )(B). 
281 The practical effect of this, in the words of the Department of Justice, means that the 
FBI could issue an NSL stating, e.g., "[a] full international terrorism investigation of subject, 
a U.S. person, was authorized . . .  because he may be engaged in international terrorism 
activities by raising funds for HAMAS." FBI Memorandum, supra note 279. 
282 Swire, supra note 263, at 1333 nn. 1 85-86 (citing Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, 
Broad Domestic Role Asked/or CIA and the Pentagon, N.Y. TiMES, May 2, 2003, at A2 1). 
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The application of NSLs to ISPs immediately implicated a broad range 
of institutions. The legal definition meant that traditional ISPs, such as 
America Online, Juno and UUNET, as well as companies whose cables and 
phone lines carry the traffic, would qualify.283 It also incorporated 
companies that provide email but are not ISPs, like Microsoft and Netscape. 
It captured any service that creates mailing lists, such as Yahoo! Groups 
service. And it incorporated any library, school, or company that provides 
physical access to the Internet. 284 Indeed, evidence exists that some portion 
of the hundreds of NSLs served immediately following 911 1  related to 
libraries.285 A study conducted by the University of Illinois found that in 
the twelve months following 911 1 , federal agents made at least 545 visits to 
libraries to obtain information about patrons, affecting just over ten percent 
of the libraries polled.286 Libraries, however, did not have the sole honor of 
receiving NSLs. In December 2003, the FBI letters sent to hotels in Las 
Vegas and required them to tum over access to all customer records 
between December 22, 2003 and January 1 , 2004.287 In similar fashion, the 
283 In re Doubleclick Inc., 1 54 F.  Supp. 2d 497, 5 1 1  n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
284 Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs John Doe and American Civil Liberties Union, Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 
47 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04 Civ. 2614). 
285 A joint FOIA request filed by the ACLU, EPIC, American Booksellers for Free 
Expression, and the Freedom to Read Foundation, yielded five pages (entirely redacted) of 
institutions on whom NSLs had been served between October 2001 and January 2003. 
These pages are available at http://www.aclu.org/patriotJoiaIFOIAlNSLIists.pdf. The lower 
court interpreted the missing names as numbering in the "hundreds." Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d 
at 502. 
286 LEIGH S. ESTABROOK, LIBRARY RESEARCH CTR., PuBLIC LIBRARIES AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES (2003), available at http://lrc.lis.uiuc.edulwebIPLCL.htrnl. For a discussion of the 
impact of the USA PATRIOT Act on libraries in particular, see Klinefelter, supra note 1 63 ;  
Susan Nevelow Mart, Protecting the Lady from Toledo: Post-USA PATRIOT Act Electronic 
Surveillance at the Library, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 449 (2004). Although the § 2 1 5  changes to 
FISA would also have allowed the FBI to obtain these records, the FBI made use of NSLs 
instead. In response to an inquiry from James Sensenbrenner, the Chair of the House of 
Representatives' Judiciary Committee, Daniel J. Bryant, the Assistant Attorney General 
suggested that "the more appropriate tool [than § 2 15] for requesting electronic 
communication transactional records would be a National Security Letter (NSL)." Letter 
from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney Gen., to James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, Comm. 
on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (July 26, 2002), available at 
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/congress/hjcpatriotactcombinedresponses3.pdf. A 
memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Robert Mueller, supports this reading; it confirmed that, as of 2003, § 2 1 5  had 
yet to be used. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to Robert Mueller, Dir. of 
the Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 1 8, 2003) available at http://www.cdt.org/ 
security/usapatriot/03091 8doj .shtrnl. 
287 The authorization for these NSLs came from the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
2004. See discussion infra. 
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FBI obtained data from airlines, and hotels in the vicinity.288 Even these 
few letters implicated an estimated 270,000 people, with no individualized 
suspicion to back them. 289 Internet service providers, too, have been 
inundated with requests. Mr. Al Gidari, a Seattle privacy lawyer who 
represents America Online, AT&T Wireless and Cingular states that 
"[ d]emands for information have soared as much as five times over pre­
September 1 1  levels.,,29o The Associated Press reports, "[a]t one major 
Internet backbone provider, requests for information 'have gone through the 
roof. ",291 
According to the Washington Post, the government now issues more 
than 30,000 National Security Letters each year, more than a hundred times 
the annual number prior to 911 1 .292 They have become routine procedure 
for preliminary investigations and also during the "threat assessment" stage, 
far before a formal investigation commences. Over five dozen FBI 
supervisors have been given the authority to issue NSLs.293 There is no 
statutory limit on how much information can be gathered, or how many 
people can be targeted in each one of these letters. 
Perhaps most concerning is the lack of control on who has access to 
the information, how long it is kept, and the manner in which it is used. In 
2003, Attorney General Ashcroft withdrew a 1 995 guideline that required 
the FBI destroy NSL information on American citizens or residents if such 
data proved "not relevant to the purposes for which it was collected.,,294 In 
its place, Aschroft required the FBI to keep all records collected, and 
authorized them to disseminate such information to any federal agency. 
The same order stipulated that the Bureau use "data mining" technology to 
trawl through its rapidly-expanding files to try to find links between people. 
In January 2004, the FBI created an Investigative Data Warehouse. This 
288 JAY STANLEY, AM. CNIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX: How THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND 
INDIVIDUALS IN CONSTRUCTION OF A SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY, 1 3  n.5 1 (2004) (citing 
Editorial, Surveillance City, LAS VEGAS REv. J., Jan. I I , 2004, available at 
http://www.reviewjournal.comllvILhome/2004/Jan-I I -Sun-2004/opinionl22961926.html). 
289 Id. ; see Rod Smith, Sources: FBI Gathered Visitor Information Only in Las Vegas, 
LAS VEGAS REv. J., Jan. 7, 2004, available at http://www.reviewjourna1.comllvrLhome/ 
2004/Jan-07-Wed-2004/news/2293425 1 .html. 
290 Net Effect: Antiterror Eavesdropping: Privacy Advocates Worry Civil Rights May Be 
Trampled, ASSOCIATED PREss, May 27, 2002, available at http://tinyurl.comlxmai 
[hereinafter Net Effect]. 
291 Id. 
292 Barton Gellman, The FBI's Secret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau Examines 
Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A I .  
293 Id. 
294 Id. 
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organization uses the same technology that the CIA depends upon, and 
which it is barred from using in similar fashion on American citizens.295 
Ashcroft also changed the guidelines to allow the FBI to incorporate 
commercially-available databases, such as ChoicePoint and LexisNexis. I 
return to the issue of data mining, below. 
An important point to remember in the collection of this information is 
that it is subject neither to judicial review, nor detailed congressional 
oversight. In four years, the FBI has only provided Congress with 
classified statistics on the number of NSLs issued, the type of information 
obtained (financial, credit, or communication), and the number of U.S. 
persons targeted. These reports omit an entire category of NSLs, as well as 
other federal agencies' use of the same. Although Congress requested in 
2004 that the Attorney General describe the scope of NSLs and provide the 
"process and standards for approving" them, eighteen months have now 
passed without a reply. As for the effectiveness of the device for 
counterterrorist purposes, the Bush Administration has not offered a single 
example of when the use of an NSL interrupted a terrorist attack. 296 
To date, two cases have made it to the courts. The first involved an 
Internet service provider. From the beginning, the plaintiff was in a 
precarious position: according to the USA PATRIOT Act, an individual 
served with an NSL could not disclose to anyone that the FBI had requested 
this information,297 a stipulation that ostensibly included an attorney or even 
a court of law. (The renewal statute now allows individuals served with an 
order to discuss the matter with an attorney and those necessary to 
obtaining the information requested.298) 
In this case, the FBI telephoned Doe and told him that he would be 
served with an NSL.299 The document, printed on FBI letterhead, directed 
him to provide certain information.30o It informed him that the NSL 
provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act prohibited Doe or his employees, 
"from disclosing to any person that the FBI has sought or obtained access to 
information or records.,,301 The FBI instructed him to deliver the records in 
person, not to use the postal system, and not to mention the NSL in any 
295 Id. 
296 Id. 
297 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 ,  479 (S .D.N.Y. 2004) (citing 18  U.S.C. § 
2709(c) (2000)). 
298 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-1 77, 
§ 1 16(a), 1 20 Stat. 1 92 (2006). 
299 Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
300 Id. at 479. 
301 Id. 
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telephone conversation.302 Doe spoke with attorneys at the ACLU, refused 
to provide the information requested, and instead brought suit.303 
The District Court held that a provision that barred recipients from 
disclosing receipt of NSLs, as applied, violated the Fourth Amendment 
because it did not allow for any judicial process.304 Judge Victor Marrero, 
who wrote the opinion, noted that in nearly twenty years, not a single 
judicial challenge had been brought to the issuance of an NSL. 305 He 
suggested, "it would be . . .  naIve to conclude that § 2709 NSLs, given their 
commandeering warrant, do anything short of coercing all but the most 
fearless NSL recipient into immediate compliance and secrecy.,,306 The 
court subjected the gag order, which counted as both a prior restraint and a 
content-based restriction, to strict scrutiny.307 It found that the indefinite 
nature of the ban on disclosure was not narrowly tailored to further the 
Government's  interest in pursuing its counterterrorist strategy, stating that 
while the national security arguments may be valid ones, "in the end . . .  the 
Government cannot cast § 2709-a blunt agent of secrecy applying in 
perpetuity to all persons affected in every case-as narrowly-tailored.,,308 
In short, this would potentially compel secrecy "even under some decidedly 
non-sensitive conditions or where secrecy may no longer be justifiable 
under articulable national security needs.,,309 The court added, 
an unlimited government warrant to conceal, effectively a form of secrecy per se, has 
no place in our open society . . . .  When withholding information from disclosure is no 
longer justified, when it ceases to foster the proper aims that initially may have 
supported confidentiality, a categorical and uncritical extension of non-disclosure may 
become the cover for spurious ends that government may then deem too inconvenient, 
inexpedient, merely embarrassing, or even illicit to ever expose to the light of day .3 10 
302 Id. According to Doe, he asked the FBI agent whether he could contact an attorney. 
The agent states, in contrast, that he was informed that Doe would be consulting a lawyer. 
/d. 
303 /d. 
304 "[R]eady availability of judicial process to pursue such a challenge is necessary to 
vindicate important rights guaranteed by the Constitution or by statute." Id. at 475. The 
court also held that, as applied, the demand that ISPs produce customer records potentially 
infringed citizens' First Amendment rights of anonymous speech and association. Id. at 506. 
305 Id. at 502. Note, however, that the citation used by the court in the case is inaccurate: 
footnote 145 refers to a letter from July 26, 2002. 
306 Id. at 504. 
307 Id. at 5 1 1 .  
308 Id. at 5 16; see also id. at 5 1 1 - 1 6  for the court's discussion. 
309 Id. at 5 1 9. 
310 Id. at 520. 
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The court concluded, "[a]t that point, secrecy's protective shield may serve 
not as much to secure a safe country as simply to save face.31 l 
In the second case, FBI agents served George Christian, who managed 
thirty-six Connecticut libraries' digital records, with an NSL.3 12 The 
document demanded "all subscriber information, billing information and 
access logs of any person" using a particular computer at one of the 
branches.3 13 Like the plaintiff in the earlier lawsuit, Christian refused to 
provide the FBI with the records.3 14 Instead, his employer, Library 
Connection Inc., brought suit.3 1 5  
Once again, the case turned on the gag order. Christian claimed that it 
amounted to a prior restraint, which caused irreparable harm-it made it 
impossible for him to participate in the public debate surrounding the 
introduction of no less than eight bills before Congress that were aimed at 
further tailoring NSL powers.3 16  
The district court granted the preliminary injunction against the 
Government to prevent the gag order from going into effect. 3 1 7 The court 
reasoned that it looked like Christian had a high likelihood of success on the 
merits, and irreparable harm would be created by him not being able to 
participate in the dialogue.3 1 8 As a content-based prior restraint, the order 
had to pass strict scrutiny.3 19 But while the state had a general interest in 
national security, no specific harm would be caused by revealing 
Christian's  identity.320 The district court concluded, "[e]specially in a 
situation like the instant one, where the statute provides no judicial review 
of the NSL or the need for its non-disclosure provision . . .  the permanent 
gag provision . . .  is not narrowly drawn to serve the government's broadly 
claimed compelling interest of keeping investigations secret.,,32 1 The court 
considered the measure "overbroad as applied with regard to the types of 
information that it encompasses.,,322 
3ll  Id. 
312 Gellman, supra note 292, at A i .  
313 Doe v .  Gonzales, 386 F .  Supp. 2 d  66, 7 0  (D. Conn. 2005). 
314 Id. 
315 Gellman, supra note 292, at A i .  
316 Doe v. Gonzales, 1 26 S. Ct. 1 , 3 (2005). 
317 Id. at 3 .  
31 8  Id. at 2. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. 
32 1 Id. (quoting Emergency Application to Vacate Stay, Doe v. Gonzales (D. Conn.) at 
22-23 [hereinafter Emergency D. 
322 Id. (quoting Emergency, supra note 321,  at 23). The court found the ban "particularly 
noteworthy" in light of the fact that proponents of the Patriot Act have "consistently relied 
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A panel of the Second Circuit reversed the district court's  decision and 
granted the motion to stay the injunction, pending an emergency appeal.323 
Justice Ginsburg, who sat as Circuit Judge for the appeal, refused to hold 
that vacatur of stay was warranted.324 She noted the speed with which the 
case was going through the Court of Appeals and recognized that the ALA, 
of which the entity in question was a member, was free to note in its 
lobbying efforts that one of its member had been served with NSL. 325 
As perhaps suggested by the number ofNSL-related bills circulating in 
2005, the effort to expand national security letter authority did not stop with 
the USA PATRIOT Act. Neither that statute nor the 1 986 ECPA imposed 
penalties for refusal to cooperate. In 2003, the DOJ prepared to close this 
loophole. Section 1 29 of the leaked draft "Enhancing Domestic Security 
Act"--colloquially known as USA PATRIOT II-provided for criminal 
penalties.326 Although leading Republicans and Democrats in Congress 
immediately condemned PATRIOT II, in September 2004, Representative 
Sensenbrenner introduced the "Anti-terrorism Intelligence Tools 
Improvement Act of 2003 ." This bill provided for up to five years in prison 
for a violation of the gag orders.327 The session closed before the bill 
passed.328 But in March 2006, the Administration managed to incorporate a 
penalty of up to five years' imprisonment and/or a fine, into the USA 
PATRIOT Act renewal statute.329 
on the public's faith [that the Government will] apply the statute narrowly . . . .  " Id. (quoting 
Emergency, supra note 32 1 ,  at 26 (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at 
Memphis, Tenn. :  Protecting Life and Liberty (Sept. IS ,  2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj .gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003/091 S03memphisremarks.htm 
(characterizing as "hysteria" fears of the Executive's abuse of the increased access to library 
records under the Patriot Act and stating that "the Department of Justice has neither the 
staffing, the time[,] nor the inclination to monitor the reading habits of Americans. No 
offense to the American Library Association, but we just don't care."» ). 
323 Id. at l .  
324 See id. 
325 Id. at 4-5. 
326 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, Section by 
Section Analysis (Jan. 9, 2003) (unpublished internal memorandum) available at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/PatriotAct/story_Ol _020703_ doc _l .pdf. 
327 Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Tools Improvement Act of 2003: Hearing on HR 31 79 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, lOSth Congo (2004), available at http://thomas. loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/ 
z?dl 0S:HR03 1 79:@@@L&Summ2=m&. 
328 See Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 3 1 79, l OSth Cong, 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 0S-3 1 79. 
329 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. l O9-177, 
§ 1 17, 120 Stat. 1 92 (2006). 
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One month after President Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act, the 
DO] constructed a new interpretation of the United States Code: where 
before NSLs could only be used in a formal investigation, they now could 
be used in preliminary inquiries.33o The "certification" process, meant to 
provide a check on the use of these powers, became a rubber stamp: the 
DO] provided all field offices with a boilerplate paragraph to be inserted 
into all NSLs at paragraph twO.33 1 The language, drafted in Washington, 
D.C., ensured that the proper requirements for certification would be met, 
regardless of the actual state of the inquiry or investigation being conducted 
by the field office.332 DO] also instructed the field offices not to include a 
date range for credit record requests, "because these requests seek all 
records where the consumer maintains or has maintained an account.,,333 
The Attorney General granted more than five dozen supervisors the 
authority to issue NSLs. 
Most notable in the expansion of powers, in December 2003, the Bush 
Administration quietly signed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2004 into law.334 The legislation included one sentence that modified 
a section of the 1 978 Right to Financial Privacy Act. The language was 
almost inscrutable.335 The net effect was to allow the FBI to issue NSLs in 
a domain where previously only Treasury and Intelligence agents could go. 
Moreover, it empowered all of these agencies to issue NSLs to an even 
broader range of institutions. The obscure cross-reference in the text to 
"section 5 3 1 2  of title 3 1 "  means that NSLs can now be issued to banks, 
credit unions, thrift stores, brokers in securities or commodities, currency 
exchanges, insurance companies, credit card companies, dealers in precious 
metals, stones, or jewels, pawnbrokers, loan or finance companies, travel 
330 FBI Memorandum, supra note 279, at 2. 
331 Id. 
332 Id. at 5.  
333 Id. 
334 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108- 1 77, § 374, 1 17 
Stat. 2599 (2003) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2000 & Supp. 2001)) 
[hereinafter Intelligence Authorization Act]; see also Kim Zetter, Bush Grabs New Power 
for FBI, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 6, 2004, available at http://www.wired.comlnews/ 
privacy/O, 1 848,61 792,00.html. 
335 See Intelligence Authorization Act, supra note 334: 
For purposes of this section, and sections I l l S and 1 1 1 7 insofar as they relate to the operation of 
this section, the term 'financial institution' has the same meaning as in subsections (a)(2) and 
(c)( 1 )  of section 53 1 2  of title 3 1 ,  United States Code, except that, for purposes of this section, 
such term shall include only such a financial institution any part of which is located inside any 
State or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American 
Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the United States Virgin Islands. 
Id. § 374(d). 
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agencies, any business that transfers funds, telegraph companies, car, 
airplane, and boat sellers, real estate agents, the United States Postal 
Service, state and local government entities involved in the preceding, and 
casinos.336 Like the NSLs to electronic communications service providers, 
a gag order prevents these entities from revealing that they have received a 
demand for information. 
When the House of Representatives passed the first version of its 
renewal bill, Sensenbrenner argued against using temporary provisions any 
further, claiming that there was no evidence that the powers had been 
abused, and asserting that they had been subjected to "vigorous 
oversight. ,,337 Yet efforts by minority members of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee to obtain hearings on the use of surveillance authorities­
including the state of NSLs-had met with little success.338 Setting aside 
for a moment the issues raised by having the same party control both the 
Executive and the Legislature, the USA PATRIOT Act contained minimal 
requirements for congressional oversight. 
The 2006 renewal statute partially addressed this deficiency. For 
NSLs, it requires the Attorney General to submit an aggregate report to 
Congress each April, laying out the total number of NSLs made by the 
DOJ.339 It also requires the Inspector General of the DOJ to audit "the 
effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal use" of NSLs 
issued by DOJ.34o This includes: (a) reviewing the NSLs issued from 2003 
to 2006; (b) a description of any "noteworthy facts or circumstances" (such 
as the illegal use of the power); (c) an evaluation of how useful NSLs are as 
an investigative tool; (d) an examination of how the information is 
collected, retained, and analyzed by DOJ and others; and, (e) an 
examination of how such information is used.341 The report, which is to be 
unclassified but can contain a classified annex, is to be submitted within a 
year to the Judiciary Committees and Select Committees on Intelligence in 
House and Senate.342 The statute also requires the Attorney General and 
Director of National Intelligence to submit a joint report on the feasibility 
336 See 35 U.S.C. § 53 1 2 .  
337 House Approves, supra note 236. 
338 Interview with Sen. Ron Wyden, at Stanford Law School, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Feb. 1 7, 
2006). 
339 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 1 09- 1 77, 
§ 1 18, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). 
340 Id. § 1 19. 
341 Id. 
342 Id. §§ 1 19-20. 
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of applying minimization procedures to protect constitutional rights of u.s. 
persons.343 
The renewal act provided some other protections, such as exempting 
libraries that function as traditional book lenders and offer Internet access 
from being served with NSLs, allowing the appeal of gag orders, and not 
requiring that the recipient of the NSL provide the FBI with the name of 
any attorney consulted about the search.344 Despite these welcome 
provisions, the broader power to collect massive amounts of information on 
cItIzens remains. Minimal restrictions are placed on who sees the 
information, how long it is kept, and the purposes to which it is directed. 
And a classified annex means that substantial amounts of information may 
still be kept secret from public scrutiny. The renewal act, moreover, 
provides for a one-year delay before a gag order can be appealed. 345 
D. WEAKENING OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES 
As the above section demonstrates, despite the history of broad 
executive use of surveillance authority, and the strictures introduced in the 
1 970s to try to protect privacy and limit use of these powers, subsequent 
legislation expanded the executive branch's ability to obtain citizens' 
private information. A similar story accompanies the administrative 
procedures adopted to implement statutory measures. 
The onslaught began as soon as the Attorney General revised the 
guidelines to reflect concerns raised in the course of the Church Committee 
hearings. Pointing to the tendency of organizations to go dormant, before 
again becoming violent, one Special Agent in Charge argued "that 
provisions for such activity should be made in the Attorney General 's 
guidelines to cover such situations prior to violent and/or detrimental 
reactivations of such organizations.,,346 In 1 982, FBI Director William 
Webster announced during Senate hearings that the DO] would be 
reviewing the guidelines to take account of the fact that some "terrorist 
groups" were "no different from other criminal enterprises. ,,347 The 
following year Attorney General William French Smith weakened the Levi 
343 Id. § 120. 
344 James Kuhnhenn, Patriot Act renewal clears hurdle in Senate, MERCURY NEWS.COM, 
Feb. 1 6, 2006, http://www.mercurynews.com/mldlmercurynews/news/politicsl 13890847 
.htm. 
345 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act § 1 1 5 .  
346 Theoharis, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 890 (citing Memorandum from SAC, Pittsburgh to 
William Webster, FBI Dir., FBI 1 00-56839-293 (Mar. 14, 1 979» . 
347 Id. at 890 (quoting Rules on FBI's surveillance of Political Groups to Change, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 1 982, at BI4 (quoting FBI Dir. William Webster» . 
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guidelines by eliminating probable cause. Instead, surveillance could 
follow whenever there was a "reasonable indication" of criminal activity.348 
Smith also broadened the provision to allow for a "limited preliminary 
inquiry." This category collapsed the preliminary and limited investigatory 
divisions established by Levi, with the effect of allowing all investigatory 
techniques-short of wiretaps, mail opening, and the gathering of envelope 
infonnation-in the preliminary stage.349 Smith doubled the length of time 
the Bureau could conduct such investigations (from 90 days to 1 80 days), 
with authorization available for further extensions. Smith did not require 
that the Bureau give notice in writing to DOJ, nor did agents need to obtain 
direct authorization. Instead, the attorney general "may, as he deems 
necessary, request the FBI to prepare a report on the status of the 
investigation. ,,350 
In 1 989, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh made minor 
amendments to the guidelines, expanding them slightly. On Attorney 
General Janet Reno's  watch, although the text did not change after the 
Oklahoma City bombing, FBI Director Louis Freeh announced that he 
would interpret the guidelines more expansively.35 I The practical effect 
meant that while, in the past, the FBI had been reluctant to go after groups 
that advocated violence unless there was some indication an imminent 
threat existed, agents could now initiate investigations where groups 
advocated violence for political or social ends, if agents detennined that the 
organizations had the ability to carry out the threats. 
Following the attacks of 9/1 1 ,  Attorney General Ashcroft overhauled 
the guidelines. He issued two documents. The first, as previously 
discussed, eliminated the wall between prosecution and intelligence 
investigations. Either side could act to initiate, operate, continue, or expand 
FISA searches or surveillance. The second gave the FBI the authority to 
enter anywhere open to public (which includes surfing the Internet, 
attending religious gatherings, and taking notes at political meetings) to 
obtain data that may be relevant to criminal activity.352 It did not require 
348 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ArrORNEY GENERAL'S 
GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC 
SECURITYffERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS, reprinted in FBI Domestic Security Guidelines: 
Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Congo 67, 79 ( 1983). 
349 See, for example, the discussions at EPIC Attorney General's Guidelines Page. 
http://www.epic.orglprivacy/fbi/ (last visited June 9, 2006). 
350 Theoharis, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 890-91 (quoting Attorney General's Guidelines on 
Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations, 32 CRIM. L. REp. (BNA) 3092 (1983)). 
35 1 Terrorism Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Crime of the H. Comm. on Int 'l 
Relations, 104th Congo ( 1995) (testimony of FBI Dir., Louis Freeh). 
352 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ArrORNEY GENERAL'S 
1 120 LA URA K. DONOHUE [Vol. 96 
suspicion of actual criminal or terrorist activity.353 This allowed for what 
one commentator referred to as the "routine mining of commercial 
databases for personal information," without any limits on with whom or to 
what extent this information could be shared.354 
Ashcroft's memo essentially collapsed the different stages of an 
investigation. Where before agents would have to check leads, then 
conduct a preliminary investigation, and, if enough evidence emerged, then 
move to open a full investigation, from June 2002 on, agents could rapidly 
move to the third stage.355 The guidelines gave the Special Agent in Charge 
the authority to initiate and renew investigations, so long as notification was 
sent to headquarters. 356 Perhaps the most startling aspect of the new 
guidelines is that they require the FBI to maintain a database of all 
investigations.357 This information can be shared with the DOJ, other 
federal agencies, and state or local criminal justice agencies. The data 
collection powers are particularly strong where terrorism is concemed?58 
As in the Vietnam era, the FBI appears to be using these powers to 
place anti-war demonstrators under surveillance. According to the New 
York Times, the Bureau is amassing "extensive information on the tactics, 
training and organization of antiwar demonstrators." The FBI defends its 
position, claiming it is simply trying to identify "anarchists and ' extremist 
elements "'-not monitor "the political speech of law-abiding protesters.,,359 
Yet during anti-war protests in New York City, questionnaires used by the 
police included queries on political party affiliation, voting record, and 
view of the President. In 2005, a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") 
suit filed by the ACLU revealed that the FBI has expanded its surveillance 
to environmental and political organizations. The ACLU, Greenpeace, and 
other civil groups have been the target of Bureau surveillance.36o 
GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE 
INVESTIGATIONS 6 (2002), available at http://www.usdoj .gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf 
[hereinafter AG TERRORISM GUIDELINES]. 
353 Swire, supra note 263, at l 355. 
354 Id. 
355 AG TERRORISM GUIDELINES, supra note 352, at 2. 
356 Id. at 19. 
357 !d. at 2 1 .  
358 Id. at 2 1 -22. 
359 Eric Lichtblau, FBI Scrutinizes Antiwar Rallies; Officials Say Effort Aims at 
'Extremist Elements, ' N.Y. TIMES, Nov 23, 2003, at 1 .  
360 Editorial, FBI Files Are Chilling, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, July 22, 2005. 
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E .  SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS 
As was previously noted, the National Security Agency' s  surveillance 
program is not the only NSA project in this realm-nor, in this regard, is 
the NSA unique amongst federal entities. Many of these operations capture 
U.S. persons in their remit--outside the contours of either the Fourth 
amendment or FISA.361 One critical difference between them and the 
programs uncovered by the Church Committee is that the amount of 
information that can now be amassed far exceeds that of the mid-20th 
century-at a fraction of the effort previously required (if such data could 
have been obtained at all). 
Perhaps one of the most significant developments in this area is the 
increasing involvement of the Department of Defense in domestic 
surveillance. This section briefly discusses DOD's Counterintelligence 
Field Activity. It also touches on Echelon, a relic of the cold war that NSA 
continues to run, and CarnivorelDCS 1 000, and Magic Lantern, projects 
initiated by the FBI. It concludes with a short examination of federal watch 
lists and, despite congressional objection, continued executive branch 
development of informer systems. 
1. Counterintelligence Field Activity 
In June 2004, ten activists went to Halliburton to protest the firm's 
"war profiteering"--charging too much for food distributed to U.S.  troops 
in Iraq. 362 The protesters wore papier-mache masks and handed out peanut 
butter and jelly sandwiches to employees. 363 Just over a year previously, 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, had authorized the 
creation of the Threat and Local Observation Notice ("TALON") 
program-"to capture non-validated domestic threat information, flow that 
information to analysts, and incorporate it into the DOD terrorism threat 
361 One suit working its way through the courts, for instance, alleges that the NSA 
intercepted client-attorney discussions between two citizens in Washington and the director 
of a Muslim charity, who at the time was in Saudi Arabia. See Carol D. Leonnig & Mary 
Beth Sheridan, Saudi Group Alleges Wiretapping by u. s. :  Defunct Charity 's Suit Details 
Eavesdropping, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2006, at A I ;  see also NSA III: Wartime Executive 
Powers and the FISA Court: Hearings Before the S. Judiciary Comm. , I 09th Congo (2006); 
Charles Babington & Dan Eggen, Gonzales Seeks to Clarify Testimony on Spying: Extent of 
Eavesdropping May Go Beyond NSA Work, WASH. POST, Mar. 1 , 2006, at A8, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com!wp-dynlcontentlarticleI2006/02/28/ AR200602280 15  87 
.html. 
362 Michael Isikoff, The Other Big Brother, NEWSWEEK. COM, Jan. 30, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com!idlI 0965509/site/newsweeki. 
363 Id. 
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warning process.,,364 The peanut butter incident made its way into a 
TALON report. And like all TALON reports, the information was 
forwarded to Counterintelligence Field Activity ("CIF A")-a post-9f 1 1 
Pentagon creation charged with putting such data in a central database and 
sharing it with the Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA" ), the Joint 
Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism, and others.365 
TALON, which grew out of Operation Eagle Eyes (a sort of military 
neighborhood-watch program discussed below), gathers information from 
"concerned CItIzens and military members regarding SUSpICIOUS 
incidents.,,366 The reports are not validated and "may or may not be related 
to an actual threat.,,367 They focus on non-specific threats to DOD interests: 
suspected surveillance of DOD facilities and personnel, tests of security, 
unusual repetitive activity, bomb threats, or any other suspicious activity or 
incident "reasonably believed to be related to terrorist activity directed 
against DoD personnel, property, and activities within the United States.,,368 
In his May 2003 Memo establishing the program, Wolfowitz made it clear 
that rapid reporting mattered more than careful detail .  He supplied a list of 
the types of information to be included-amongst other items, the date, 
location, criteria for inclusion, classification level, source and assessment of 
credibility, and details of the act in question-who, what, when, where, 
why, and how.369 
TALON and CIFA illustrate the military's movement into the 
domestic surveillance realm. But they are not the only such initiatives, and 
they stem from a broader, more far-reaching re-orientation of the military to 
domestic affairs. Following 9f1 1 , the Bush Administration pronounced the 
continental United States a military theater.370 The Pentagon created 
364 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Secretaries of the 
Military Dep'ts, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Sec'ys of Def., Assistant 
Sec'ys of Def., Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def., Inspector Gen. of the Dep't of Def., 
Assistants to the Sec'y of Def.,  Dirs. of the Def. Agencies, and Dirs. of the Dep't of Def. 
Field Activities, Collection, Reporting, and Analysis of Terrorist Threats to DOD within the 
United States (May 2, 2003), available at http://blogs.washingtonpost.comlearlywarningJ 
files/depsecdeC memo_on _talon _ terroristJeporting_ maL 2003p.pdf [hereinafter Wolfowitz 
Memo]. 
365 !d. The name of the database is CORNERSTONE. Letter from Robert W. Rogalski, 
Deputy Under Secretary of Def. (Counterintelligence and Sec.) to the Hon. John Warner, 
Chairman, Comm. on Armed Serv., Jan. 27, 2006, available at http://www .sldn.org/binary­
datalSLDN_ARTICLES/pdCfileI2859.pdf. 
366 Wolfowitz Memo, supra note 364, at 1 .  
367 Id. 
368 Id. at 2. 
369 Id. at 3 .  
370 Robert Block & Jay Solomon, Neighborhood Watch; Pentagon Steps Up Intelligence 
Efforts Inside u.s. Borders, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Apr. 27, 2006, 
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Northern Command ("Northcom,,).371  Based in Colorado Springs, 
Northcom maintains intelligence centers in Colorado and Texas-where the 
military analyzes data from CIFA, the FBI, and other domestic agencies.372 
The 290 intelligence agents that staff these centers outnumber both the 
number of people at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, and the number of intelligence agents at the Department of 
Homeland Security ("DHS,,)373 -whose job it is to protect the homeland. 
According to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Robert W. 
Noonan, military intelligence agents not only are allowed to collect 
information about U.S. persons, but can "receive" any information "from 
anyone, anytime." Noonan wrote in his November 2001 memo that the 
enemy moves in "a shadowy underworld operating globally with supporters 
and allies in many countries, including, unfortunately our own.
,,374 Military 
intelligence would "play a pivotal role in helping to defeat" the terrorist 
threat. He continued, "[ c ]ontrary to popular belief, there is no absolute ban 
on intelligence components collecting U.S. person information.,,375 Noonan 
expressed concern about reports that had reached his staff, where military 
intelligence ("MI") personnel had declined "to receive reports from local 
law enforcement authorities, solely because" they contained such 
information. He hastened to reassure the agents, noting that not only could 
they receive the data-"[r]emember, merely receiving information does not 
constitute 'collection' . . .  collection entails receiving 'for use"'-and retain 
it where it related to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, but MI 
could transmit or deliver the information to others.376 
In January 2002, an official from the Army Inspector General's  office, 
Michael Varhola, again raised the issue in a professional circular. He 
complained, "unfortunately some individuals find it easier or safer to avoid 
the issue altogether by simply not collecting the data on citizens they may 
need to do their complete jobs."m By February 2002, Wolfowitz had 
created CIF A to coordinate military intelligence.378 
http://www.nps.edu/News/ReadNews.aspx?id=2487&role=pao&area=media. 
371 Walter Pincus, Pentagon Expanding its Domestic Surveillance Activity: Fears of 
Post-9I}} Terrorism Spur Proposals for New Powers, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2005, at A6. 
372 Id. 
373 Id. 
374 Memorandum from Robert W. Noonan, Jr., Lieutenant Gen., GS, Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Intelligence, Dep't of the Army, on Collecting Information on U.S. persons (Nov. 5, 
2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/uspersons.html. 
375 Id. 
376 Id. 
377 Block & Solomon, supra note 370. 
378 Id. 
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Military domestic surveillance initiatives did not stop there.379 CIF A, 
intended as a clearinghouse for information from other organizations, took 
on a broader role.380 It is said now to have more than one thousand 
employees (although its capacity and budget remain classified).381 CIFA's  
mission has become to "transform" counterintelligence by "fully utilizing 
2 1 st century tools and resources.,,382 The Pentagon boasts that the program 
uses "leading edge information technologies and data harvesting," and 
exploits "commercial data"-this means contracting with White Oak 
Technologies, MZM, and other companies to collect information. CIF A, 
considers counterintelligence to include not just data collection, but also 
activities that "protect DoD and the nation against espionage, other 
intelligence activities, sabotage, assassinations, and terrorist activities . . .  
. ,,383 Their motto is reported to be "Counterintelligence 'to the Edge. ",384 
While the full extent of information being gathered remains cloaked 
from the public eye, in late 2005 and early 2006 some details emerged. In 
Florida, for instance, a TALON report was filed when fewer than two dozen 
people protested outside a military recruiting office at the local mall.  385 The 
librarian who organized the event seemed surprised that the gathering, at 
which a "Bush Lied" sign was displayed, presented a national security 
threat.386 
A Freedom of Information Act request submitted by Service members 
Legal Defense Network also yielded documents in April 2006 showing 
TALON reports filed on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transvestite ("LGBT") 
student groups opposed to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.387 
379 In 2004, for instance, the Marine Corps expanded its domestic intelligence gathering; 
it now oversees the "collection, retention and dissemination of information concerning U.S. 
persons" (as stated in the April 2004 order approving the program). Pincus, supra note 3 7 1 .  
The order suggests that Marine Intelligence will be "increasingly required to perform 
domestic missions . . . as a result, there will be increased instances whereby Marine 
intelligence activities may come across information regarding U.S. persons." Id. (quoting 
the April 2004 order). 
380 Mark Hosenball, America 's Secret Police? Intelligence Experts Warn that a 
Proposal to Merge Two Pentagon Units Could Create an Ominous New Agency, 
NEWSWEEK. COM, Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.comlidlI22901 87/site/newsweekl. 
381 Pincus, supra note 3 7 1 ,  at A6; see also Walter Pincus, Defense Facilities Pass Along 
Reports of Suspicious Activity, WASH . POST, Dec. 1 1 , 2005, at AI2  (discussing CIFA's 
expanded remit). 
382 Pincus, supra note 3 7 1 ,  at A6 (quoting CIFA brochure). 
383 Id. 
384 Isikoff, supra note 362. 
3 8 5  Id. 
386 Id. 
387 TALON Report 902-03-02-05-07 IjulUext, Feb. 3, 2005, at I ,  available at 
http://www .sldn.orglbinary-data/SLDN _ AR TI CLES/pdC file/2859 .pdf. 
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One group, New York University's  OUTlaw-a decades-old student 
organization found at law schools throughout the United States-attracted 
attention in part because of the nomenclature.388 The agent filing the 
TALON report, unaware that the name referred to the intersection between 
coming out and legal issues, wrote, "the term ' outlaw' is not defined in the 
posting . . .  the term 'outlaw' is a backhanded way of saying it's  all right to 
commit possible violence and serve as vigilantes during the symposium. 
Therefore, it is possible that physical harm or vandalism could occur at this 
event. ,,389 A later update to the file noted that the term might "refer to 
members of the gay community that are now ' out' in the open that are 
studying at law schools." It continued, "[h]owever, per the original source 
there is almost nothing about the term 'outlaws' available with conventional 
Internet search engine . . . the source believes there is still a potential for 
confrontation at NYU.,,39o This claim appears somewhat extraordinary: at 
the time of writing, a Google search for "outlaw law schools" yields more 
than 1 .5 million hits in 0.53 seconds. Admittedly, fourteen months have 
elapsed since the original TALON report-and some portion of the hits are 
not directly on point for Outlaw groups at law schools. But it seems at least 
unlikely that enough references did not grace the Internet at the time for an 
intelligence officer to ascertain the nature of the NYU student group's  
activities. 
These are not the only activities that are rather far afield from terrorist 
threats to make their way to CIFA. NBC reported on December 1 3, 2005, 
that of approximately fifteen hundred "suspicious incidents" included in a 
sample of TALON database entries from July 2004 to May 2005, some four 
dozen focused on anti-war meetings and protests, and opposition to military 
recruiting. 391 
In January 2006, Paul Wolfowitz acknowledged in a memo that DOD 
may have obtained and retained information on U.S. citizens that it ought 
not to have.392 Stephen A. Cambone, the Undersecretary of Defense, 
388 /d. at 1 1 - 12. 
389 Id. 
390 Id. at 13  ; see also TALON Report 902-22-04-0S-3S8JuIUext.txt, Apr. 2 1 ,  200S, at 
2, available at http://www.sldn.orgibinary-data/SLDN_ARTICLES/pdCfile/2859.pdf. In 
February, the ACLU filed a FOIA on behalf of the American Friends Service Committee, 
Greenpeace, United for Peace and Justice, and Veterans for Peace. See National Pentagon 
Freedom of Information Act Request by the ACLU (Feb. 1 ,  2006), available at 
http://www .aclu.org/safefree/spyfiles/2402 I lgI2006020 I .html. 
391 Walter Pincus, Pentagon Will Review Database on U.S. Citizens: Protests Among 
Acts Labeled 'Suspicious " WASH. POST, Dec. I S, 200S, at A I .  
392 Isikoff, supra note 362. 
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ordered a formal review.393 The assessment determined CIFA did indeed 
have data that violated regulations-specifically, a ban on retaining 
information on U.S. citizens more than ninety days, unless it was 
"reasonably believed" to be linked to terrorism, criminal wrongdoing, or 
foreign intelligence.394 In January 2006, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon 
England issued a memo, ordering that CIF A "purge such information from 
its files" and recommending refresher training courses on the regulations.395 
Yet, efforts to expand CIF A's  purview continue. CIF A has allegedly 
contracted with Computer Sciences Corporation to buy "identity masking" 
software, enabling it to create false web sites.396 Towards the end of 2005, 
a Presidential commission on intelligence suggested that CIF A be 
empowered to conduct domestic criminal investigations as well as 
clandestine operations.397 Its law enforcement authorities would extend to 
crimes such as treason, espionage, and terrorism. 398 The commission found 
that such an expansion would not require any congressional approval; 
rather, a Presidential order and Pentagon directive would be sufficient to 
provide the requisite authority.399 The 2006 Intelligence Authorization Bill 
included a provision that would allow the FBI, with the approval of the 
Director of National Intelligence, to share information with the Pentagon 
and CIA.400 (The Pentagon, for now, must report such information 
exchanges to Congress.40I) And now rumors are circulating about the 
possible merger of CIF A and the Defense Security Service, an entity that 
holds the data generated by background checks on defense contractors and 
their employees.402 
An important aspect of these programs, and the military's movement 
to this realm, is the relative lack of attention paid to it: while the NSA' s 
apparently more limited domestic surveillance program has been the subject 
of at least four congressional hearings, neither the Senate nor the House has 
conducted an inquiry into DOD ' s  changing domestic surveillance role.403 
393 Pincus, supra note 391,  at AI.  
394 Isikoff, supra note 362. 
395 Id. 
396 Id. 
397 Pincus, supra note 371 ,  at A6 . 
398 Id. 
399 Id. 
400 Id. 
401 Id. 
402 Hosenball, supra note 380. 
403 Pincus, supra note 391 ,  at A I .  For hearings on the NSA program see, e.g., An 
Examination of the Call to Censure the President: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 
1 09th Congo (2006); NSA III, supra note 361; Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's 
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The full extent of the program has yet to be made public: setting aside the 
content for the moment, even the number of annual TALON reports is 
classified.404 Yet the intrusion on individual privacy may be significant: 
according to the inspector general's newsletter, for instance, just one 
military service taking part in this program-the Air Force-generated 
1 ,200 reports during the fourteen months that ended September 2003.405 
2. Echelon 
The NSA's  domestic surveillance effort that has attracted so much 
attention of late is not the only NSA project underway. Echelon, a relic of 
the Cold War, scans telecommunications traffic for key words and phrases, 
recording the content of related conversations. The project began with a 
1 947 agreement between the United States and United Kingdom. Its 
existence finally reached the public domain in the 1 980s, when Margaret 
Newsham, having overheard United States Senator Strom Thurmond while 
listening to his conversations at the Menwith Hill facility in England, 
appeared before Congress.406 The countries party to the agreement 
continued to deny Echelon' s  existence until the late 20th and early 2 1 st 
century.407 Around this time, the European Union Parliament's Scientific 
and Technical Options Assessment Program Office issued two reports: An 
Appraisal of Technologies of Political Control and Interception 
Capabilities 2000.408 Both referred to Echelon and raised the somewhat 
awkward issue of economic espionage.409 The program now includes 
Surveillance Authority II: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm. ,  109th Congo (2006); 
Wartime Executive Power and the NSA 's Surveillance Authority: Hearing Before the S. 
Judiciary Comm. ,  109th Congo (2006). 
404 Pincus, supra note 391,  at A I .  
405 Pincus, supra note 381 ,  at A12.  
406 Duncan Campbell, Somebody 's Listening, NEW STATESMAN, Aug. 12, 1988, at 10-12, 
available at http://cryptome.sabotage.orglechelon-dc.htm; see also David Wood, The Hidden 
Geography of Transnational Surveillance: Social and Technological Networks Around 
Signals Intelligence Sites (Dec. 2 1 ,  2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Newcastle), available at http://www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/d.f.j.woodlthesis.htm. 
407 Jeffrey Richelson, Desperately Seeking Signals: "Echelon " May Be Worrisome, But 
It 's not the All-absorbing Big Ear that Some People Think, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS, Mar.! Apr. 2000, at 47, available at http://www. thebulletin.orglarticle.php? 
art ofn=maOOrichelson. 
408 See DUNCAN CAMPBELL, IPTV LTD., INTERCEPTION CAPABILITIES 2000 (1999) 
available at http://www.cyber-rights.orglinterceptionlstoalic2kreport.htm; STEVE WRIGHT, 
OMEGA FOUND., EUROP!,AN PARLIAMENT, AN ApPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES OF POLITICAL 
CONTROL (Dick Holdsworth ed. 1998), available at http://www .statewatch.orglnews/ 
2005/may/steve-wright-stoa-rep.pdf. 
409 Richard Barry, ECHELON: The EVidence, ZDNET (U.K.), June 29, 2000, 
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,s2079850,00.html. 
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GCHQ in the United Kingdom, the Communications Security 
Establishment ("CSE") in Canada, the Defence Signals Directorate 
("DSD") in Australia, and Government Communications Headquarters 
("GCSB") in New Zealand.410 
Twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, Echelon monitors non­
military communications from, to, and within the United States. This 
means that Internet activity, email, faxes, and telephone transmissions run 
through its filters. It analyzes more than two million messages per hour and 
redistributes them to member states for decryption, filtering, and 
codification.41 1 With listening stations around the world, the five member 
countries submit "dictionaries": lists of key words that flag the system to 
automatically transcribe the message, give it a code, and forward the 
intercept to the country that is interested in that subject matter. Officials 
then further examine the information. "Often, the messages that are red­
flagged are nothing more than innocent conversations and do not have 
substantial merit as threats to national security"-such as a mother relating 
that her son had "bombed" in a play at school.4 12 
The same reluctance that marked Congress' willingness to question 
NSA between 1973 and 1 976 characterizes congressional attitudes towards 
Echelon. In April 2000, Representative Bob Barr finally managed to hold 
hearings to find out if American citizens had come under surveillance. Met 
by NSA stonewalling, the House of Representatives subsequently passed a 
measure requiring full disclosure. However, the Senate stepped in and 
amended it, requiring only a confidential report from NSA to the Select 
Committees on Intelligence.4 13 . Partly because of this lack of public 
oversight, the legal framework for Echelon remains less than clear. When 
Porter Goss, the Republican Chair of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, asked NSA to provide legal standards, the 
agency refused.414 The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 
410 Sarah Ferguson, Overloading Big Brother: 'Hactivists ' Try to Short-Circuit the 
Spooks, VILL. VOICE, Oct. 20-26, 1999, available at http://www.villagevoice.comlissues/ 
9942/ferguson.php; see also Richelson, supra note 407; Patrick S. Poole, ECHELON: 
America's Secret Global Surveillance Network, http://home.hiwaay.net/�pspoole/ 
echelon.html (last visited June 9, 2006). 
41 1  Erin Zimmennan & Dale Hurd, Surveillance Society: Exposing Echelon, Techno 
WarfareIMACRO-VSGOV, Dec. 14, 1999, http://members.tripod.coml�ellis_smith 
Ivwars3.html (last visited June 9, 2006). 
412 Erin L. Brown, Comment, Echelon: The National Security Agency 's Compliance with 
Applicable Legal Guidelines in Light of the Need for Tighter National Security, 1 1  
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 185, 189 n.48 (2003). 
413 H.R. 1 555, 106th Congo (2000). 
414 Richelson, supra note 407 
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required NSA, CIA, and the Attorney General to address the legal standards 
for the interception of communications when such interception may result 
in intentional targeting of communications involving U.S. persons.415  
3. Carnivore/DCS 1000 
In July 2000, Neil King of the Wall Street Journal revealed another 
secret, wiretapping operation.416  Carnivore, introduced in 1 999 by the FBI 
without DOJ approval (or knowledge), monitors ISPs to intercept digital 
information. The Bureau activates the system "when other implementations 
(e.g., having an ISP provide the requested data) do not meet the needs of the 
investigators or the restrictions placed by the court.,,41 7 Carnivore uses 
hardware, known as a "black box," and software, attached to the ISP ' s  
system, to collect email, instant messaging, chat-room discussions, financial 
transactions, and websites visited.4 18  CarnivorelDCS 1 000 "chews all the 
data on the network"-while ostensibly only eating the particular 
information indicated in a court order.4 19 Law enforcement can program it 
to collect all information to and from specified receivers and senders. 
As news of Carnivore hit the proverbial fan, the FBI renamed the 
system the more innocuous-sounding "DCS 1 000.'.420 The House and the 
Senate immediately held hearings to look into the matter, at which the FBI 
revealed that by September 2000 it had used the system twenty-five to 
4 15 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-120, § 309, 1 1 3, 
Stat. 1606, § 1613 (1999). Ostensibly, the legal framework would include the Fourth 
Amendment requirement of reasonableness and probable cause for search and seizure. If the 
interceptions fall under FISA, then those structures would apply. Of additional relevance 
would be Executive Order 12,333, established by President Ronald Reagan in 1981  and 
dealing with the use of surveillance for national defense. 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981).  
416 Neil King, Jr., FBI 's Wiretaps to Scan E-Mail Spark Concern, WALL ST. J., July 1 1 ,  
2000, at A3. 
417 STEPHEN P. SMITH ET AL., ILL. INST. OF TECH., CHI .-KENT COLL. OF LAW, INDEPENDENT 
REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM: FINAL REpORT viii (2000) (marked DOJ Sensitive; 
obtained by EPIC in 2004 FOIA request). 
418 Graham B. Smith, Notes and Comments, A Constitutional Critique of Carnivore, 
Federal Law Enforcement 's Newest Electronic Surveillance Strategy, 2 1  Loy. L.A. ENT. L. 
REv. 481 ,  492 (2001). Full content communications is collected under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
22 (2000) and 50 U.S.C. § §  1 801-29; address information is taken under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3 121 -
27  and 50  U.S.C. §§ 1 841 -46. The filter works at a rate of  forty million megabits per second 
or faster. [d. 
419 Robert Graham, Carnivore F AQ, http://corz.orglpublic/docs/privacy/camivore­
faq.html (last visited June 9, 2006). 
420 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CARNIVOREIDCS- l OOO REpORT TO CONGRESS 1 
(2003) [hereinafter FBI CARNIVORE REPORT] (submitted to Judiciary Committees of the 
United States House of Representatives and United States Senate on Feb. 24, 2003). 
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thirty-five times.421  Twenty-eight members of Congress followed with 
letters to Attorney General Janet Reno, demanding that the program be 
terminated.422 Instead, the DO] suspended it, pending an independent, 
technical review.423 When the report concluded that the system was sound, 
the DOJ reengaged Carnivore.424 Importantly, though, while the review 
noted that the information being gathered may exceed the court order 
initiating the surveillance, it did not address the constitutional issues raised 
by the operation of the program. 
The agency' s  refusal to disclose more information led to the 
introduction of Section 305 of the 2 1 st Century Department of Justice 
Appropriation Authorization Act, which required a report at the end of 
Fiscal Year 2002 and Fiscal Year 2003 on the operation of the program. In 
these documents, the FBI announced that it had used DCS 1 000 zero times 
from 2002 to 2003. Instead, the Bureau made use of commercially­
available software to undertake surveillance thirteen times during that 
period.425 (This number does not include the number of times ISPs used 
their own software to intercept communications, such as those requested 
under NSLs.426) 
An Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") FOIA request in 
October 2000 yielded 729 pages of information on the system-of which 
two hundred pages were blank, and another four hundred partially 
redacted. 427 The FBI, which justifies the system on claims of national 
security, asserted that it could only be programmed to get specific 
information. However, as noted by Senator Patrick Leahy and the formal 
review report, the system lacks procedural safeguards. The FBI determines 
which emails to obtain, according to classified FBI procedures. 
421 See Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's 'Carnivore ' Program: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the JudiCiary, 1 06th Congo 
(2000), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committee/judiciary/hju6730S.000/ 
hju6730S_0.htm; Digital Privacy and the FBI's Carnivore Internet Surveillance Program: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Congo (2000). 
422 Smith, supra note 418, at 49S. 
423 SMITH ET AL., supra note 417. 
424 Smith, supra note 4 18, at 496. 
425 See FBI CARNIVORE REpORT, supra note 420, at 1 .  
426 See Kevin Poulsen, FBI Retires Its Carnivore, SECURITY Focus, Jan. 14, 200S, 
http://www.securityfocus.comlnews/l 0307. 
427 Peter 1. Young, Note, The Case Against Carnivore: Preventing Law Eriforcement 
from Devouring Privacy, 3S IND. L. REv. 303, 306 (2001). 
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4. Magic Lantern 
Magic Lantern is an FBI keystroke logging program that does not 
require physical access to conduct surveillance of an individual 's computer 
use.428 The software targets a user's  system through an email message, with 
the sender posing as a friend or family member. It is unclear whether the 
recipient needs to open the attachment or not.429 The FBI also has the 
option of hacking a user's computer and placing the program directly on the 
hard drive. Magic Lantern captures keystrokes and, when the computer 
hooks up to the Internet, automatically sends the information back to the 
FBI. Although Magic Lantern might be caught by virus scans, the FBI 
approached companies that program against viruses and requested that they 
not target the surveillance device. Some agreed.430 This program provides 
the FBI with a way to break the use of encryption by identifying pass 
phrases used to access information. It also can recreate emails and word 
documents never printed or sent, as well as other information that was never 
meant to move beyond the immediate computer. Its primary use is in an 
intelligence function. 
The courts have already addressed the constitutionality of keystroke 
programs: they determined that a key-logging device, with a search 
warrant, is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.43 1 The court wrote, 
"we must be ever vigilant against the evisceration of Constitutional rights at 
the hands of modem technology. Yet, at the same time, it is likewise true 
that modem-day criminals have also embraced technological advances and 
used them to further their felonious purposes.,,432 The government argued 
in Scarfo that the Key Logger System ("KLS") used met Title III 
requirements: it did not record the user's entry while any modem on the 
computer was in operation. Similarly, the program did not actively seek out 
428 See Elinor M. Abreu, FBI Confirms Magic Lantern Exists, REUTERS, Dec. 12, 200 1 ,  
originally published a t  http://www.msnbc.comlnews/67198 1 .asp?Osi. currently available at 
http://www.comrnondreams.org!headlinesOI11 2 12-07.htm; Alex Salkever, A Dark Side to 
the FBI's Magic Lantern, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, Nov. 27, 2001 ,  
http://www.businessweek.comlbwdaily/dnflashlnov200Ilnf2001 1 127_501 1 .htm; Bob 
Sullivan, FBI Software Cracks Encryption Wall, MSNBC, Nov. 20, 2001 ,  
http://www.msnbc.comlnews/660096.asp?cpl = l ;  Robert Vamosi, Commentary, Warning: 
the FBI Knows What You 're Typing, ZDNET (U.K.), Dec. 4, 200 1 ,  
http://zdnet.com.coml2 100- 1 107-504142.html; see also Christopher Woo & Miranda So, 
Note, The Case for Magic Lantern: September 11 Highlights the Need for Increased 
Surveillance, 1 5  HARV. J.L. & TECH. 521 , 521 (2002). 
429 See Sullivan, supra note 428. 
430 Woo & So, supra note 428, at 524 (citing Carrie Kirby, Network Associates Mired in 
Security Debate, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 28, 2001 ,  at B l ). 
431 United States v. Scarfo, 1 80 F. Supp. 2d 572, 578 (D.N.J. 2001).  
432 Id. at 583. 
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data already held on the computer. The court denied defense counsel access 
to the manner in which KLS operated as well as the precise data gained, 
saying instead that the program "obtained the passphrase to the [suspect] 
file and retrieved information. ,,433 
5. Terrorism Information and Prevention System (TIPS) 
In January 2002, the DOJ announced plans for the Terrorism 
Information and Prevention System ("TIPS"). "A national system for 
concerned workers to report suspicious activity,',434 the aim was to recruit 
"millions of American truckers, letter carriers, train conductors, ship 
captains, utility employees and others" as informers.435 The pilot program 
would have required one in every twenty-four Americans living in the 
largest ten cities to report anything perceived as "unusual or suspicious." 
For seven months after the announcement, little happened. Then, just 
weeks before the DOJ was set to launch TIPS, Ritt Goldstein wrote an 
article in the Sydney Morning Herald pointing out that implementation 
would mean "the US will have a higher percentage of citizen informants 
than the former East Germany through the infamous Stasi secret police. ,,436 
Some four percent of Americans would report "suspicious activity.',437 The 
Associated Press picked up the story, and an immediate backlash fol lowed. 
A Boston Globe editorial led off: "OPERATION TIPS . . .  is a scheme 
that Joseph Stalin would have appreciated. ,,438 Opposition spanned the 
ideological divide: in the House of Representatives, Republican majority 
leader Dick Armey and Representative Bob Barr condemned the program, 
their resistance matched in the Senate by Democratic Senators Patrick J. 
433 Id. at 574; see also JAMES A. ADAMS, NAT'L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, OVERVIEW 
OF CHAPTER 1 2 1 .  STORED WIRE AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSACTIONAL 
RECORDS ACCESS Commentary (2004). 
434 STANLEY, supra note 289, at 3.  
435 Operation TIPS web pages have since been removed from the internet, although the 
original pages from July 16 and Aug. 8, 2002, are available at 
http://www.thememoryhole.org/policestate/tips-changes.htm (last visited June 9, 2006). 
436 Ritt Goldstein, U.S. Planning to Recruit One in 24 Americans as Citizen Spies, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 1 5, 2002, at 2, available at http://www.srnh.com.aul 
articles/2002/07 11411 0261 85 141232.html?oneclick=true. 
437 !d. 
438 Editorial, Ashcroft vs. Americans, BOSTON GLOBE, July 1 7, 2002, at 22, available at 
http://http:llwww.commondreams.org/views02/07 17-01 .htm; see also Editorial, What is 
Operation TIPS?, WASH. POST, July 14, 2002, at B6; Ellen Sorokin, Planned Volunteer­
Informant Corps Elicits '1984 ' Fears; Accessing Private Homes is Objective of 'Operation 
TIPS, ' WASH. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at A3, available at http://www.commondreams.org/ 
headlines02/07 16-0 l .htm. 
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Leahy, Edward M. Kennedy, and Charles E. Schumer.439 The deliberate 
inclusion of professions with access to private homes, and the apparent 
intention to use TIPS to build a central data base, caused particular affront. 
On July 25, Attorney General Ashcroft told the Senate Judiciary Committee 
that although the FBI and agencies would retain the information, he was not 
aware of any plans to build a central data base.44o 
Congress, unconvinced, shut down the program: "Any and all 
activities of the Federal Government to implement the proposed component 
program of the Citizen Corps known as Operation TIPS (Terrorism 
Information and Prevention System) are hereby prohibited.'.441 
Congress' ban on TIPS turned out to be wishful thinking: although the 
website disappeared from cyberspace, a plethora of watch programs 
followed. Marine Watch sprung up in Maine, Ohio, and Michigan.442 
President Bush declared "Coastal Beacon," which coordinated reports of 
suspicious activity along the shores of Maine, to be "[0 ]ne of the most 
innovative TIP [sic] programs in the country.'.443 DHS, which funded 
Highway Watch, embraced the more than three million truck drivers 
integrated into the program as "a potential army of eyes and ears to monitor 
for security threats," claiming they are "naturally very aware of suspicious 
activity and behavior." The department added, "truck drivers are 
everywhere-ports, airports, malls, bridges, tunnels-thus giving greater 
range to homeland security observation efforts.,,444 On March 1 5, 2004, the 
Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") announced that another 
$ 1 9.3 million would assist the TSA and American Trucking Associations to 
expand the operations. The press release stated, "[t]his innovative program 
combines the training of highway professionals in safety and security 
awareness with information sharing and analysis networks, to assist in 
439 Adam Clymer, Ashcroft Defends Plan for National Hotline on Terrorism, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2002/07/25/politics/25CND­
PRIV.html. 
440 See, e.g. , William Matthews, Ashcroft: No Central Database for Citizen Tips, 
FCW.COM, July 29, 2002, http://www.fcw.comlfcw/articles/2002/0729/news-tips-07-29-
02.asp. 
441 See H.R. REp. 108-2555, §880 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) available at http://www.ala.org/ 
alaloifiifissues/terrorisminformationprevention.htm. 
442 STANLEY, supra note 289, at 5 .  
443 Press Release, The White House, President Promotes Citizen Corps for Safer 
Communities (Apr. 8, 2002), available at http://www. hitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/04/ 20020408-4.html. 
444 Highway Watch Fact Sheet, http://www.highwaywatch.comlpressJooml 
fact_sheets.html (last visited June 9, 2005); see also http://www.tmta.com!ResourceslNews/ 
HighwayWatch.asp (last visited June 9, 2006). 
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national security and road safety.'.445 What makes the expansion-indeed, 
the very existence---of the Highway Watch system surprising is that the 
"Operation TIPS Fact Sheet" initially listed it as a TIPS system, making its 
continuance a violation of Congress' express prohibition.446 
Proponents of these programs argue that the state has limited 
resources. Enlisting the help of law-abiding citizens-many of whom are 
eager to help in some way-would dramatically increase law enforcement's 
ability to interdict crime. And past successes readily present themselves. 
For instance, the "Neighborhood Watch" concept has proven effective in 
stemming ordinary crime.447 Terrorism, in particular, depends upon 
surreptitious operations-planning that may easily slip beneath the radar of 
law enforcement that must focus on a range of different threats. The 
approach counters the impersonalization created by social mobility and 
urbanization, returning society to an environment more like the small 
communities that characterize rural areas.448 By preventing terrorists from 
blending into their surroundings, they lose the anonymity critical to their 
ability to mount attacks. With the potential devastation created by 
technological advances, it becomes all the more important to try to prevent 
terrorist attacks. 
Those opposed to these programs note the potential for prejudice and 
abuse imbedded in the requirement that "suspicious activity" be reported. 
According to Eagle Eyes, for instance, potential terrorists include, "[p ]eople 
who don't seem to belong in the workplace, neighborhood, business 
establishment or anywhere else . . .  people know what looks right and what 
doesn't look right in their neighborhoods, office spaces, commutes, etc., 
and if a person just doesn't  seem like he or she belongs, there' s  probably a 
reason for that.'.449 As the Pentiti trials in Italy or the Supergrass system in 
445 Highway Watch, Transportation Security Administration and the American Trucking 
Associations Team up to Prevent and Respond to Possible Terrorist Threats, 
http://www.highwaywatch.comlannouncements/tsa.html (last visited June 9, 2006). 
446 STANLEY, supra note 289, at 5 n. l l . 
447 See, e.g. , Neighborhood Crime Watch, Anchorage Police Dep't, 
http://www.muni.orglapd2/ncw.cfm (last visited June 9, 2006) (extolling the virtues of the 
Anchorage neighborhood watch program); Neighborhood Watch, City of San Diego, 
http://www.sandiego.gov/police/preventionlneighwatch.shtml (last visited June 9, 2006) 
(underscoring the value of the San Diego neighborhood watch program); Neighborhood 
Watch, Lane County, Or., http://www.co.lane.or.uslNeighborhoodWatchidefault.htm (last 
visited June 9, 2006) (referring to Neighborhood Watch as "a proven crime-reduction 
program."). 
448 As of 1 977, three out of every four Americans lived in cities or surrounding suburbs. 
See PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM'N, REpORT: PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 1 ( 1977), available at http://www.epic.orglprivacy/ppscI977reportl c l .htm. 
449 U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Eagle Eyes Program, 
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Northern Ireland attest, such programs become a way for people to settle 
old scores-which bear no relation to terrorism.450 And the lack of controls 
over what happens to the information-:-how it is stored, whether and to 
what extent it is verified, who sees it, how long it is kept, and to what ends 
it is directed-creates a system that is vulnerable to political abuse. 
Even once ordered destroyed, such information may nevertheless 
haunt those to whom it relates. In the mid- 1 970s, the Church Committee 
hearings led to the order to destroy thousands of files held by the Los 
Angeles Police Department.45 1 In 1 983, however, it emerged that an LAPD 
detective had stolen the files and kept them in his garage, making the 
information available to the Western Goals Foundation.452 This anti­
Communist, Cold War organization circulated the data to local police 
departments, the Secret Service, FBI, State Department, and CIA.453 Such 
systems may quickly take on racial overtones. Moreover, they increase fear 
and mistrust in society and may have a debilitating affect on social 
interactions. And free speech bears the burden: the ease with which issues 
may be discussed both publicly and privately may alter, with a debilitating 
affect on the democratic process. 
TIPS is only one part of the Citizen Corps program handed down by 
Executive Order in the aftermath of 9/1 1 .  The Corps' self-stated goal is "to 
harness the power of every individual through education, training, and 
volunteer service to make communities safer, stronger, and better prepared 
for terrorism . . . .'.454 The Citizens' Preparedness Guide, issued by the 
USA Freedom Corps, (with a foreword by Ashcroft noting the need to 
change social behavior in the aftermath of 9/1 1 )  urges citizens to 
"[c]onsider incorporating your place of worship into your Neighborhood 
Watch programs.,.455 
At one extreme, such recommendations contribute to increased 
suspicion throughout the fabric of social life. At the other, many 
recommendations appear to have little real impact on terrorism. The guide 
also recommends, for example, that Americans keep their yards clean and 
http://public.afosLamc.af.milleagle/index.asp (last visited June 9, 2006). 
450 See, e.g., STEVEN GREER, SUPERGRASSES: A STUDY IN ANn-TERRORIST LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND ( 1995). 
451 STANLEY, supra note 288, at 8. 
452 [d. 
453 !d. at 8-9. 
454 [d. at 27. 
455 NAT'L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, UNITED FOR A STRONGER AMERICA: CITIZENS' 
PREPAREDNESS GUIDE 1 2  (2002), available at http://www.citizencorps.gov/pdflcpg.pdf. 
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"[p ]rune shrubbery. ,,456 Citizens are directed to contact law enforcement 
whenever they see "someone unfamiliar . . .  loitering in a parking 10t.,,457 
The guide further urges that, "[ w ]hen traveling" Americans should "dress 
conservatively. ,,458 
6. Watch Lists 
As was previously discussed, in the mid-20th century the CIA, FBI, 
IRS, and NSA all had "watch lists" that carried consequences for American 
citizens.459 It was not clear exactly how names got onto each of these lists. 
The directors of the organizations did not review each name personally. 
The head of the NSA, Admiral Gaylor, did not even know about the 
existence of the tabulations until a year after taking office. Instead, the lists 
were administered at a lower level and agencies circulated names to each 
other, which the NSA and others simply accepted on the assurance that their 
inclusion was somehow appropriate.460 
Once again, the executive branch has begun to construct lists with 
minimal procedural safeguards. At least twelve exist at a federal leve1.461 
One of these, what has colloquially come to be considered the "No Fly 
List," merits brief discussion. 
As of September 1 1 , 200 1 ,  the federal government maintained sixteen 
people on a secret "No Transport List"-a total number that, even if names 
correlated, would have been insufficient to prevent all nineteen hijackers 
from boarding the planes. By December 2001 ,  this list evolved into two 
sets of records : the "No Fly List" and the "Selectee List." The first 
completely barred individuals from flying; the second merely subjected 
certain people to further security measures. By the following year, these 
456 Id. at 6. 
457 Id. at 18. 
458 Id. at 15. 
459 Church Committee Vol. 5, supra note 98. 
460 !d. at 30-33. 
461 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: TERRORIST WATCH 
LISTS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO PROMOTE BEITER INTEGRATION AND SHARING 12 
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03322.pdf; see also Progress in 
Consolidating Terrorist Watchlists-The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC): Joint Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H Comm. on the 
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Intelligence and Counterterrorism of the H Select Comm. 
on Homeland Security, 108th Congo 8-1 3  (2004) (statement of Donna A. Bucella, Dir., 
Terrorist Screening Ctr., Fed. Bureau of Investigation) (discussing Terrorist Screening 
Center watchlist derived from Terrorist Threat Integration Center's main database); Review: 
'No-jly list ' Lacks Rules, Procedures: Watch List Meant to Stop Terrorists from Flying Is 
Under Scrutiny, CNN.com, Oct. 10, 2004, http://www.cnn.coml2004IUSIl 01 l0/ 
terror. watch.listl [hereinafter Review: 'No-Fly list 1-
2006] PRIVACY AND SUR VEILLANCE 1 1 37 
two lists combined encompassed more than one thousand names, and by 
April 2005, some 70,000 names graced the two catalogs.462 For the 
program's  first two-and-a-half years, however, the FBI and TSA denied its 
existence.463 
It was not until prominent anti-war activists, such as Jan Adams and 
Rebecca Gordon, and political opponents of the Bush Administration, such 
as Senator Edward Kennedy and civil rights attorney David Cole, found 
themselves on the list that it began to attract broader public attention.464 
Various prominent Muslim-Americans, such as singer Cat Stevens and 
Anny chaplain James Yee, similarly found themselves singled out, as did 
two dozen students, chaperoned by a priest and a nun, on their way to a 
peace teach-in.465 Documents obtained through an ACLU FOIA request in 
2004 demonstrated that even those entering names and administering the 
list had no idea how everyone had been added.466 One particularly telling 
email suggested that the author would not risk flying commercial, because 
of the haphazard manner in which the list had been assembled and the lack 
of procedural safeguards or mechanisms to facilitate getting off of it. 
Beyond the 70,000 people actually on the lists, anecdotal evidence 
shows that individuals who share exact or similar names to those on the list 
also have become caught in the system. In Portland, Oregon, two 
comedians wrote a song about the plight of anyone named David Nelson: 
They call me David Nelson and my name has been besmirched 
When I fly across my country, I will always be strip-searched 
Somewhere a David Nelson is allegedly quite mean 
And the TSA ain't able to declare my person clean . . .  
I missed my flight from Texas and I missed my flight to Spain 
You'd think my second cousin was a Tikrit named Hussein 
462 Morning Edition (Nat'l Pub. Radio radio broadcast, Apr. 26, 2005). 
463 Telephone interview with Thomas R. Burke, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, in 
Palo Alto, Cal. (May 5, 2005). 
464 BOB CunDY & ANGILEE SHAH, Jan Adams & Rebecca Gordon, in AM. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL., CAUGHT IN THE BACKLASH: STORIES FROM NORTHERN 
CALIFORNIA (2002), available at http://www.aclunc.orgl9 1 Ilbacklashl; Sara Kehaulani Goo, 
Sen. Kennedy Flagged by No-Fly List, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2004, at AO I ;  Interview with 
David Cole, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., in Palo Alto, Cal. (Sept. 1 7, 
2005) [hereinafter Interview with Cole]. 
465 James Bovard, The Surveillance State, AM. CONSERVATIVE, May 19, 2003, at 10; 
Interview with Cole, supra note 464. 
466 See Review: 'No-fly list, , supra note 461 .  
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I'm scrutinized and sanitized by security and then 
The next time that I fly, they have to do it all again.467 
In response to a class-action lawsuit filed by people caught in the name 
game, the TSA created an ombudsperson process. Individuals now can 
download and print out a Passenger Identity Verification Form and mail it, 
along with certain notarized documents, to TSA. The organization then 
decides whether clearance procedures may help to expedite your travel, but 
it is not required to do anything, nor is any criterion available as to how the 
decision is made. The process does not remove your name. Rather, it 
differentiates you from others who may be on the list and saves your 
personal information, which is then forwarded to the airlines, in another, 
specially-cleared list. 
The No Fly List list overlaps with the Computer Assisted Passenger 
Screening ("CAPS"), which draws information from a database to 
determine which individuals ought to be placed under further scrutiny.468 
The idea behind CAPS was to create a "vast air security screening system 
designed to instantly pull together every passenger's  travel history and 
living arrangements, plus a wealth of other personal and demographic 
information" in order to "profile passenger activity and intuit obscure clues 
about potential threats.,,469 Airlines would collect and provide the full 
name, address, phone number, and date of birth of people flying. The 
broader system would then use "data-mining and predictive software" to 
determine the degree of risk posed by the individual.470 
The companies initially signed up to develop prototypes collected the 
information themselves, which ranged from land records and car ownership 
to projected income, magazine SUbscriptions, and telephone numbers.471 
When interviewed on the system, the former acting administrator of the 
Federal Aviation Administration (and security consultant for the CAPS 
project) said, "[t]his is not fantasy stuff . . . .  This technology, based on 
467 ACLU of Northern California, No-Fly Lawsuit Client Biography: David C. Nelson, 
http://aclunc.orgl91 I1nelson.htrnl (last visited June 9, 2006). 
468 The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1 996 required the FAA to help airlines 
to develop CAPS as part of its overall security effort. Pub. L. No. 104-264, § 307, 1 1  0 Stat. 
32 13, 3253 (1 996). 
469 Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Intricate Screening of Fliers in Works, WASH. POST, Feb. I ,  
2002, at A I .  
470 Id. 
471 See id. To accommodate the accumulation of this information, the Washington Post 
reported, "[i]ndustry officials have already discussed with lawmakers the possible need to 
roll back some privacy protections in the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Driver's Privacy 
Protection Act to enable them to use more of the credit and driver's-license data." Id. 
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transaction analysis, behavior analysis, gives us a pretty good idea of what's 
going on in a person's mind.,,472 In July 2004, Homeland Security 
Secretary Tom Ridge announced that CAPS II would be terminated, but 
other DRS officials said only the name had been retired.473 Indeed, Secure 
Flight, the FAA's latest project, bears a striking similarity to the previous 
project.474 
The problems with the No Fly List generally, and Secure Flight in 
particular, loom large. It is not at all clear who runs the lists, how the 
information gets entered, who verifies it, what the criteria are for inclusion, 
and how the information subsequently is used. Passengers are not given the 
opportunity to challenge the relevant data or to confront those accusing 
them of being associated with terrorist activity. In July 2005, government 
auditors alleged that Secure Flight held information on 43,000 people who 
were not suspected of terrorism-in violation of existing privacy laws.475 
Because TSA refuses to comment on the criteria used, it also cannot reveal 
whether First Amendment activities are being used as a basis for inclusion. 
The existence of the lists shifts the burden of proof onto anyone wishing to 
travel. She first has to prove that she is not the individual sought by the 
state. It also is not clear where the information goes. The Departments of 
Defense, State, Justice, Transport, and Treasury all run similar watch lists, 
some of which include biometric and other personal data. Furthermore, 
much of the information is currently in the hands of private industry. 
The combination of these programs and the proliferation of 
surveillance operations, such as TALON, Echelon and Carnivore, the use of 
programs such as Magic Lantern, and the operation of widespread informer 
systems raise concerns about the broader impact of post-9Il l  surveillance 
on the country. The next section discusses how technology has changed the 
nature of this surveillance, moving the United States from a position of 
physical or data surveillance into the psychological realm. 
F. DATA MINING 
Data mining is a technique used to extract information from large 
amounts of information. The United States operates hundreds of data 
472 Id. (emphasis added). 
473 Cynthia L. Webb, Uncle Sam Mothballs Screening Program, WASH. POST.COM, July 
1 6, 2004, http://www. ashingtonpost.comlwp-dynlarticles/ A54487 -2004Jul I 6.html. 
474 Compare Secure Flight Program: Test Phase: Privacy Impact Assessment, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 57,352 (Sept. 24, 2004), with Privacy Act of 1974: System of Records; Secure Flight 
Test Records, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,345 (Sept. 24, 2004). 
475 Mark Clayton, U.S. Plans Massive Data Sweep, CHRISTIAN SCI . MONITOR, Feb. 9, 
2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.coml2006/0209/pOls02-uspo.html. 
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mining operations, more than a dozen of which relate to counterterrorism. 
The material included in these efforts is not limited to what is gathered 
through surveillance. On the contrary, it may come from any number of 
private and public sources. The aim is to use technology to construct a 
detailed picture of individuals, organizations, and regions. 
Such efforts are not new. In 1 96 1 ,  for instance, Santa Clara County 
developed an alphabetical person index, called LOGIC: Local Government 
Information Control .  476 The database included citizens' names, any aliases 
they used, their social security number, their address, birth date, and 
driver's  license number, any vehicles they drove, where they were 
employed, what their voter and jury status was, and property they owned.477 
Programs currently in existence, though, are considerably more 
sophisticated than earlier prototypes. The information revolution means 
that different, and intensely personal, information can be recorded and 
traced. Digital technology allows massive amounts of information to be 
stored-and shared. And new systems process information faster and allow 
for more complex analysis. 
Data mining tools are not singular to counterterrorism. In the private 
sector, companies use them to manage their customer relationships, conduct 
market research, and increase supply chain efficiency.478 The United States 
government initially wielded them to prevent financial fraud. But after 
9/1 1 ,  data mining emerged as one of the principal tools for the Departments 
of Defense and Homeland Security to counter the terrorist threat. This 
section briefly touches on advances in technology and the commodification 
of information that affect data mining capabilities; it then turns to a 
discussion of Total Information Awareness and other post-9I1 1 data mining 
operations. 
1. Advances in Technology and the Commodification of Information 
Digitization allows vast amounts of information to be recorded, 
transferred, analyzed, and stored. The type and extent of the material now 
available eclipse that obtained in more traditional surveillance operations. 
Some forty-four percent of American Internet users, for instance, contribute 
their thoughts to the online world.479 Sixty-four percent, nearly eighty two 
476 See WESTIN, supra note 1 6, at 3 1 1 .  
477 Id. 
478 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE 
RANGE OF USES 4 (2004), available at http://www .gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf; James X. 
Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L.  REv. 
1459 (2004). 
479 AMANDA LENHART ET AL., THE PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, CONTENT 
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million Americans, go online for spiritual or religious purposes.480 The 
most popular uses reflect the most personal of matters, such as financial 
records, access to medical information, letters to friends and family, and gift 
purchases.48 I 
It is not just Internet use that leaves a trail; medical, educational, 
financial, and other records can be digitally recorded and shared. And the 
evolution in telephony from copper to optical fiber means that not just 
voice, but data and images, can be transferred at the speed of light: just one 
of Cisco Systems's  CRS- 1 routers can move the entire Library of Congress 
in 4.6 seconds.482 From circuit-switched networks, technology has morphed 
to allow for packet-switched designs, making the movement of data even 
more efficient.483 And satellites break physical constraints. These and 
other technologies have dramatically increased the number of people using 
electronic communications. By 2007, the number of people using just 
mobile phones-not computers or land lines-is expected to hit two 
billion.484 
CREATION ONLINE: 44% OF u.S. INTERNET USERS HAVE CONTRIBUTED THEIR THOUGHTS AND 
THEIR FILES TO THE ONLINE WORLD (2004), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/ 
pdfslPIP ":'Content_ Creation _ Report.pdf. 
480 STEWART HOOVER ET AL., THE PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, FAITH ONLINE: 
64% OF WIRED AMERICANS HAVE USED THE INTERNET FOR SPIRITUAL OR RELIGIOUS 
PURPOSES (2004), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfsIPIP]aith_Online_2004.pdf. 
481  See SUSANNAH Fox, THE PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TRUST AND PRIVACY 
ONLINE: WHY AMERICANS WANT TO REWRITE THE RULES 4 (2000), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfsIPIP_Trust]rivacy_ Report.pdf; SUSANNAH Fox & 
DEBORAH FALLOWS, THE PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, INTERNET HEALTH 
RESOURCES: HEALTH SEARCHES AND EMAIL HAVE BECOME MORE COMMONPLACE, BUT 
THERE Is ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN SEARCHES AND OVERALL INTERNET ACCESS (2003), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfsIPIP_Health_Report_July_ 2003.pdf; LEE 
RAINIE & JOHN HORRIGAN, THE PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, HOLIDAYS ONLINE -
2002: EMAIL GROWS AS A SEASONAL FIXTURE AND E-SHOPPING ADVANCES (2003), available 
at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfsIPIP _Holidays_Online _ 2002.pdf. The proliferation of 
computing technology further assisted the telecommunications explosion and the greater use 
made by people of Internet technologies. In 198 1 ,  for example, only three hundred 
computers were linked to the Internet. But by 1 993, approximately one million computers 
had joined it. As of Jan. 2000, some 72.4 million were connected. See Young, supra note 
427, at 303 n.4 (citing Randall L. Sarosdy, The Internet Revolution Continues: Responding 
to the Chaos, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2000, at 1 5). 
482 Press Release, Cisco Sys., CRS-I Heralds New Era for Modem Communications 
(May 24, 2004), available at http://newsroom.cisco.comldlls/2004lhd 052504d.html. 
483 See Susan Landau, National Security on the Line 1 7  (July 
-
1 ,  2005) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
484 Number of Mobile Phone Users Worldwide to Increase to 2 Billion by 2007, 
GEEKZONE, Aug. 8, 2003, http://www.geekzone.co.nzlcontent.asp?contentid=I245. 
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Traveling through time and space to obtain information, share ideas or 
beliefs, and communicate with others are all activities that leave a trail­
one on which private industry, quite �utside state demands, has capitalized. 
Acxiom, Choicepoint, LexisNexis, and other firms now comprise a multi­
billion dollar information industry. Infobase, just one of Acxiom.com's 
products, provides "[0 ]ver 50 demographic variables . . . including age, 
income, real property data, children's data and others.'.485 It contains 
material on education levels, occupation, height, weight, political 
affiliation, ethnicity, race, hobbies, and net worth.486 For a fee, 
Docussearch.com will provide any customer with the target's social 
security number, previous addresses, date of birth, neighbors, driver 
records, current address and phone number, current employer, driver's 
license number, driver histories, license plates/vehicle VIN numbers, 
unlisted numbers, beepers, cell phone numbers, fax numbers, bankruptcy 
and debtor filings, employment records, bank account balances and activity, 
stock purchases, corporate bank account, and credit card activity.487 
Not only does private industry trade in this digital market, but the state 
buys access to it as well. Choicepoint, one of the industry's leaders, claims 
that it contracts with at least thirty-five American government agencies. 
These include a number of organizations that deal in counterterrorism, such 
as the DOJ, the FBI, the DEA, the US Marshals, the IRS, the Immi,gration 
and Naturalization Service ("INS"), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms.488 
The development of public identification, search, and tracking systems 
adds yet another dimension to the type of information that can be recorded, 
shared, and analyzed. Aerial and satellite reconnaissance aside, video 
surveillance systems make it possible to follow a person as she moves 
through public and, where closed circuit television ("CCTV") is provided 
by nonpublic actors, private space.489 Combined with biometric 
485 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 3-4 (2004). 
486 Id. 
487 The Privacy Commission: A Complete Examination of Privacy Protection: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt., Info., and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 
106th Congo 28-42 (2nd Sess. 2000). 
488 See STANLEY, supra note 289, at 26 n . 107 (citing William Matthews, Commercial 
Database Use Flagged, FED. COMPUTER WEEK.COM, Jan. 1 6, 2002, http://www.fcw.com! 
fcw/articles/2002/01 14/web-epic-O I - 16-02.asp); Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If 
the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on You, It May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13,  
2001 at AI ;  Electronic Privacy Information Center, EPIC Choicepoint Page, 
http://www.epic.orglprivacy/choicepointldefault.html (last visited June 9, 2006). 
489 See Kevin Flynn, Fighting Crime with Ingenuity, 007 Style: Gee Whiz Police Gadgets 
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technologies, such as voice, gait, iris, and signature recognition, and hand 
or face vein mapping, cameras can identify members of the public without 
their knowledge.490 
Individuals can be searched without being aware that it is being done: 
millimeter wave technology, infrared heat emission, back-scattered X-ray 
imaging, and radar skin scanning cut through barriers to reveal the human 
form and any objects located beneath garments.49 1  Some of these systems 
already have been deployed at airports and other public places. And 
technology can go even further. For instance, thermal polygraphy may 
reveal whether a subject is telling the truth, without the person even 
knowing that they are under observation.492 Tracking systems too have 
become ever more sophisticated. RFID tags, which emit short-range radio 
signals, or cell phone locator chips, take advantage of global positioning 
systems and allow for objects--or individuals-to be tracked. Both RFID 
and GPS chips are built to be implanted under the skin. 
Get A Trial Run in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at B l .  For discussion of video 
technology, see Robert D. Bickel et aI., Seeing Past Privacy: Will the Development and 
Application of CCTV and Other Video Security Technology Compromise an Essential 
Constitutional Right in a Democracy, or Will the Courts Strike a Proper Balance? 33 
STETSON L. REv. 299 (2003); Roberto Iraola, Lights, Camera, Action/-Surveillance 
Cameras, Facial Recognition Systems and the Constitution, 49 Loy. L. REv. 773 (2003); 
Christopher S. Milligan, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 
S. CAL. INTERDISCIP. L.J. 295 (1999); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera 
Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 2 1 3  (2002); Kent 
Greenfield, Comment, Cameras in Teddy Bears: Electronic Visual Surveillance and the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1045 (199\); Robert H. Thornburg, Comment: Face 
Recognition Technology: The Potential Orwellian Implications and Constitutionality of 
Current Uses under the Fourth Amendment, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 321  
(2002). 
490 See, e.g. , Pentagon Aims to Track People, OREGONIAN (Portland), May 20, 2003, 
available at http://foi.missouri.edulterrorandcivillib/paimstotrack.html. 
491 Aerial reconnaissance and satellite imaging, for their part, provide views from the air, 
or space, of people and objects below. Senate Armed Services Committee Chair, John 
Warner, wants to deploy drones within the United States. For a discussion of Fourth 
Amendment and issues raised by aerial surveillances, see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986); Eric D. Bender, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: 
Curtains for the Curtilage? 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 725 ( 1985); Krysten C. Kelly, Note, 
Warrantless Satellite Surveillance: Will Our 4th Amendment Privacy Rights Be Lost in 
Space?, 1 3  1. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 729 ( 1995); John R. Dixon, Note, Criminal 
Procedure/Constitutional Law--Warrantless Aerial Surveillance and the Open View 
Doctrine-Florida v. Riley, 1 09 S. Ct. 393 (\989), 1 7  FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 57 (1989). 
492 Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible Legal 
and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: 
BRAIN, MIND AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 1 14, 129- 130 (Brent Garland ed., 2004). 
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These technologies and trends mean many things. But critically, for 
privacy and surveillance, they mean that a digital copy of our selves exists 
and can be refined. None of the underlying activities that we perform­
birth, education, seeking medical care, buying food, reading, or writing 
letters-is new. But the recording of this information, its integration, and 
its swift recall-by private or public entities-is unprecedented. Access to 
such data gives others insight into who we are, who we have been, and who 
we are becoming. It allows people to get inside our minds and to learn 
about how we react, what our emotional states are, what issues we care 
about, and what drives us. A critical point here is that the information is 
individualized. It relates specifically to us and can be recalled in relation to 
ourselves. 
Whatever the arguments may be for and against the accumulation and 
retention of this information, it represents something different in kind, not 
degree, from what has come before.493 What makes this relevant to the 
current discussion is that national security claims generally, and 
counterterrorism in particular, dramatically increase the state's access to 
this information. Perhaps nowhere is this more obvious than in the realm of 
data mining, where the elimination of anonymity and entrenchment of 
broad psychological surveillance is the stated aim of those responding to the 
terrorist threat. 
2. Data Mining Operations 
In 2004, the GAO conducted a survey of 128 departments and 
agencies to determine the extent of federal data mining activities.494 GAO 
uncovered 1 99 operations.495 These served a broad range of purposes, such 
as improving services, managing human resources, and detecting terrorist 
activity.496 The Department of Defense maintained the largest number of 
projects, with the most frequent users of data mining efforts being the 
Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Education.497 One 
hundred and twenty-two of the 1 99 projects included personal information. 
493 These and other advances have devices led Sun Microsystems experts Whitfield 
Diffie and Susan Landau to write, "the impact of technology is so weighted on the side of 
law enforcement as to make it remarkable that crime has survived at all." DIFFIE & LANDAU, 
supra note 2 15, at 1 2 l .  
494 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REpORT TO THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, THE BUDGET, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE: DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS 
COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 2 (2004) [hereinafter DATA MINING REPORT]. 
495 [d. 
496 Id. at 2-3. 
497 Id. at 3 .  
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Fifty-four purchased data from the private sector. Seventy-seven mined 
data from other federal agencies.498 
Most importantly for our purposes, fourteen of the 1 99 programs 
addressed counterterrorist activity.499 The CIA, for instance, runs 
"Octopus" and "Quantum Leap."soo DIA operates "Insight Smart 
Discovery," and "Pathfinder." The Department of Education maintains 
Project Strikeback, which compares FBI and Department of Education files 
to find anomalies. The Department of Homeland Security's Notebook 12 
links people and events to specific data points. The DOJ has a Secure 
Collaborative Operational Prototype Environment to enable investigators to 
analyze multiple digital sources to find hidden patterns and relationships. 
Some rely in considerable measure on personal information. For example, 
DIA's Verity K2 Enterprise trawls the intelligence community and the 
Internet to identify foreign terrorists or Americans connected to foreign 
terrorism. Eight of the fourteen counterterrorist initiatives drew on 
privately-held information to profile potential operatives.501 Twelve 
obtained information from other agencies.502 
Non-terrorist government databases also can be used for mining 
operations. The Department of the Treasury collects financial information 
from banks and financial institutions. The FBI maintains a criminal 
database with records, fingerprints, and DNA material. The Department of 
Health and Human Services has a "new hires" database that includes the 
name, address, social security number, and quarterly wages of every 
working person in the U.S. The Department of Education maintains 
primary school through higher education records (which, post-911 1 ,  the FBI 
can search without probable cause). And the Departments of Motor 
Vehicles have photographs of virtually every American over the age of 
sixteen.503 As for the terrorism-specific data mining efforts, while it would 
border on tedium to go through each one of these programs, a short 
discussion of a few will illustrate the extent to which the state is actively 
498 !d. 
499 !d. at 7. 
500 Bill Powell, How George Tenet Brought the CIA Back From the Dead, FORTUNE, 
Sept. 29, 2003, at 129, 1 34; Michael J. Sniffen, Controversial Terror Research Lives On, 
WASH. POST., Feb. 23, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp­
dynlarticlesl A63582-2004 F eb23 .html. 
501 DATA MINING REpORT, supra note 494, at 1 1 . 
502 Id. at 12. 
503 JAY STANLEY & BARRY STEINHARDT, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BIGGER MONSTER, 
WEAKER CHAINS: THE GROWTH OF AN AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY, 8 (2003), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/acluJeport_bigger_monster _weaker_ 
chains. pdf. 
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seeking to develop psychological profiles, and highlight impact of these on 
privacy. 
In 2002, John Poindexter launched Total Information Awareness-a 
program designed to link all government and commercial databases 
available worldwide.s04 The leviathan would trawl through multiple 
petabytes of data, uncovering hidden patterns and giving advance warning 
of a terrorist attack.sos The logo of Poindexter's  new agency neatly 
captured his vision: an eye from the top of the Illuminati pyramid spread its 
gaze over the world. Encircled with the words "Information Awareness 
Office," a Latin phrase at the bottom, Scientia est Potentia, proclaimed 
"Knowledge is Power." 
The public balked at the flagrant disregard for privacy. On the 
Internet, web sites immediately appeared, dedicated to collecting 
information on Poindexter: his telephone number, where he lived, where he 
shopped, what he bought, what his family did, and where he last had been 
spotted.so6 Poindexter changed his telephone number. And in May 2003, 
he renamed the program "Terrorism Information Awareness."so7 
504 John Markoff, Pentagon Plans A Computer System that Would Peek at Personal Data 
of Americans, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2002, at A12; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., U.S. Hopes to Check 
Computers Globally, WASH. POST, Nov 12, 2002, at A4; see also INFO. AWARENESS OFFICE, 
DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECT AGENCY, REpORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE 
TERRORISM INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM: DETAILED INFORMATION 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.globalsecurity.orgisecurity/library/report/2003/tia-diJeport_ 20may 
2003.pdf [hereinafier TIA REpORT] . For a thoughtful discussion of the privacy issues raised 
by TIA and subsequent data mining efforts, see Dempsey & Flint, supra note 478. 
505 See THE INTENSIFICATION OF SURVEILLANCE: CRIME, TERRORISM AND W ARF ARE IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 3 (Kirstie Ball & Frank Webster, eds., 2003). One petabyte would fill the 
Library of Congress' space for 18 million books more than 50 times. Some intelligence data 
sources '" grow at the rate of four petabytes per month.'  Experts said those are probably files 
with satellite surveillance images and electronic eavesdropping results." Sniffen, supra note 
500 (quoting the Office of Advanced Research and Development Activity). Deviance from 
social norms was to serve as an early indicator of terrorism: 
From human activity models, the ARM Program will develop scenario-specific models that will 
enable operatives to differentiate among normal activities in a given area or situation and 
activities that should be considered suspicious. The program aims to develop technologies to 
analyze, model, and understand human movements, individual behavior in a scene, and crowd 
behavior. The approach will be multisensor and include video, agile sensors, low power radar, 
infrared, and radio frequency tags. 
TIA REpORT, supra note 504, at I I . 
506 See, e.g. , Warblogging.com, Who is John Poindexter?, http://www.warblogging.coml 
tialpoindexter.php (last visited June 9, 2006); Peter Barnes, Tracking John Poindexter, TECH 
LIVE WASH., D.C., Dec. 20, 2002, http://www.g4tv.comltechtvvault! 
features/41 146/Tracking_John ]oindexter.html. 
507 A report submitted to Congress on the operation of the program bragged that TIA had 
already been used to analyze data obtained from detainees in Afghanistan, and to assess 
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As it became clear that the new TIA shared much in common with the 
old TIA, on September 30, 2003, Congress cut off funding. 50S But many of 
the projects simply transferred to other intelligence agencies.509 Two of the 
most important have moved to the Advanced Research and Development 
Activity ("ARDA"), located at NSA headquarters.5 10 
In 2002, DOD awarded a $ 1 9  million contract to Hicks & Associates 
to build an Information Awareness Prototype System-the architecture 
underlying TIA.5 l I  An email from Brian Sharkey, an executive at the firm, 
to subcontractors, said that the congressional decision "caused a significant 
amount of uncertainty for all of us aJout the future of our work." 
"Fortunately," he added, "a new sponsor has come forward that will enable 
us to continue much of our previous work.,,5 12 According to the National 
Journal, the new source was ARDA.5 1 3 Sharkey wrote that the new effort 
would be referred to as "Basketball"-a program later described by the 
Defense Department, after Congress shut down TIA-in the same language 
used for the TIA Information Awareness Prototype System first awarded to 
Hicks & Associates.5 1 4  
Another central TIA project, Genoa II, 
'
sought to develop the 
technology to help to anticipate and preempt terrorism.51 5 Intelligence 
sources confirmed to National Journal that this project had been re-named 
"Topsail" and moved to ARDA.5 16 In October 2005, a government press 
release announced that it had granted SAle a $3.7 million contract under 
"weapons of mass destruction in the Iraqi situation." See TIA REpORT, supra note 504, at 
16.  These examples give pause: many detainees were tortured for information, making 
subsequent analysis somewhat suspect. Furthermore, the Bush Administration later admitted 
that there had been no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The nine organizations already 
using TIA included the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command ("INSCOM"); NSA, 
DlA, CIA, DOD's Counterintelligence Field Activity ("CIFA"), U.S. Strategic Command 
("STRATCOM"), Special Operations Command ("SOCOM"), Joint Forces Command 
("JFCOM"), and Joint Warfare Analysis Center ("JW AC"). Id. at 1 6- 1 7. The report was 
required by the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. Pub. L. No. 1 08-7, 1 1 7 Stat. I I  
(2003). 
508 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-87, 1 1 7 Stat. 1 054 
(2004). 
509 Sniffen, supra note 500. 
5 10 Shane Harris, TIA Lives On, NAT'L J. ,  Feb. 23, 2006, available at 
http://nationaljournal.comlscripts/printpage.cgi? /about/njweekly/storiesI2006/0223nj I .htm. 
5 1 1  Id. 
5 12 Id. 
5 1 3  Id. 
5 14 Id. 
5 1 5  Id. 
5 1 6  Id. 
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Topsail-with language describing the project virtUally the same as 
previous descriptions of Genoa 11.5 1 7 In February 2006, when Senator Ron 
Wyden asked the Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte 
whether it was "correct that when [TIA] was closed, that several . . . 
projects were moved to various intelligence agencies,,,5 18  Negroponte's  
deputy, General Michael V. Hayden, the former director of the NSA, 
responded, "I'd like to answer in closed session.,,5 19 
The Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee ("TAPAC"), 
appointed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to analyze the use of 
"advanced information technologies to identify terrorists before they act,,,520 
admitted in March 2004 that TIA-like activities "may be continuing."s21 It 
5 1 7  Id. 
5 1 8  Id. 
5 1 9  Id. In a classified annex to its legislation halting funding to TIA, Congress created an 
exception, allowing funds to be used for "[p ]rocessing, analysis, and collaboration tools for 
counterterrorism foreign intelligence . . . .  " Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. 
L. No. 1 08-87, § 8 1 3 1 ,  1 1 7 Stat. 1 054 (2004). The condition attached was that such tools 
could only be used where connected to "lawful military operations of the United States 
conducted outside the United States" or "lawful foreign intelligence activities conducted 
wholly overseas, or wholly against non-United States citizens." Id. § 8 1 3 1  (b)( I )-(2). 
520 DEP 'T OF DEF., TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMITTEE CHARTER (2003), 
available at http://faca.disa.miVpdf/1 65969.pdf. 
52 1 TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST 
TERRORISM: REpORT OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMlTTEE viii (2004), 
available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriotl20040300tapac. pdf [hereinafter TAP AC 
2004 REpORT]. Evidence exists to support this. After Congress directed TIA to be 
dismantled, SRS Technologies, the primary support contractor for DARPA's Information 
Awareness Office, subcontracted with Torch Concepts to develop a data mining prototype. 
Ryan Singel & Noah Shachtrnan, Army Admits Using JetBlue Data, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 23, 
2003, http://www. ired.comlnews/privacy/0. 1 848.60540.00.html. The aim was to identify 
"abnormal events or activities that may include rebel actions before damaging events occur" 
by applying "intelligent pattern recognition in identifying latent relationships and behaviors 
that may help point to potential terrorist threats." Id. (quoting Press Release, Torch 
Concepts (May 8, 2002» . Singel and Shachtrnan pointed out, "[t]o privacy advocates, that 
sounds a lot like TIA's mission of researching 'data search and pattern recognition 
technologies . . .  based on the idea that terrorist planning activities or a likely terrorist attack 
could be uncovered by searching for indications of terrorist activities in vast quantities of 
transaction data.' "  Id. To help in constructing the prototype, JetBlue gave Torch Concepts 
five million passenger records. Ryan Singel, JetBlue Shared Passenger Data, WIRED NEWS, 
Sept. 1 8, 2003, http://www.wired.comlnews/privacy/0. 1 848.60489.00.htrnl. Torch Concepts 
then combined them with social security numbers, income levels, and other personal 
information. Id. The Transportation Security Administration facilitated the transfer of 
information. Id. Although other airlines immediately tried to distance themselves from the 
incident and claimed that, unlike JetBlue, their passenger records remained solely in the 
possession of the airline, this turned out to be false. Id. Immediately following 9/1 1 , airlines 
turned over millions of records to the FBI. Sara K. Goo, Northwest Gave U.S. Data on 
Passengers, WASH. POST, Jan. 1 8, 2004, at AI ;  John Schwartz et aI., Airlines Gave F.B.I. 
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added, TIA is "not unique in its potential for data mining. TAP AC is aware 
of many other programs in use or under development both within DOD and 
elsewhere in the government that make similar uses of personal information 
concerning U.S. persons to detect and deter terrorist activities."m 
Indeed, the Homeland Security Act requires DHS ' s  Directorate for 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection: 
To access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence 
information, and other information from agencies of the Federal Government, State 
and local government agencies (including law enforcement agencies), and private 
sector entities, and to integrate such information in order to--(A) identify and assess 
the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland; (B) detect and identify 
threats of terrorism against the United States; and (C) understand such threats in light 
of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the homeland.523 
The legislature authorized $500 million for the Homeland Security 
Advanced Research Projects Agency to develop "data mining and other 
advanced analytical tools.,,524 
Many of the systems being developed remain screened from the public 
eye. Hints of the scope of some of the projects, however, occasionally 
surface. One little-known DHS project, for instance, is Analysis, 
Dissemination, Visualization, Insight and Semantic Enhancement 
("ADVISE,,).525 According to the National Laboratories, this project "is a 
Millions of Records on Travelers After 9/1 1 ,  N.Y. TIMES, May 1 ,  2004, at AIO. Later, 
Northwest Airlines provided millions more to NASA. Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, Northwest Airlines' Disclosure of Passenger Data to Federal Agencies, 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/nasa/ (last visited June 9, 2006). And American 
Airlines admitted it had given 1 .2 million passenger records to TSA. American Released 
Passenger Data, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr 1 0, 2004, http://www.wired.com/news/ 
privacy/O, 1 848,630 1 8,00.html. 
522 TAPAC 2004 REpORT, supra note 521 ,  at viii. The report recognized that although 
data mining may be a "vital tool in the fight against terrorism . . .  when used in connection 
with personal data concerning U.S. persons, data mining can present significant privacy 
issues." !d. Magnitude of privacy concerns depends upon, 
the sensitivity of the data being mined, the expectation of privacy reasonably associated with the 
data, the consequences of an individual being identified by an inquiry, and the number (or 
percentage) of U.S. persons identified in response to an inquiry who have not otherwise done 
anything to warrant government suspicion. 
Id. at ix. 
523 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201 (d)(1),  1 1 6 Stat. 2 135, 
2146 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 121  (Supp. 2002)). 
524 GINA M. STEVENS, PRIVACY: TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAMS AND 
RELATED INFORMATION ACCESS, COLLECTION, AND PROTECTION LAWS, RL 3 1 730, at 20 
(2003) (citing Homeland Security Act, § 201(d)( 14), 1 16 Stat. at 2 147 (codified as amended 
at 6 U.S.c. § 121)). 
525 Clayton, supra note 475; see Hearing Before H. Comm. on Science, 1 09th Congo 
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thrust area that has been developed to support the full range of information 
fusion needs of the DRS." The past tense here matters: it is under "spiral 
development," meaning that DRS implements ifas the system evolves.526 
ADVISE collects a broad range of information, such as financial 
records, blog postings, and news stories.527 But it does not stop there. The 
model, as discussed by the National Laboratories, also includes multimedia, 
inferences, metadata, and history as types of information to be integrated 
into the system.528 ADVISE then cross-references this data against 
intelligence and law-enforcement records.529 The system stores each cross­
reference as an "entity." A report summarizing a 2004 DRS conference in 
Virginia said that the system would be able to retain information on 
approximately one quadrillion entities.530 According to Joseph Kielman, 
who manages DRS ' Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment 
portfolio (which oversees ADVISE), the aim is not just to identify terrorists, 
but to find new patterns that reveal their intentions: to generate new 
knowledge.53 1 
In addition to the federal efforts that continue apace, multi-state 
initiatives mirror TIA aims. Immediately following 9/1 1 , Seisint Corp., a 
database firm located in Boca Raton, Florida, offered to work with the 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") to create a statewide 
TIA program. According to their website, "Seisint is a global information 
management and technology company whose platforms enable 
organizations to unleash the power of massive data stores.,,532 Their Data 
Supercomputer "enables data fusion and analysis of tens of billions of 
records in seconds and minutes instead of hours, days, or even weeks.,,533 
The company owns more than seven billion public records "from thousands 
(2005) (statement of Dr. Charles McQueary, Under Sec'y for Sci. and Tech., Dep't of 
Homeland Sec.) (referencing ADVISE knowledge-generating architecture and highlighting 
plans to use it to "Create a National Homeland Security Support System (NH3S)"), available 
at http://www .house.gov/science/hearings/full05/feb 16IMcQueary .pdf 
526 SANDIA NAT'L LABs. & LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NAT'L LAB., DATA SCIENCES 
TECHNOLOGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND KNOWLEDGE 
DISCOVERY 4, 6 (2004), available at http://csrnr.ca.sandia.gov/-tgkolda/pubs/ 
DSW2004_LoRes.pdf [hereinafter DATA SCIENCES]' 
527 Clayton, supra note 475.  
528 DATA SCIENCES, supra note 526, at 6-1 1 .  
529 Clayton, supra note 475. 
530 Id. 
531 [d. 
532 Line56.com, E-Business Company Profiles, http://www.line56.comldirectory/ 
company.asp?CompanyID=3349 (last visited June 9, 2006). 
533 SEISINT INC., SEISINT' S  FACTS FOR THE MATRIX PROJECT 8 (2003), available at 
http://www .aclu.orgIFilesPDFs/seisint_facts_83.pdf. 
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of locations" containing information on U.S. individuals and businesses.534 
The company announced, "[t]he associative links, historical residential 
information, and other information, such as an individual 's  possible 
relatives and associates, are deeper and more comprehensive than other 
commercially available database systems presently on the market.,,535 
Seisint's offer almost immediately resulted in a working group with 
the FBI, U.S. Secret Service, INS, and the U.S. Attorney' s  Office, (plus 
FDLE and Seisint).536 Although the working group ceased after six months, 
Seisint continued to work on a model system with FDLE. They combined 
"billions of public and commercial records with five of Florida's  existing 
data files: Criminal Histories, Drivers' Licenses, Motor Vehicle 
Registrations, Department of Corrections records and Sexual and Violent 
Offender lists."m The Florida Crime Information Center Plus (FCIC+) has 
been in operation since March 2002. As this program got off the ground, 
the Office of Justice Programs, DOJ, initiated funding for MA TRIX-"a 
proof-of-concept, state initiated and state governed project.,,538 By August 
2004, DHS and DOJ had provided more than $9.2 million to develop a 
counterterrorism system.539 Georgia, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania 
joined ranks, and by mid-2003, some thirteen states participated, covering 
roughly fifty percent of the population in the US. A public relations 
nightmare, however, ensued, as political and civic leaders began to realize 
what was happening. By August 2004, eight of the thirteen had dropped 
out, leaving only Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania.540 
In September 2004, LexisNexis acquired Seisint.541 
MATRIX combined criminal records, driver' s  license data, motor 
vehicle registration records, and individual-specific public information.542 
At one point, the program's  web site claimed to marshal more than twenty 
534 Id. at 6. 
535 Id. at 1 0. 
536 Id. 
537 Id. 
538 Id. 
539 Id. ; STANLEY, supra note 289, at 26 n. l 08 (citing INST. FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RESEARCH, ApPLICATION FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE TO THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE (2002» . 
540 Brian Robinson, Reenter the Matrix, FED. COMPo WEEK.COM, Aug. 30, 2004, 
http://www.fcw.com!supplements/homelandl2004/sup3/hom-matrix-08-30-04.asp. 
541 Press Release, LexisNexis Completes Acquisition of Seisint, Inc.: Acquisition 
Enhances Ability to Provide Customers with Powerful, Fast and Easy-to-Use Risk 
Management Products and Services (Sept. I ,  2004), http://www.accurint.com 
Inews/news_9 _1_2004.html (last visited June 9, 2006). . 
542 Anita Ramasastry, Why We Should Fear the Matrix, FIND LAW, Nov. 5, 2003, 
available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com!ramasastry/2003 1 1 05.html. 
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billion records from hundreds of sources. 543 The system included social 
network visualization-a diagram that presents relationships among 
individuals, addresses, vehicles, and corporations. MATRIX also generated 
geographic mapping visualization, photomontage, and photo lineups. In 
October 2003, the ACLU filed FOIA requests with Connecticut, Michigan, 
New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania to find out more about the program.544 
In April 2006, the MATRIX web site indicated that the project had been 
completed, and the web site was discontinued.545 
TIA, ADVISE, MATRIX, and the other data mining efforts 
demonstrate that the United States has an interest in, and is attempting to 
develop, a centralized clearinghouse for information. In July 2002, the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security recognized that instead of a 
central computer network, information exists in a variety of federal, state, 
and local databases. The strategy stated, "[i]t is crucial to link the vast 
amounts of knowledge resident within each agency at all levels of 
government.,,546 The document declared its intent: 
We will build a national environment that enables the sharing of essential homeland 
security information. We must build a 'system of systems' that can provide the right 
information to the right people at all times. Information will be shared 'horizontally' 
across each level of government and 'vertically' among federal, state and local 
governments, private industry, and citizens . . . .  We will leverage America's leading­
edge information technology to develop an information architecture that will 
effectively secure the homeland.547 
This goal raises important concerns related to privacy and the role it plays 
in democratic states-issues that include but expand beyond the state's 
effectiveness in countering terrorist threat. I return to these in Part III. 
II. SURVEILLANCE AND THE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The English constitution differs from its American counterpart in that 
it embraces the principle of parliamentary supremacy. This means that the 
constitution combines common law, statutory law, and custom. Unlike in 
the United States, no single document takes precedence. While some 
543 Briefing by Seisent, Inc., MATRIX Michigan Briefing, slide "Seisint's Core 
Capabilities" (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/ 
14950res20040 12 1 .html. 
544 Ramasastry, supra note 542. 
545 Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange, http://www.matrix-at.org/ (last 
visited June 9, 2006). 
546 OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 55 
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.govlhomelandlbookl nat_strat_hls.pdf (emphasis 
added). 
547 /d. at 56. 
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statutes may be considered particularly important, all acts technically have 
the same status. In 1 998, an important nuance emerged: Westminster, 
through the Human Rights Act, incorporated the European Convention of 
Human Rights into domestic law. The statute requires that acts of 
Parliament be read as far as possible in a manner consistent with the 
Convention. However, should courts find a divergence, the legislation 
requires only that a declaration of incompatibility be made. No other 
domestic legal consequences follow. 
Until the incorporation of this Convention, the English constitution did 
not admit of a right to privacy writ large. Instead, specific statutes 
protected different aspects of the country's unique culture of privacy. The 
1 36 1  Justices of the Peace Act, for instance, outlawed eavesdroppers and 
peeping toms.548 Semayne 's Case later underscored the status of the 
home.549 Just over a century later, in Entick v. Carrington, Lord Camden 
dismissed the doctrine of state necessity without statutory basis, requiring 
the Crown to obtain proper authorization to cross the threshold of the 
home.55o This case formed part of a series of civil actions in which English 
courts grappled with the contours of privacy. 55 1 These cases, however, and 
such laws as did exist, addressed particular situations that gave rise to 
privacy claims.552 
548 Justices of the Peace Act, 1361 , 34 Edw. 3, c. 1 (Eng.). 
549 Semayne's Case, ( 1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K. B.). 
550 Entick v. Carrington, ( 1765) 19 St. Tr. 1030 (K.B.). Security forces, searching for 
John Wilkes' pamphlets, had entered into Entick's dwelling, broken into locked desks, and 
retrieved his papers. Lord Camden warned against a state of affairs where, "the secret 
cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search and 
inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even to 
suspect, a person to be the author, printer or publisher of a seditious libel." Id. at 1 063. 
551 See also Wilkes v. Wood, (1 763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.); Huckle v. Money, ( 1 763) 
95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.), ajJ'd, Money v. Leach (1 765), 19 Howell 's State Trials 1002, 
1 028, 97 Eng. Rep. 1 075 (K.B.). The United States Supreme Court later looked to them as a 
guide of what the Framers intended in the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g. , Boyd v. United 
States, 1 16 U.S. 616, 626 (1886). 
552 See also Data Protection Act, 1 984, c. 35 (U.K.), repealed by Data Protection Act, 
1998, c. 29 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.ukIACTS/actsI9981l 9980029.htm; 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974, c. 53 (U.K.); Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, 
c. 40 (U.K.); Unsolicited Goods & Services Act, 1971,  c. 30, § 4 (U.K.). Common law 
protection in the realm of nuisance also existed. See, e.g., Victoria Park Racing & 
Recreation Grounds Co. Ltd. v. Taylor (1937) 58 C.L.R. 479 (Austl.); Khorasandjian v. 
Bush, (1993) Q.B. 727 (U.K.); Bernstein v. Skyviews & Gen. Ltd., ( 1978) Q.B. 479 (U.K.); 
Jolliffe v. Willmett & Co., ( 1971 )  1 All E.R. 478 (U.K.); Hickman v. Maisey, (1900) 1 Q.B. 
752 (A.C.) (Eng.). But see Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd., [ 1997] A.c. 655 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (U.K.). Breach of confidence also was widened at common law. See, e.g. , 
Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., (1984) 2 All E.R. 408 (A.C.) (U.K.). 
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Part of the reason for the lack of a blanket protection revolved around 
the complexity of the right and its intimate relationship with other rights 
and freedoms. In some measure, it also related to the difficulty of 
definition. In the late 1 9th century, Judge Thomas Cooley provided one of 
the earliest: the right to be left alone. Although initially a negative claim, as 
in the United States, British popular understanding gradually moved 
tcwards a more positive right-the ability to control information and to 
choose whether and in what manner to communicate personal details. 
However, the definitional problem remained. In 1 972, the Younger 
Committee declared that privacy escaped satisfactory definition.553 Nearly 
two decades later, the Calcutt Committee echoed the earlier findings, 
stating, "nowhere have we found a wholly satisfactory statutory definition 
of privacy.,,554 Undeterred, the Committee nevertheless suggested one: 
"The right of the individual to be protected against intrusion into his 
personal life or affairs, or those of his family, by direct physical means or 
by pUblication of information. ,,555 The possibility of creating a more general 
right to individual privacy attracted attention. 
In 1 993, a fol low-up report called for the government to introduce 
legislation to protect the private sphere.556 And other documents followed. 
The Lord Chancellor's Department issued Infringement of Privacy, which 
attacked the absence of such protections in English law. The report called 
for the creation of a tort to address situations where substantial distress 
might be caused by the invasion of privacy. Soon thereafter, the U.K. 
government's  Response to the National Heritage Select Committee asserted 
"[e]very individual has a right to privacy comprising: (a) a right to be free 
from harassment and molestation; and (b) a right to privacy of personal 
information, communications, and documents.,,557 But the government still 
determinedly dodged the creation of a broader right. 
It was not until the 1 998 incorporation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights ("ECHR") into domestic law that Westminster embraced a 
general right to privacy. Article 8(1 )  of the Convention ensures that all 
553 HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, 1972: REpORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, 
1972, Cm. 5012  (U.K.) [hereinafter YOUNGER COMMITTEE REpORT]. 
554 HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, REpORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND 
RELA TED MATTERS, 1990, Cm. 1 102 (U.K.) [hereinafter CALCUTT COMMITTEE REpORT]. 
555 [d. 
556 HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, CALCUTT (No.2) REpORT, 1993, Cm. 2135 
(U.K.). 
557 HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL 
HERITAGE SELECT COMMITTEE, PRIVACY AND MEDIA INTRUSION, 1995, Cm. 291 8  (U.K.). 
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persons have the right to respect for their private and family life, their 
home, and their correspondence.558 
Article 8(2), however, goes on to provide that the public authority can 
interfere with this right when it "is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ,,559 
When placed against counterterrorist claims, this exception provides a 
loophole that can be exploited by the state. Exactly what constitutes a 
national security concern can be molded to fit the moment. Moreover, the 
Human Rights Act, which incorporated the ECHR, requires only that 
legislation be read as far as possible in a manner compatible with the 
convention. In the event that surveillance statutes contravene it, the 
judiciary only is required to make a declaration of incompatibility. And 
question still exists about the extent of European law. Three years after 
incorporation of the ECHR, the House of Lords questioned whether any 
actionable right to privacy exists in the United Kingdom.560 
Part II posits that despite the recent protections offered by the 
European Convention of Human Rights, and the British government' s  
repeated claim to be meeting the European Court's objections through the 
introduction of a statutory framework, it appears as though the state has 
558 Under the European Convention, respect for the privacy of the home extends to the 
place of business. Halford v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523, 523-24 (1997) ("It is 
made clear from the Court's case law that telephone calls made from business premises as 
well as from the home may be covered by the notions of 'private life' and 'correspondence' 
within the meaning of Article 8(1)."); see also Niemietz v. Germany, 1 6  Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, 
97-98 (1992); Chappell v. United Kingdom, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 ( 1990). However, in public 
places, no legitimate expectation of (illegitimate) businesses is provided. Compare Khan v. 
United Kingdom, 3 1  Eur. Ct. H.R. 1016, 1023 (2001) (finding that there was no legal 
authority for proper judicial regulation of police placing microphone on outside of a 
building), with Ludi v. Switzerland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 73 ( 1992); see also Kruslin v. France, 
1 2  Eur. Ct. H.R. 547 ( 1990). 
559 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 2 1 3  U.N.T.s. 22 1 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.hri.org/docsIECHR50.html. 
560 Douglas v. Hello! Ltd, [2001]  Q.B. 967, 1012 (A.C.) (U.K.) (maintaining that it was 
"unlikely that Kaye v. Robertson, which held that there was no actionable right of privacy in 
English law, would be decided in the same way on that aspect today"). 
Consequently, if the present case concerned a truly private occasion, where the persons involved 
made it clear that they intended it to remain private and undisclosed to the world, then I might 
have concluded that in the current state of English law the claimants were likely to succeed at 
any eventual trial. 
FELDMAN, supra note 1 7, at 550 (quoting Kaye v. Robertson, ( 1992) F.S.R. 62 (A.C.) 
(U.K.)). 
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used European objections as an opportunity to legitimize existing practices 
and extend the scope of state surveillance. Unlike the United States, 
warrants for surveillance remain within the executive domain. Outside the 
judicial domain, the standard applied is that of reasonable suspicion, which 
sets the bar lower than the probable cause requirements for Title III 
searches across the Atlantic. 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF INFORMATION-GATHERING AUTHORITY 
This section begins with the evolution of information-gathering 
authority in British law. It focuses on property interference, the 
interception of communications, covert surveillance, the use of covert 
human intelligence sources, and encrypted data. The main bodies 
exercising these powers for counterterrorist purposes include the Security 
Service ("MI5"), Secret Intelligence Service ("MI6"), Government 
Communications Headquarters ("GCHQ"), and law enforcement.561 While 
oversight mechanisms within the executive branch exist, their effectiveness 
is not at all clear. The United States is not alone in taking advantage of 
technology to expand its surveillance capabilities. Part II concludes with a 
brief discussion of CCTV, the realm in which the U.K. leads the world for 
concentration of cameras in the public sphere. 
1. Property Interference 
The first observation to be made about British surveillance law is that, 
as in the United States, a distinction between regular law enforcement and 
counterterrorist authorities can be drawn. The English Constitution long 
ago addressed the conditions under which the police had to obtain a warrant 
physically to interfere with property. More recently, the 1 984 Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act provided the relevant standard.562 The 1 997 Police 
561 The United Kingdom has three agencies that perfonn its principal counterterrorist 
intelligence functions: The Secret Intelligence Service, Government Communications 
Headquarters, and the Security Service. MI6, run under the authority of the Secretary of 
State, provides infonnation relating to events, individuals, and networks outside domestic 
bounds. Its powers are exercisable only in relation to national security (particularly defense 
and foreign policy), safeguarding the economy, and preventing or detecting serious crime. 
GCHQ, of Bletchley Park fame, focuses on signals intelligence, monitoring electromagnetic, 
acoustic, and electronic communications. Its functions must be carried out in the interests of 
national security, the economic well-being of the UK, and the prevention or detection of 
serious crime. MIS covers domestic national security threats. SIS and GCHQ report to the 
Foreign Secretary, and MIS to the Home Secretary. Intelligence-gathering authority for 
counterterrorism also extends to agencies located at the Ministry of Defence, the Cabinet, 
and law enforcement. 
562 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 8, � I (U.K.), available at 
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Act subsequently expanded the number of law enforcement bodies who 
could obtain permission to gain entry to include the police, the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service ("NCIS"), the National Crime Squad, and 
HM Customs and Excise.563 In the event that a dwelling, hotel bedroom, or 
office, is to be inspected, or where confidential information is likely to be 
acquired, prior approval must be granted by a Commissioner.564 The statute 
empowers the Commissioner to quash the warrant where reasonable 
grounds exist for believing the authority sought does not meet statutory 
requirements. In all cases, the officer authorizing the intrusion must notify 
the Commission. 
Unlike law enforcement, MI6 which addressed threats outside 
domestic bounds had, until 1 994, no statutory authority to interfere with 
property inside state borders.565 
Perhaps more spectacularly, for nearly four decades the MIS, which 
did focus on domestic matters, operated without any statute sanctioning its 
existence or powers.566 This meant that, technically, MIS operatives had the 
same search and arrest authorities extended to all British subjects.567 
http://www.opsi.gov.uklsi/si I988IUksi_1988 1 200_en_l .htm. 
563 SECURITY SERVICE COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REpORT FOR 1 999, � 22 (U.K.), available 
at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.ukldocumentlcm47/4779/4779-01 .htm. Formal 
implementation of these measures began in February 1 999. The officer must be satisfied 
that the action will be "of substantial value in the prevention or detection of serious crime, 
and that what the action seeks to achieve cannot reasonably be achieved by other means." 
Police Act 1997, c. 50, § 93(2) (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uklacts/actsI997/ 
97050--j.htm#91 .  The legislation defines serious crime as violent acts, events that result in 
substantial financial gain, or conduct by a large number of people in pursuit of a common 
purpose. It also includes any offense for which a person above the age of twenty-one with 
no previous convictions, would likely receive at least three years' imprisonment. Id. § 93(4). 
564 If, however, it is not reasonably practicable for a Commissioner to grant prior 
approval, an urgent, seventy-two-hour approval can be authorized by designated officers 
within the law enforcement bodies, for later approval by a Commissioner. Id. §§ 94-95. 
565 See Intelligence Services Act, 1994, §5(3) (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi. 
gov.uklACTS/acts 19941Ukpga_199400 13_en_l .htm. In 1 909, MI6 began as the foreign 
section of the Secret Service Bureau. By 1922 it had evolved into a separate agency, called 
the Special Intelligence ServicelMI6. MICHAEL COUSENS, SURVEILLANCE LAW 9 1  (2004). 
566 In 1952, Sir David Maxwell Fife issued a Directive to the Director General of the 
Security Service, indicating that MI5 would report directly to the Home Secretary. The 
organization was to be considered separate from the Home Office and part of the United 
Kingdom's Defence Forces. Its purpose would be to defend the realm "from external and 
internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage or from actions of persons 
and organizations whether directed from within or without the country which may be judged 
to be subversive of the state." Directive to the Director General of the Security Services, 
issued by Home Secretary Sir David Maxwell Fife, 24 Sept. 1 952 (U.K.), reprinted in 
COUSENS, supra note 565. 
567 LORD DENNING'S REpORT, 1963, Crnnd. 2 1 52, c. XVII (U.K.). 
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Nevertheless, just five years after the creation of the agency, a special 
Committee of Privy Councillors detennined that MI5 routinely intercepted 
domestic communications.568 
Towards the end of the 20th century, public concern mounted about 
MI5 's general role. The media reported, for instance, that the agency 
screened potential employees of the British Broadcasting System. 569 The 
secretive nature of the organization and lack of redress afforded to British 
subjects for perceived violations of individual rights came under increasing 
scrutiny. A prominent case raising these concerns reached the European 
Commission ("EC,,).57o The applicants, both members of the National 
Council for Civil Liberties, claimed to have been the object of MI5 
surveillance. The EC found that the 1 952 Directive that created the 
Security Service did not count as a legally enforceable rule. It did not give 
British subjects a sufficient idea of the powers of the state; nor was there an 
effective remedy under English law. This brought the UK into violation of 
articles 8 and 1 3  of the ECHR. 
In 1 989 the government responded by placing MI5 on a statutory 
basis.571 Section 5 of the Security Services Act empowered the Secretary of 
State to issue warrants for physical interference with property. The 
application includes a description of the case, the name of the person or 
organization targeted, the property involved, the operational plan, and an 
assessment risk. The Secretary of State must be satisfied that the search is 
necessary, "of substantial value" to MI5 in discharging its duties, and 
"cannot reasonably be obtained by other means.,,572 The warrant is valid for 
568 REpORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE 
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS (1957) (U.K.), available at http://fipr.org/ 
riplBirkett.htm [hereafter BIRKETT REpORT]. 
569 COUSENS, supra note 565, at 85. 
570 Hewitt & Harman v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 657 (1992). 
571 Updated in 1996, the Security Services Act requires MI5 to protect national security 
"against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of 
foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary 
democracy by political, industrial or violent means." The statute leaves "national security" 
undefined. Security Service Act, 1 989, c. 5 (U.K.), available at http://www.archive.official­
documents.co.uk/documentlcm47/4779/4779.htm. This statute replaced a 1952 Directive 
that read, in part, "[t]he Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of the country. Its 
task is the Defence of the Realm as a whole, from external and internal dangers arising from 
attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of persons and organisations whether 
directed from within or without the country, which may be judged to be subversive of the 
State." LORD DENNING'S REpORT, supra note 567, at 80. 
572 SECURITY SERVICE COMMISSIONER, supra note 563, � 7-8. 
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a period of up to six months from issue, but can be renewed for another six 
month period if considered necessary by the Secretary of State.573 
What makes this mechanism extraordinary is that, even as it allows the 
Security Services to move into ordinary policing, the device for preventing 
misuse of the powers remains in the control of the Executive-not the 
Judiciary. This appears to violate the basic principle laid down in Entick v. 
Carrington:  allowing the state to cross the threshold of the home without 
appropriate oversight risked abuse. Yet MI5 can now enter and search 
property without a judicial warrant. 
To bring the powers into line with the European Convention, 
Parliament provided for formal review by an Independent Commissioner, 
whose annual report is laid before each House of Parliament. These reports, 
however, contain little information of value. They do not even reveal the 
number of warrants obtained by the Intelligence Services. In the First 
Report, the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Stuart Smith considered it "not in the 
public interest" to provide such information, adding that, compared to the 
1 985 Interception of Communications Act, there were only a 
"comparatively small number of warrants issued under the 1 989" 
legislation. Despite further statutes; however, reviews have consistently 
resisted providing such information, concerned that it would "assist the 
operation of those hostile to the state.,,574 For the most part, the annual 
reports simply restate the legal authority under which the Intelligence 
Services operate. The legislation also included the creation of a Tribunal 
for investigating complaints. Between 1 989 and 1 999, the Tribunal 
considered some 338 complaints, with three left outstanding.575 In none of 
these cases did the Tribunal find in favor of a complainant. 576 I will return 
to these considerations in Part III. 
2. Interception of Communications 
Legal scholarship sharply divides over the origin of Executive 
authority to intercept communications. But speculation over whether the 
573 Security Service Act 1989, c. 5, §§  3(4)-(5) (U.K.). The procedure on renewal is 
much the same as on initial application, except that the request states whether or not the 
operation has produced intelligence of value since its inception, and has to show that it 
remains necessary for the warrant to continue to have effect for the purpose for which it was 
issued. In 1994, the Intelligence Service Act brought the warrant requirements of MI6, MIS, 
and GCHQ into line. Application for all is made to the Secretary of State. 
574 INTELLIGENCE SERVICES COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 2005, H.C. 548, � 3 1  (U.K.), 
available at http://www.official-documents.co.ukldocument/hc0506lhc05/0548/0548.pdf. 
575 SECURITY SERVICE. COMMISSIONER, supra note 563, � 37. 
576 Id. � 38. 
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power finds its locus in Royal Prerogative, statutes governing preservation 
of the state and public order, common law, or custom derived from a 
monopoly on the posts, remain just that.577 Indeed, two secret committees 
(one each in the House of Lords and House of Commons), designated in 
1 844 with the task of detennining the state of the law with respect to 
opening letters, dodged consideration of the origins of this power by simply 
recognizing its existence.578 
Written documents and letters became the first kind of 
communications to be intercepted. The ordinance establishing the first Post 
Office referred to the office as "the best Means to discover and prevent any 
dangerous and wicked Designs against the Commonwealth.,,579 An Act of 
Parliament in 1 660 agreed mutatis mutandis with the content of the 
Ordinance.58o Three years later, the Crown issued a Royal Proclamation, 
announcing that only the Principal Secretary of State could open packages 
and letters.58 ' Similar language marked the 1 7 1 0  statute "for establishing a 
General Post Office for all Her Majesty's Dominions," 1 837 Post Office 
(Offences) Act, 1908 Post Office Act, and, more recently, the 1 953 Post 
Office Act. Under this last statute, only an express warrant issued by a 
Secretary of State could authorize the' interception and opening of any letter, 
postcard, newspaper, parcel, or telegram.582 
This history led a special review body to conclude in 1 957 that: 
(a) The power to intercept letters and postal packets and to disclose their contents and 
otherwise to make use of them had been used and frequently used through many 
centuries 
(b) Such a power existed and was exercised widely and publicly known , , . .  
(c) At no time had it been suggested with any authority that the exercise of the power 
was unlawful. 583 
The power to intercept telephone communications presents a similar 
history. 
S17 See BIRKETT REpORT, supra note 568, at Part I .  
578 The House of Lords commented, "the Power appears . . .  to have been exercised from 
the earliest Period, and to have been recognized by several Acts of Parliament. This appears 
to the committee to be the State of the Law in respect to the detaining and opening of Letters 
at the Post Office and they do not find any other Authority for such detaining or opening." 
ld. � 1 5. 
579 ld. 
580 ld. 
581 ld. � 32. 
582 Post Office Act 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. II, c. 36, §87(l) (U.K.). 
583 BIRKETT REpORT, supra note 568, � 39. 
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From the origins of the telephone until 1937, the Post Office and 
others assumed that any entity operating the telecommunication network 
had the authority to intercept messages.584 Such surveillance did not, 
therefore, require any warrants from the Secretary of State; rather, the 
intelligence services and law enforcement contacted the Director-General of 
the Post Office to obtain information.585 In 1 937, the policy changed to 
reflect the Home Secretary' s  view that the powers granted to the Secretary 
of State in regard to the post and, later telegrams, logically extended to 
telecommunications.586 For nearly fifty years, however, no explicit, 
statutory authority followed. 
Throughout this time, the Secretary of State required that the 
requesting body provide the name, address, and telephone number of the 
targets of the interception. Occasionally, one warrant would include 
multiple people.587 The standard practice was for the Secretary to ascertain 
whether such intercepts would be necessary for either the prevention or 
detection of serious crime or to protect national security.588 What 
constituted a "serious crime," though, changed over time: during the war 
years, efforts to get around rationing constituted a serious offence. 
Participating in lotteries, a severe crime in 1 909, by 1 953 had become a 
way to pass the time. And the standards for obscenity gradually relaxed.589 
The Metropolitan Police and HM Customs and Excise submitted the 
majority of the warrant requests.590 From time to time the Home Office 
admonished these and other agencies for making too many requests: In 
September 1 95 1 ,  the Home Office issued letters saying the interception was 
an "inherently objectionable" practice, and suggested that "the power to 
stop letters and intercept telephone calls must be used with great 
caution.,,59 1 The Secretary laid down three conditions for law enforcement 
to meet: the offence had to be really serious-meaning an individual with 
no previous record could reasonably expect at least three years' sentence, or 
the offence, of lesser gravity, involved a significant number of people. For 
Customs and Excise, the Secretary of State narrowed "serious crime" to 
cases involving "a substantial and continuing fraud which would seriously 
damage the revenue or the economy of the country if it went unchecked." 
584 Id. '\1 40. 
585 !d. 
586 Id. '\1 41 .  
587 Id. '\1 56. 
588 Id. '\1 57. 
589 Id. '\1'\1 58-59. 
590 Id. '\1 66. 
591 Id. '\1 64. 
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Finally, the requesting agency had to have tried normal methods of 
investigation, and failed. Alternatively, other methods had to be unlikely to 
succeed. The Home Office also declared that good reason must exist to 
believe that interception would result in conviction.592 
The Home Office maintained separate arrangements for warrants 
granted to the Security Service.593 For this organization, the Secretary of 
State required that the investigation relate to a major subversive or 
espionage activity likely to hurt national security, and that the material thus 
yielded would be of use to MI5 in carrying out its duties. While the 
Secretary of State preferred that more conservative means of gathering the 
information be first attempted, or be unlikely to succeed, the Home Office 
gave greater weight to the collection of information than to the need to 
secure convictions.594 All warrants issued by the Secretary of State 
authorized interception for an indefinite period. 
Although not regulated by statute, the procedure for requesting 
warrants involved many layers; the Metropolitan Police, Customs and 
Excise, and MI5 created internal structures to vet applications.595 The first 
two organizations then forwarded these to the Home Office Criminal 
Department for approval, after which the application went to the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State. (MI5 forwarded the application directly to the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State). If satisfied that the requirements had 
been met, the under-secretary then forwarded the request to the Secretary of 
State for final approval. The net result of this process was that the 
Secretary of State ended up rejecting very few applications596-a claim 
reflected in the American Department of Justice's  defense of the almost 
nonexistent refusal by the FISA courts to grant a warrant. Additional 
procedures within the Home Office, law enforcement, and intelligence 
agencies assisted in vetting applications: as of 1 957, the Permanent Under­
Secretary undertook quarterly reviews of outstanding warrants. 597 The 
Metropolitan Police (from 1 956) undertook their own weekly review; 
Customs and Excise considered theirs quarterly; and MI5 analyzed 
outstanding warrants twice a year. The Home Office strictly followed a 
policy that, except in extraordinary circumstances, any information gleaned 
592 Id. �� 64-67. 
593 ld. � 67. 
594 Id. � 68. 
595 Id. � 69. 
596 Id. � 70. 
597 ld. � 7 1 .  
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from interception would be excluded from judicial proceedings or as 
evidence in any other formal Inquiry.598 
While cautioning against the use of intercept material in the course of 
investigations, consecutive Secretaries of State recognized the importance 
of such surveillance in undermining criminal and subversive activities. 
Successes ranged from disrupting a £9 million illicit diamond market and 
recapturing escaped convicts to detecting Communist spies located in the 
Civil Service.599 
As telecommunications grew in social importance, the trend moved 
away from postal intercepts and towards telephone conversations. In 1 93 7, 
the total number of warrants for mail openings issued by the Home 
Secretary in England and Wales, eclipsed the number issued for telephone 
wiretaps: 556 warrants approved of postal intercepts, while a mere 
seventeen applied to telephones. In 1 955, the numbers reversed, with 
wiretaps exceeding mail openings. And the number of taps steadily 
expanded: from 299 in 1 965, by 1 975 the number had grown to 468. In 
1 995 the Home Secretary authorized 9 1 0  taps. By 2000, this number had 
increased to 1 ,559.600 
Throughout this period, no law sanctioned the interception regime or 
provided a remedy for violations. It technically remained legal to place 
phone taps even in the absence of an authorizing warrant. This caused the 
Birkett Committee to suggest as early as 1 957 that Parliament "consider 
whether legislation should be passed to render the unauthorised tapping of a 
telephone line an offence.,,60, It was not until the United Kingdom fel l  
afoul of European law, however, nearly three decades later, that 
Westminster took up the gauntlet. 
598 Id. � 90. 
599 Id. �� 104-07. 
600 These numbers do not reflect the total number of wiretaps issued in the UK. They 
omit warrants issued in Scotland, although a similar pattern existed there. See Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uklacts/ 
acts2000/20000023.htm; INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 2001 ,  
H.C. 1243 (U.K.), available at  http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.ukldocumentl 
depslhclhcI243/l243.pdf. The numbers also neglect those issued by the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, which have never been published, as well as the Foreign Secretary, 
which have been withheld from public scrutiny since 1 984. Equally absent is the number of 
wiretaps placed, but not specifically authorized or penalized, by domestic law. See 
Statewatch News Online, Telephone Tapping and Mail-opening Figures 1 937-2000, 
http://www.statewatch.org!newsIDOCSlTeltapl .htm (last visited June 9, 2006) (providing a 
table indicating number of telephone tapping, mail opening, and total surveillance warrants 
issued in England and Wales by year). 
601 BIRKETT REpORT, supra note 568, ch. 5 � 1 3 1 .  
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a. Malone v. United Kingdom602 and its aftennath 
In the mid-1 970s, the London Metropolitan Police requested and 
obtained a warrant from the Secretary of State to tap the phone lines of an 
antique dealer suspected of handling stolen property. Mr. Malone, the 
target of the intercept, responded to charges brought against him with a suit 
against the police claiming relief under both English law and the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
In regard to the first, Malone argued that it was unlawful for anyone, 
including the state, to intercept communications without the consent of 
those involved. This claim arose from the right of property, the right of 
privacy, and the right of confidentiality. The state countered, saying that no 
statute made government wiretapping illegal; in fact, broad recognition in 
the statutory instruments that such tapping occurred suggested no right to 
immunity existed. 
Sir Robert Megarry responded to Malone's claims by announcing that 
he was unconvinced that the electronic impulses transmitted over the wires 
constituted property. On the right to privacy, the oft-repeated recognition 
that no blanket right to privacy existed in English law-not least in the 
recently published Halsbury's Laws of England-rather defeated any claim 
to an express right. The claim to an implicit right also failed. Like the 
American court in Olmstead, Megarry asserted that interception outside the 
bounds of ones premises did not constitute trespass. Nor could the intercept 
be understood as eavesdropping: Described in 1 809 by Blackstone as the 
act of listening under walls or windows or the eaves of a house and framing 
slanderous and mischievous tales, the offence had once earned punishment 
of "immersion in the trebucket or ducking stool.,,603 The 1 967 Criminal 
Law Act, however, abolished this offense.604 The right of confidentiality, 
still in its infant stages, also did not apply, as extension lines, private 
switchboards and crossed lines meant that no realistic person would expect 
not to be overheard when speaking on a telephone. 
The plaintiffs second claim relied on Article 8 of the ECHR, which 
safeguarded family and private life, and Article 1 3 :  "Everyone whose rights 
and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an 
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity." 
602 Malone v. United Kingdom, 1985 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 (Article 50) of Apr. 26, 1 985 (ser. 
A no. 95). 
603 Malone v. Comm'r for the Metro. Police (no. 2), ( 1979) 2 All E.R. 620 (Ch.) (Eng.) 
(Sir Robert Megany). 
604 Criminal Law Act, 1 967, c. 58, § 13 (Eng.). 
2006] PRIVACY AND SUR VEILLANCE 1 1 65 
Here the English court recognized a case directly on point. In Klass v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, the European Court had found that although 
the Federal Republic of Germany had not actually placed wiretaps on the 
five German citizens claiming relief, the legal structure of the German 
surveillance system could be addressed.605 German law required the state to 
inform the citizens after the fact, where it would not jeopardize the purpose 
of the surveillance, that their communications had been intercepted. It also 
required, inter alia, that there be an imminent danger to state security, that 
other methods of obtaining the information be unavailable, and that the 
surveillance cease as soon as the requisite conditions cease. These 
safeguards meant that the statute, which fell afoul of Article 8( 1 ), 
nevertheless met the criteria for exception laid out in Article 8(2). The 
court also required that an effective remedy before a national authority 
existed, bringing such measures into line with Article 1 3 .  
In contrast to the German case, English surveillance provisions, as 
previously noted, did not exist on a statutory basis, and so no legal remedy 
for violations that may occur were available. This suggested that the 
measures fell afoul of the ECHR. The English court, however, bristled at 
the suggestion that European law carried any weight in the domestic realm: 
"Any regulation of so complex a matter as telephone tapping is essentially a 
matter for Parliament, not the courts; and neither the Convention nor the 
Klass case can, I think, play any proper part in deciding the issue before 
me.,,606 While, then, wiretapping may be "a subject which cries out for 
legislation," the court's hands were tied. Malone appealed to the 
Continent. 607 
In 1 984, the European Court of Human Rights found for Malone. 
Justice Pettiti wrote in his concurring judgment that "the mission of the 
Council of Europe and its organs is to prevent the establishment of systems 
and methods that would allow 'Big Brother' to become master of the 
citizen's  private life.,,608 He noted the continuing "temptation facing public 
authorities to 'see into' the life of the citizen.,,609 The United Kingdom 
responded with new statutes to satisfy the ECHR. 
605 Klass v. Fed. Republic of Gennany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 (Ser. A, no. 28) ( 1979). 
606 Malone, 2 All E.R. 620. 
607 Malone v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 ( 1985). 
608 Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79 (judgement of Aug. 2, 1984) (Pettiti, 
J., concurring) (translated), available at http://www.mannrettindi.is/the-human-rights­
rpoject/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/Undirflokkureuropeancourtofhum 
anrights/nr/576. 
609 Malone, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 4. 
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The 1 985 Interception of Communications Act made it a crime to 
obtain communications en route, other than as specified under statute.610 It 
also established a complaints body. Any citizen, suspecting interception of 
their mail or telephone conversations, could file a complaint with a special 
tribunal, which was empowered to use judicial review mechanisms to 
ascertain whether the individual was, in fact, under surveillance and, if so, 
whether proper procedures were followed. Where an individual was not 
under surveillance, however, the tribunal could only confirm to the 
applicant that no violations had occurred. In the event of surveillance and 
actual violations, the tribunal informed the applicant and Prime Minister, 
quashed the warrant, destroyed any information intercepted, and 
compensated the applicant. A senior member of the judiciary served as 
Commissioner and generated an annual report, which, after the deletion of 
national security concerns, was laid before Parliament. 
In the first six years of the statute's enactment, the tribunal uncovered 
a number of what it considered to be minor mistakes (such as the wrong 
phone tapped), but no blatant violations. On the whole, the number of 
warrants issued steadily increased.6 1 1  
Soon after the adoption o f  the 1 985 legislation, Westminster 
introduced measures to place the intelligence agencies on more secure legal 
footing. The 1 989 and 1 996 Security Services Acts and 1 994 Intelligence 
Service Act empowered these agencies to apply through the secretary of 
state for telegraphic intercepts. By the mid- 1 990s, however, with 
momentum gaining ground for the incorporation of the European 
Convention of Human Rights into domestic law, gaps in British law 
remained. A landmark case reached the European Court directly on point, 
vividly highlighting what still needed to be done in domestic law to bring it 
into line with the Convention. 
b. Halford v. United Kingdom and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000 
The Assistant Chief Constable for Merseyside, the most senior female 
police officer in the United Kingdom, failed eight times in seven years to 
obtain a promotion to Deputy Chief Constable either in Merseyside or 
elsewhere.6 12 In 1 990, she initiated proceedings in the Industrial Tribunal, 
claiming gender discrimination. Two years later, she finally obtained a 
6 1 0  Interception of Communications Act 1 985, c. 56, § 1 (Scot.). 
6 1 1  See id.; INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 1 988, Cm. 652, 
'\I 8 (U.K.); see also HOME OFFICE, INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, 1 985, Cm. 9438 at annex 2 (U.K.). 
6 1 2  Halford v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523 (1997). 
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hearing. To prepare for the case, the Chief of Police for Merseyside placed 
secret wiretaps on Ms. Halford' s  home and work telephones.613 
The European court held that the interception of communications over 
private telecommunications systems fell outside the scope of the 1 985 
Interception of Communications ACt.6 14 But no remedy at either common 
law or within domestic statutory law existed. The European Court found 
therefore a violation of Article 8(1) saying phone calls made from work or 
home could be considered "private life" and "correspondence.,,61 5  As it was 
a public authority interfering with private life and correspondence, such 
actions had to be taken in accordance with the law. But the domestic 
statutes did not provide adequate protection. The court also found that the 
practice violated Article 1 3  and awarded £ 1 0,000 in damages plus £25,000 
for costs and default interest at eight percent per year.616 The case drew 
attention to two problems: the codes of practice under which the police 
operated and the remedy such as was provided for under the law. With the 
1 998 Human Rights Act looming large, the case forced the Labour 
Government to bring forward new legislation. 
In June 1 999, the Home Office issued a consultation paper on the 
interception of communications. Although the aim, purportedly, was to 
establish the safeguards required by the Convention, the state used the 
occasion as an opportunity to update the powers claimed by the state to 
respond to (and take advantage of) new technologies: the Government noted 
in particular issues associated with the increase in the number of companies 
offering fixed line services, the mass distribution of mobile phones, the 
evolution of satellite technology, the growth of Internet communications, 
and the diversification of the postal network to include non-state-run 
companies.617 A number of changes followed. 
The state proposed to expand the interception of communications sent 
via post or public telecommunication systems to all communications by 
telecoms operators or mail delivery systems, and to relax warrant 
applications, tying them not to addresses, but to individuals, with a list of 
addresses and numbers attached and easily amendable by lower officials.61 8  
6 1 3  Id. 
614 [d. 
6 1 5  [d. 
6 16 [d. 
6 1 7  Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill, 2000, H.C. Bill [64] (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.ukipa/cm199900/cmbills/064/2000064.htm2. 
6 1 8  INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 2001 ,  supra note 600, at 
9. The purpose of this was to allow for what the United States referred to at the time as 
"roving wiretaps," giving the state flexibility to handle situations where suspects used and 
discarded or frequently switched telephones. 
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For urgent situations, Labour would expand those granted the authority to 
request wiretaps from the Senior Civil Service to the Head of the Agency 
involved. The Labour Government wanted to expand the length of time for 
which a warrant operated: previously taps only stayed in place for a two 
month period, with monthly renewals in cases of serious crime, and on a six 
month basis for matters of national security or economic well-being. The 
state proposed to change the length of time to three months, renewed every 
three months for serious crime, and six months, renewed every six months 
for matters of national security and economic well-being.6 19 The state also 
proposed to expand intercept authority to include private networks. The 
aim was to make it legal for businesses to record communications to create 
a paper trail of commercial transactions and business communications in 
the public and private sector. Where previously communications data could 
be turned over voluntarily, the state wanted to compel them to do so. The 
new legislation ultimately forced Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") to 
attach devices to their systems to enable communications to be intercepted 
while in-route.62o This move reversed the principle of innocent until proven 
guilty, with ISPs automatically re-routing all Internet traffic-from email to 
click streams-to the Government Technical Assistance Centre at MIS 's 
London headquarters.621 No effort was made to insert any form of prior 
judicial sanction into the process. Again, it should be noted that none of 
these alterations addressed concerns raised by the European Court. Rather, 
they represented expansions in existing powers. The Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act ("RIP A") became the primary legislation for 
surveillance and the interception of communications.622 
c. Effectiveness of Safeguards 
While RIP A served to expand the authorities claimed by the state to 
intercept communications, it should be remembered that the original 
impetus was actually to introduce safeguards on privacy to bring British 
law into line with the Convention. The legislation did create judicial and 
administrative oversight functions and established a complaints tribunal to 
6 1 9  This brought the interception of communications into the same timeframe as intrusive 
surveillance device provisions, discussed in the subsequent text. 
620 See Young, supra note 427, at 3 13.  
62 1  Your Privacy Ends Here, OBSERVER (U.K.), June 4, 2000, available at 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk! focus/story/0,6903 ,328071 ,00.html. 
622 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk!acts/acts2000120000023.htm. While Halford helped to stimulate this 
piece of legislation, other factors also played a role. See Yaman Akdeniz et aI., 
Bigbrother.gov.uk: State Surveillance in the Age of Information and Rights, CRIM. L. R. 
(U.K.), Feb. 2001 ,  at 73. 
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protect, in particular, private infonnation.623 However, significant questions 
can be raised about the effectiveness of these safeguards. 
First, consider the annual reports. Like those generated under the 1 985 
Interception of Communications Act, reports on the use of the powers by 
law enforcement issued by the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner ("ICC") post-RIP A refer to a "significant number of errors" . h . f h ' 624 Th h III t e operatIOn 0 t e Illtercepts. ese center on uman error or 
technical problems, which resulted in the destruction of the infonnation 
intercepted. But they do not address substantive violations. The portions of 
the reports that might have sensitive infonnation remain classified. As for 
the annual report generated on the intelligence services by the Intelligence 
Services Commissioner, this document stands out in its use of the cut-and­
paste function, simply repeating from year to year the legal authorities 
under which the intelligence services conduct surveillance. The handful of 
paragraphs addressing errors made by the intelligence services (which, each 
year, can be counted on one hand) carry language to the effect, "[a]s it is 
not possible for me to explain any details of these breaches without 
revealing infonnation of a sensitive nature, I have referred to them in more 
detail in the confidential annex.,,625 The reviewers frequently assure the 
public, however, that what errors exist are solely due to administrative 
hiccups and were conducted in good faith. The law requires the 
623 In addition to the oversight function provided by the Commissioners, which I address 
in the following text, RIP A created a nine-member Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which 
replaced the Interception of Communications Tribunal, Security Service Tribunal, and 
Intelligence Services Tribunal, as well as complaints function under Police Act 1 997 
Commissioner and Human Rights Act claims. This body has not found any violations of 
RIPA or the 1998 HRA. See, e.g. , INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, 
REpORT, 2003, H.C. 883, at 6-7 (U.K.), available at http://www.archive2.official­
documents.co.uk/documentldeps/hc/hc883/883.pdf. 
624 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act; INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 2000, H.C. 1047, at 5-6 (U.K.), available at http://www.archive2 
.official-documents.co.ukIdocumentideps/hc/hc1047/1047.pdf. As of the present time, under 
RIP A 2000, there are four commissioners: the Interception Commissioner (replacing the 
Commissioner under IOCA 1 985; previously a High Court judge: Lord Lloyd, 1 986-91 ;  
Lord Bingham. 1 992-93, Lord Nolan, 1 994-2000, and Lord Justice Swinton-Thomas, 200 1 -
06), the Intelligence Services Commissioner (replacing two different commissioners under 
the Security Services Act 1989 and ISA 1 994), the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for 
Northern Ireland, and a Chief Surveillance Commissioner (who has functions under the 
Police Act 1 997, now Parts II and III of RIPA). They have not been combined into one 
Commission, which would ensure clear lines of accountability. 
625 INTELLIGENCE SERVICES COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 2002, H.C. 1048 at 8 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.ukIdocumentideps/hc/hc I 0481 
1048.pdf; see also INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 2003, H.C. 884 at 8 
(U.K.), available at http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/documentldeps/hc/ 
hc884/884.pdf. 
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Investigatory Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland, who focuses on 
the operation of the security services in the province, to lay annual reviews 
of the surveillance powers befm:e the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
However, the legislation specifies that the commissioner may exclude any 
information that may be prejudicial to the prevention or detection of serious 
crime or the continued discharge of the functions of any public authority. 626 
This appears to be a rather large chunk of material, as precious little 
information is made public. Annexes to the Chief Surveillance 
Commissioner' s  annual review, the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner's annual review, and the Parliamentary Intelligence and 
Security Committee, which performs oversight of MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, 
are confidential. 
Second, the broader information made public tells us little about the 
powers specifically as related to terrorism and national security-the rather 
large loophole provided by Article 8(2) of the ECHR. The ICC, for 
instance, does not disclose the number of warrants issued by either the 
Foreign Secretary or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland-the two 
secretaries most likely to be dealing with terrorism. The rationale, as laid 
out by the Birkett Committee, is that "[i]t would greatly aid the operation of 
agencies hostile to the state if they were able to estimate even 
approximately the extent of the interceptions of communications for 
security purposes.,,627 The government does not consider a similar risk, 
however, to accompany the release of information related to warrants issued 
by the Home Secretary or the First Minister for Scotland, nor does it 
consider the release of information related to property warrants, and broken 
down into offences that include drug crimes, terrorism, and the like, to 
compromise the state. 
Third, while the ICC and Intelligence Services Commissioner inspect 
the agencies engaged in the interception of communications, the results of 
their inspections remain secret.628 
626 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act §§ 57-61 .  
627 BIRKETT REpORT, supra note 568, � 1 2 1 .  
628 The legislation also creates the position of Interception of Communications 
Commissioner ("ICC"), to review the exercise and performance of the Secretary of State. 
Twice a year the ICC visits the Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ, NCIS, 
Special Branch of Metropolitan Police, Strathciyde Police, Police Service for Northern 
Ireland, HM Customs and Excise, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, 
Scottish Executive and MoD. These organizations forward a complete list of warrants issued 
since the last visit; the Commissioner then selects which cases he would like to inspect­
sometimes at random, sometimes for specific reasons. The ICC reviews the files, supporting 
documents, and the product of the interception to ensure that the procedure complies with 
RlPA. He also speaks to the Home Secretary, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
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Fourth, while RIP A also provided for a tribunal to function as a 
complaints body and to oversee remedies for violation of the statute, its 
effectiveness also can be questioned. Under RIP A, the new Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal assumed jurisdiction over the areas previously addressed 
by the Interception of Communications Tribunal, the Security Service 
Tribunal, and the Intelligence Services Tribunal. It also took over the 
complaints function assigned to the Commissioner under the 1997 Police 
Act, as well as complaints lodged under the Human Rights Act. On no 
occasion did the tribunal find in favor of an applicant.629 The net result is 
that the previous breakdown in information regarding the cases forwarded 
to the court has become obfuscated, with only the total number of 
complaints made available.630 
Against the above concerns is the fact that some aspects of the 
legislation did formalize what before had been general guidelines adopted, 
exercised, and modified by the Secretary of State. To this extent, the 
changes offered increased procedural protections. Part I of RIP A reiterated 
from the 1 985 legislation, for instance, that it was a criminal offence for any 
person, without lawful authority, to intercept any communication sent via 
public post or telecommunication in .the course of their transmission.63 1 To 
be lawful, interception must be undertaken in accordance with a warrant 
issued by the Secretary of State� The grounds for granting the warrant 
collapsed national security, preventing or detecting serious cnme, 
Secretary of State for Defence, and First Minister for Scotland. In 2003, the Commissioner 
also visited communications service providers (such as the Post Office and major telephone 
companies), which are the entities responsible for executing the warrants. Critics look at 
this, and the Home Secretary's refusal to state publicly the average amount of time spent 
examining warrant requests, as evidence that the Secretary simply rubber stamps 
applications. See, e.g. , Letter from Mr. Simon Davies, Dir., Privacy In1'l, to the Rt. Hon. Sir 
Swinton Thomas, Interception of Commc'ns Comm'r (July 3 1 ,  2002) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.privacyinternational.orglcountries/uk/surveillance/pi-letter-swinton2.html. 
629 See, e.g., Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act; INTERCEPTION OF 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 2001 ,  supra note 600, at 4; INTERCEPTION OF 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, 2000, REpORT � 32 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/documentl cm47/4778/4778.htm. 
630 See INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 2003, supra note 625, at 7-8; 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 200 1 ,  H.C. 1 244, at 7, available at 
www .ipt-uk.comldocs/rep_intel_ser_comm.pdf. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSIONER, REpORT, 200 1 ,  supra note 600, at 2-3; INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSIONER, REpORT: REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT, 2000, Cm. 5296, at 
10 (U.K.), available at http://www .privacyinternational.orglcountries/uklsurveillance/inter­
comm-report -2000.pdf. 
631 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act § 1 ;  see Interception of Communications Act 
1 985, c. 56, §§ 1 (1),  1 (2)(s), 2(2) (U.K.), available at http://www.archive.official­
documents.co.uk! documentlcm47 14778/4 778.htm. 
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safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom (in relation 
to persons outside the British Islands), or giving effect to any international 
mutual assistance agreement in relation to serious crime, into one category. 
The statute requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied that no other 
reasonable means exists for obtaining the same information. The conduct 
authorized must be proportionate to that sought to be achieved. The 
warrant must specify the conduct that will be undertaken, how related 
communications data will be obtained, and the individuals who must assist 
in giving effect to the warrant. Those authorized to request interception 
warrants include the Director-General of MI5, the Chief of MI6, the 
Director of GCHQ, the Director General of the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service, the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis, the 
Chief Constables of the Northern Ireland and Scottish police forces, the 
Commissioners of Customs and Excises, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, 
and, for cases involving mutual assistance, any competent authority of 
countries outside the United Kingdom.632 It is up to the Secretary of State 
to examine and approve the number of persons to whom the material is 
made available and the extent to which the information is released or 
copied, as well as the number of copies made.633 Overall, the new 
legislation did force the agencies conducting intercept activities to conform 
to and ensure their practices were in accord with the legal authorities. 
It is not clear whether other elements carried over from the Home 
Office guidelines offer greater or less protection for British subjects. What 
is important, however, about these is that their codification in law does not 
offer greater protection to the targets of surveillance than existed prior to 
the European Court's findings. For example, the statute excludes any 
information gathered--or the information that it had been gathered-from 
being used as evidence in COurt.634 Anyone revealing it becomes subject to 
criminal penalties.635 
Arguments can be made both ways as to whether the exclusion of 
intercepts benefits or hurts targets of surveillance. On the one hand the 
state can use the information to find a place and time where further 
information could be obtained. The fruits of such surveillance remain 
admissible. On the other hand, private aspects of an individual's  life, even 
those not at all related to the crime suspected, may enter the surveillance 
record. This provision thus prevents such information from surfacing 
632 Regulation of investigatory Powers Act § 6. 
633 [d. § 1 5 .  
634 Id. § 1 7. The legislation exempted proceedings before the Tribunal, the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission, or the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission. 
635 [d. § 19 .  
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directly in a court of law. But, back to the first hand, keeping the 
surveillance out of court means that the means of surveillance writ largely 
remains cloaked-which is, of course, the primary argument put forward 
for preventing it from entering official records. The state is reluctant to 
provide information about the authorities' capabilities, which would give an 
advantage to those engaged in terrorism and other serious crime.636 The 
inclusion of this limitation has proven to be highly controversial, with 
multiple reviews arguing for its repeal, but the state has held its course.637 
3. Covert Surveillance: Intrusive, Directed, Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources 
Covert surveillance, or electronic bugging, occurs when the target of 
the surveillance is unaware of its existence. Like the relationship of the 
intelligence agencies to the interception of communications, Home Office 
guidelines, not statutes, governed law enforcement's  use of electronic 
surveillance throughout most of the 20th century. Part III of the 1 997 
Police Act introduced the first statutory controls, including a Code of 
Practice on Intrusive Surveillance, which entered into force in February 
1 999.638 Similarly, until 1 994, no law regulated MI5 ' s  use of covert 
surveillance. That year the Intelligence Services Act required authorization 
by the Secretary of State.639 RIPA amended and expanded these statutes. 
Before delving into the details of the current authorities, however, it is 
helpful to first look at a case considered by the European Court of Human 
Rights, which demonstrates where the authorities introduced between 1 989 
and 1 997 fell short of Convention demands. 
636 See 400 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (2003) 588 (U.K.). 
637 See e.g., PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW COMMITIEE, REpORT: ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME 
AND SECURITY ACT REVIEW, 2005, H.C. 100, at 9, (U.K.) available at 
http://www .statewatch.org!news/2003/dec/atcsReport.pdf; HOME AFFAIRS SELECT 
COMMITTEE, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE (2003) (U.K.) (testimony of Lord Carlile of Berriew QC 
on Mar. 1 1 , 2003), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uklpa/cm200203/ 
cmselect!crnhaffl5 1 5/303 l l 0 1 .htm; see also 614  PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) (2000) I I I  
(U.K.); LORD LLOYD, INQUIRY INTO LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM, 1 996, Cm. 3420, c. 7 
(U.K.). 
638 R v. Khan (Sultan), [ 1997] A.c. 558 (1996) (appeal taken from Eng. A.C.); see also, 
R v. Khan (Sultan), 2 CHRLD 125, n.4 ( 1996). Various non-statutory codes of practice also 
were developed at this time by the Association of Chief Police Officers in England and 
Wales, the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, and HM Customs and Excise. 
The Code has been replaced by the Covert Surveillance Code of Practice (Surveillance 
Code) issued under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 7 1 (5) (U.K.), 
available at http://www .opsi.gov.uklacts/acts2000/20000023.htm. 
639 Intelligence Services Act 1 994, c. 13,  § 5(2) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.opsLgov.uklACTS/actsI994IUkpga_19940013_en_l .htm. 
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a. Khan v. United Kingdom 
On March 1 4, 1 994, English courts sentenced Sultan Khan, a British 
national, to three years in prison for dealing drugs. The case relied heavily 
on information obtained from an electronic bug that the police placed in his 
home.64o The Appeal Courts dismissed his appeal but raised the issue as a 
point of law whether the product of covert surveillance could be introduced 
as evidence in a criminal trial .  Although the House of Lords again 
dismissed the appeal, it addressed the question at hand. The Lords asserted 
that English law admitted of no right to privacy writ large-and that, even 
if such a right did exist, common law required that improperly obtained 
evidence be admitted at trial, according to judicial discretion. Lord Nolan, 
writing for the majority, added, "[t]he sole cause of this case coming to the 
House of Lords is the lack of a statutory system regulating the use of 
surveillance devices by the police." He continued, "[t]he absence of such a 
system seems astonishing, the more so in view of the statutory framework 
which has governed the use of such devices by the Security Service since 
1 989, and the interception of communications by the police as well as by 
other agencies since 1 985.,,641 
In January 1 997, Kahn lodged a complaint with the European 
Commission of Human Rights, claiming, inter alia, a violation of Article 8, 
focusing on the right to respect for private life, and Article 1 3 , requiring an 
effective domestic remedy. In April 1 999, the European Court agreed to 
hear the case. The Court held that the surveillance in question clearly 
violated Article 8(1) .642 The question was whether it fell sufficiently within 
Article 8(2)-namely, whether it was "in accordance with the law" and 
"necessary in a democratic society" for one of the purposes specified in that 
section. Drawing on Halford, the court noted that "in accordance with the 
law" required both compliance and attention to whether it reflected the rule 
of law. The court recognized that this meant, amongst other things, that the 
law had to be sufficiently clear as to inform the public of the authorities 
claimed by the state. But no statutory scheme existed. The Home Office 
guidelines that governed covert surveillance neither carried the force of law, 
nor could the public directly access them. The Court unanimously ruled 
that the practice violated Article 8. The Court also found in the applicant's  
favor with respect to  the claim under Article 13 :  while the English judiciary 
could have excluded the evidence under the Police and Criminal Evidence 
640 R v. Khan (Sultan), 2 CHRLD 125 (1 996). 
641 Id. 
642 Khan v. United Kingdom, 3 1  Eur. H.R. Rep. 45 (2001); see also Hewitson v. United 
Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 1  (2003). 
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Act, the only redress to violations of that statute was to file a complaint 
with the Police Complaints Authority-hardly an impartial body.643 On 
May 1 2, 2000, the Court awarded Khan £3 1 1 ,500.644 
b. 2000 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
Khan dealt with the state of law prior to the RIP A and revealed in stark 
contours the difference between British practice and European standards. 
In the interim, RIP A addressed this disparity by creating a new regime to 
address electronic bugging. As with the interception of communications, 
however, the Government did not just address the issues raised by the 
European court; instead, it used the occasion as an opportunity to expand on 
the existing guidelines to allow for broader surveillance authority. 
Part II of the legislation focuses on the three categories of covert 
surveillance established in the 1 997 Police Act: intrusive surveillance, 
directed surveillance, and covert human intelligence sources. The levels of 
authorization that must be obtained, and the circumstances under which 
public authorities can authorize information gathering, vary depending on 
the category, and the entity undertaking the surveillance. The legislation 
covers operations undertaken by MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, as well "public 
authorities," which encompasses more than 950 entities. These entities 
range from local authorities and health trusts, to the National Crime Squad 
and the Metropolitan Police. In 2004, the Government further expanded the 
number of public authorities to which the legislation applied, bringing such 
varied bodies as the Postal Services Commission and Office of Fair Trading 
under its remit.645 
The first area, intrusive surveillance, covers any covert search 
conducted on residential property or in private vehicles, in which either an 
individual or device collects the information. Gadgets not physically 
located on the property or in the car, which deliver the same quality of 
information as though the instrument were physically present, count as 
intrusive. The authorizing officer must be assured that the surveillance is 
necessary on the grounds of national security, or to prevent or detect serious 
crime. The statute also requires that the officer be satisfied that the 
643 See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1 984, § 78 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.ukJsilsi I 988/uksi_19881200_en_l .htm. 
644 The court also awarded V AT for costs and expenses, minus any funds obtained from 
legal aid. See Khan v. United Kingdom, http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uklpipermaill 
ukcrypto/2000-May/0 I 0446.html 
645 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human 
Intelligence Sources) Order, 2003, S.l. 2003/3 1 7 1 ,  art. 2 � 1 7  (U.K.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.ukJsi/si200S/200S I 084.htm. 
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operation is proportionate to its aim. Outside of emergency situations, the 
approval of a Commissioner is required prior to implementation. 646 
Although the legislation established Commissioners to oversee the 
process, once again question can be raised as to how much of an impact 
they have. In the first year of the statute's  operation, for instance, the 
Commissioners only refused prior approval in one case (out of 3 7 1  
authorizations for property interference and 258 authorizations of intrusive 
surveillance). 647 The Commissioners did not overturn any of the forty-six 
emergency authorizations. Outside of prior approval, the commissioners 
also have the ability to terminate an authorization or renewal where either 
no reasonable grounds exist for believing that the authorization meets the 
required criteria, or where an emergency authorization is found to be 
wanting. In the first year of the statute' s  operation, the Commission 
refrained from overturning any intrusive surveillance warrants. In his 
annual review of these powers, Andrew Leggatt interpreted these numbers 
as indicating "that applications continue to be properly considered by the 
agencies before they are authorized.,,648 This trend continued.649 
The second category, directed surveillance, focuses on information 
sought in the course of an investigation or operation where private data is 
likely to be gathered. Electronic bugs placed in work areas or non-private 
646 Subsequent guidelines constructed by the Commissioners' office state that it is not 
necessary to obtain authorization through the Secretary of State when hostages are involved; 
the suspects in such circumstances are considered to be engaged in crime, thus stripping 
them of any claim to privacy. The victims, in tum, would be unlikely to object to any 
invasion of their privacy if it meant being freed from captivity. CHIEF SURVEILLANCE 
COMMISSIONER, REpORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO SCOTTISH MINISTERS, 2002-2003, 
H.C. 1062, at 4 (U.K.), available at http://www.archive2.official-documents. 
co.ukldocumentl depsl hc/hcl 062/1062.pdf. 
647 The reason for refusal centered on timing: the public authority initiated the 
surveillance prior to obtaining commission approval, as required by law. 
648 Police Act 1997, ch. 50 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uklacts/ 
acts I 9971l997050.htm; CHIEF SURVEILLANCE COMMISSIONER, supra note 646. The 2002-03 
report states, "I am satisfied that such authorizations continue to be treated seriously by the 
authorities concerned." Id. 
649 CHIEF SURVEILLANCE COMMISSIONER, supra note 646; see also CHIEF SURVEILLANCE 
COMMISSIONER, ANNUAL REpORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO SCOTTISH MINISTERS, 
2003-2004, H.C. 668, at 1 1  (U.K.), available at http://www.surveillancecommissioners. 
gov.ukldocsl!annualreport2003-04.pdf. These numbers do not include renewals, which, at 
least in regard to the Police Act, are increasing: 437 in 2001-2002, 543 in 2002-2003 . CHIEF 
SURVEILLANCE COMMISSIONER, supra note 646, at 3. The total renewals are decreasing, 
however, in intrusive surveillance: from 102 in 2001-2002, the total dropped to eighty in 
2002-2003. Id. at 4. In his annual review of these powers, the Chief Commissioner, Andrew 
Leggatt, attributed this decline and the drop in urgent requests to "improved knowledge and 
efficiency as well as to an increasing familiarity with the requirements of authorization." Id. 
at 3. 
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vehicles fall into this category. The . process for obtaining warrants 
duplicates intrusive surveillance requirements. But there are two critical 
differences in the criteria considered in this process: First, unlike intrusive 
surveillance, the senior authorizing officer, or (for intelligence services) 
Secretary of State, does not need to take into account whether the 
information could reasonably be obtained by other means; second, the 
number of entities who can request a directe<;l warrant is significantly 
broader than those who can request an intrusive one. This links to the 
broader number of aims such warrants can seek. Where intrusive warrants 
are limited to issues of serious crime, national security, and the economic 
well-being of the United Kingdom, directed warrants may, in addition to 
these, be directed towards public safety, the protection of public health, the 
assessment or collection of taxes or duties, and any other purpose specified 
under order by the Secretary of State. Accordingly, orders of magnitude 
more authorizations are made for directed surveillance than for intrusive. In 
200 1 ,  for instance, public authorities and intelligence agencies obtained 
some 28,000 directed authorizations, as opposed to 493 intrusive ones.650 
The third category, covert human intelligence sources (CHIS), 
addresses the process via which public authorities develop relationships 
with individuals in order to facilitate the secret transfer of information. As 
with intrusive surveillance, proportionality is required. The statute requires 
that the public authority establish a manager for day-to-day contact with the 
CHIS, a handler for general oversight, and a registrar to maintain records on 
the source, and that access to the records be limited to a need-to-know 
basis. CHIS authorizations include the broader aims of directed 
surveillance, extending the utilization of such information-gathering powers 
to public safety, public health, the collection of taxes, and other purposes as 
may be issued under order by the Secretary of State. On average, public 
authorities and the intelligence services recruit between five and six 
thousand new sources annually. For all three of these categories, 
authorization lasts for three months, with three-month renewals possible. In 
an emergency, authorization can be granted for a seventy-two-hour period. 
The role of the Commissioners here again draws attention. Arguments 
could be made that the oversight conducted by the office is significant: 
Records of all surveillance must be kept by the public authority for review 
by the Commissioners. But, again, in the rare instance that the Commission 
does quash an authorization (only a handful of instances in the five years 
650 In 2004, the state narrowed this requirement for local authorities to only allow them 
to conduct direct surveillance or use CHIS for preventing crime or disorder. Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) Order 
2003 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2003/draftJ20037759.htm. 
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that have elapsed since RIPA), law enforcement and public authorities can 
appeal to the Chief Surveillance Commissioner. And the standard of 
review here is remarkably weak: where the Chief Surveillance 
Commissioner is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist for believing that 
the requirements had been satisfied, he can modify the Commissioner's 
decision. There is, though, some oversight of this: the Chief Surveillance 
Commissioner then reports his findings directly to the Prime Minister.651 
In addition to the reporting of statistics and review of applications for 
authorization, the Commissioners also conduct general inspections of law 
enforcement and public authorities making use of the powers. Again, an 
argument could be made that this is an effective function: the Surveillance 
Commissioners annually inspect approximately 60 law enforcement entities 
and 270 public authorities. With this rigorous schedule, as of the time of 
writing, all 442 local authorities in Great Britain have undergone at least 
one inspection. However, the results of these inspections are not made 
public. Rather, the Commission forwards a report to the Chief Officer and, 
where necessary, requests that the entity develop an action plan to address 
any issues raised. Some flavor of these reviews comes through in the 
Commissioner's annual report. Here he has highlighted a number of bad 
practices, such as "insufficiently specific applications and authorizations, 
exceeding the terms of the authorization, delegation of reviews by 
authorizing officers, codes of practice not readily available to practitioners 
and inadequate RIPA training and education.,,652 The inspections also 
revealed a significant number of basic errors, such as the entry of wrong 
addresses, mistakes in the vehicle identification numbers specified in the 
authorization, and the use of the procedures for intrusive surveillance when 
the situation warranted only directed surveillance authority. 
The importance of these reviews is not to be underestimated; it is 
likely that the presence of "inspectors" external to these agencies creates a 
certain relationship within which errors in the application of these powers 
can be addressed. This is something. But the insistence that reports on 
these agencies be made available only to the entity being inspected 
somewhat detracts from our ability to judge its effectiveness. 
4. Encrypted Data 
Section III of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act appears 
somewhat at odds with Labour's stated goal of making Britain "the most e-
651 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 38-38 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.ukiacts/acts2000/20000023.htm. 
652 CHIEF SURVEILLANCE COMMISSIONER, supra note 649, at 1 1 . 
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friendly country in the world" by 2002.653 With virtually no public 
discussion prior to its introduction, this portion of the legislation addresses 
the issue of encrypted electronic data. The statute creates a duty on 
individuals possessing the key to disclose the information where necessary 
for reasons of national security, preventing or detecting crime, or in the 
interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. It may also be 
required where the information sought is central to the exercise of public 
authority, statutory power, or statutory duty. In either case, the duty of 
disclosure must be proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by its 
imposition, and it must be the only reasonable way in which the information 
can be obtained.654 Criminal penalties with up to two years imprisonment 
and a fine follow violations of the statute. The legislation makes it illegal to 
tip off others that the state is seeking the information.655 This is treated as 
even more serious of an offence than not providing the keys, carrying up to 
five years imprisonment and a fine as a penalty. The Act creates a duty on 
law enforcement and public authorities to use the keys only for the purpose 
for which they are sought, as well as to store them in a secure manner. The 
records of the keys must be destroyed as soon as the key is not longer 
needed to decrypt the information.656 
Although the powers were supposed to begin in 2004, the Home 
Office deferred implementation of Part III. Leggat writes, 
[t]he use of infonnation security and enclYPtion products by terrorist and criminal 
suspects is . . .  not yet as widespread as had been expected when the legislation was 
approved by Parliament four years ago. Meanwhile the National Technical Assistance 
Centre (a facility managed by the Home Office to undertake complex data processing) 
is enabling law enforcement agencies to understand protected electronic data, so far as 
necessary. I am assured that the need to implement Part III of RIPA is being kept 
under review.657 
As of the time of writing, Part III of RIP A remained in abeyance. 
The upshot of this section is that while MIS would still need a warrant 
to read the content of the information obtained from ISPs, such 
authorization is not necessary for the agency to monitor patterns, such as 
web sites visited, to and from whom email is sent, which pages are 
downloaded, of which discussion groups a user is a member, and which 
653 Your Privacy Ends Here, supra note 621 .  
654 Regulation ofInvestigatory Powers Act § 49. 
655 Id. § 54. 
656 Id. § 55. 
657 CHIEF SURVEILLANCE COMMISSIONER, supra note 649, at 3 (statement by the Rt. Hon. 
Sir Andrew Leggatt), available at http://www.spy.org.uk/spyblog/2004/07/annuaIJeport_ 
oCthe _ chieC sur.htrnl. 
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chat rooms an individual visits. It is too early to gauge how these powers 
will measure up against the ECHR. Nor is it clear how the European Court 
will respond to the gag orders included in the legislation. Their practical 
effect is that if an individual is approached for an encryption key, and she 
has forgotten the code, she cannot even inform her family of why she is 
being taken away by the police and charged. 
What makes the section of particular note is the transferred burden of 
proof: it is not the state that must prove that an individual has the key, but 
the accused that must prove that they have forgotten it. The statute assumes 
the accused's guilt. Both business and civil liberties groups object to the 
legislation, which the Government presented with little public discussion 
and no evidence about the level of threat posed over the Internet by 
terrorists, pedophiles, and other criminals. Nor did the Government present 
evidence that would suggest that the need for these measures outweighs 
their impact on privacy. 
B. POST-9f l l :  THE 2001 ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 
After formal inquiry and extensive public debate, in 2000 the United 
Kingdom introduced permanent counter terrorist legislation. Prior to that 
time (albeit since the 1 9th century) counterterrorist measures existed on a 
temporary basis.658 Despite the recent comprehensive terrorism package, 
following 9/1 1 ,  pressure to expand state power resulted in further 
legislation. The 2001 Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act ("ATCSA") 
had the feel of stale leftovers; powers that the security and intelligence 
forces had attempted to acquire previously but which they had been unable 
to obtain.659 While much of the statute has very little to do with terrorism, 
some sections are directly relevant to our current discussion. I will here 
briefly address Part III, which allows for the exchange of information 
between government entities, and Part XI, which augments the surveillance 
powers contained in RIP A. 
RIP A, it will be recalled, prevents information collected via covert 
surveillance from being used in court. Part III of the A TCSA does not 
repeal this, but it allows public bodies to disclose information to assist in 
criminal investigations or proceedings either in the United Kingdom or 
abroad (including inquiries into whether charges ought to be initiated or 
investigations brought to an end).660 The legislation also allows Inland 
658 See LAURA K. DONOHUE, COUNTERTERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 1 922-2000 (2000). 
659 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act,"2001 ,  c. 24 (U.K.). 
660 Id. §§ 1 7-20. While the Secretary of State may prevent disclosure of information 
under the ATCSA to overseas jurisdictions that do not offer an "adequate" level of 
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Revenue and Customs and Excise to disclose information to the intelligence 
and security agencies. This means that the information gathered for 
counterterrorist purposes can be distributed to organizations with a 
considerably different remit than those gathering the data.661 
As reflected in the catch-all nature of the statute itself, many of the 
information exchanges that have already occurred have little to do with 
terrorism. Between January 2002 and September 2003, for instance, only 
four percent of the disclosures made by Inland Revenue to police and 
intelligence services under Part 3,  Section 1 9  of the ATCSA related to 
terrorism.662 In contrast, forty-six percent (9, 1 57 disclosures) related to sex 
offences, and twenty-four percent (4,848 disclosures) related to drug 
offences.663 This phenomenon is not singular to Inland Revenue: during the 
same period, only twenty-one percent of the disclosures made by Customs 
and Excise related to terrorism.664 Observing the use of these powers, the 
Privy Counsellor Review Committee concluded, "these provisions are, in 
our view, a significant extension of the Government's  power to use 
information obtained for one purpose, in some cases under compulsory 
powers, for a completely different purpose.,,665 
Part XI of the 2001 ATCSA augmented the surveillance powers in the 
2000 RIP A. It requires that communication service providers retain data 
for a specified period, in order to ensure that requests made under 2000 
RIP A can be fulfilled. Some scholars attribute the inclusion of this passage 
to lobbying done by NCIS on behalf of the police, Customs and Excise, the 
Security Service, SIS, and GCHQ, which called for a minimum twelve­
month retention by the CSP, followed by six-year storage, either in-house 
or by a Trusted Third Party.666 What is fascinating about the expansion is 
the rationale offered by NCIS: 
Communications data is crucial to the business of the Agencies. It is pivotal to 
reactive investigations into serious crime and the development of proactive 
protection, the exact parameters that would require this fmding remain less than clear. 
661 PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW, supra note 637, at 43-44. As the parliamentary body 
reviewing the measure notes, "information obtained by public authorities under statutory 
powers conferred for one purpose may be disclosed to the police and intelligence and 
security agencies to be used for completely different legitimate purposes . . . . " [d. at 43. 
� M � # 
. 
663 [d. 
664 Id. at 44. 
665 Id. at 45. 
666 Clive Walker & Yaman Akdeniz, Anti-terrorism Laws and Data Retention: War is 
Over?, 54 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 1 59, 1 62 n.2 l (2003) (citing ROGER GASPAR, NCIS 
SUBMISSION TO THE HOME OFFICE; LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: CLARITY ON COMMUNICATIONS 
DATA RETENTION LAW 9 (2000), available at http://cryptome.orglncis-camivore.htm). 
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intelligence on matters effecting not only organized criminal activity but also national 
security. At the lower level, it provides considerable benefit to the detection of 
volume crime . . . .  Short term retention and the deletion of data will have a disastrous 
impact on the Agencies' intelligence and evidence gathering capabilities.667 
This language suggested a general data mining approach to the detection of 
crime-startlingly similar to its U.S. counterpart.668 
In order to carry out the retention provisions, the A TCSA empowered 
the Secretary of State to issue a voluntary code of practice, a draft of which 
the Home Office published in March 2003, to be followed by 
implementation via statutory instrument. In the event that the code proves 
inadequate to force communication service providers to turn over 
information, the legislation empowers the Secretary of State to issue 
compulsory directions.669 In the case of a recalcitrant service provider, civil 
proceedings for an injunction or other relief may be initiated by the 
Secretary of State.670 
Like so many information-gathering authorities in the USA PATRIOT 
Act, the A TCSA does not limit the information retained to terrorism data. 
A late amendment required that the information "may relate directly or 
indirectly to national security" for prosecution-however, "may" also 
suggests "may not.,,67 1 There is some evidence that the purpose may be for 
entirely different reasons: the Government opposed the amendment at the 
time.672 Counsels' advice to the Information Commissioner on the data 
retention provisions in the A TCSA noted that it is "an inevitable 
consequence of the scheme envisaged by A TCSA that communications 
data" retained for an extended period will be "available for production in 
accordance with a notice issued under [S]ection 22 RIP A for a purpose with 
no connection whatever to terrorism or national security.,,673 
667 Walker & Akdeniz, supra note 666, at 1 63. 
668 While Lord Rooker formally denied this language in the House of Lords, similar 
claims proliferate. See 629 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2001 )  770 (U.K.). 
669 Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act, 200 1 ,  c. 24, §§ 102-04 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2001l20010024.htm; see also S. A. Mathieson, The Net 's 
Eyes are Watching, GUARDIAN ONLINE (U.K.), Nov. 15 ,  200 1 ,  http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
intemetnews/story 10,7369 ,593920,00.html. 
670 Walker & Akdeniz, supra note 666, at 170. While the 1998 Data Protection Act and 
1999 Telecommunications (Data Protection and Privacy) (citing THE HOME OFFICE, 
REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: RETENTION OF COMMUNICATIONS DATA �� 2 1 -23 (2001)  
(U.K.» . 
671 Walker & Akdeniz, supra note 666, at 1 66. 
672 Id. 
673 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 : Retention and Disclosure of 
Communications Data Summary of Counsels' Advice, � 13 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.privacyintemational.orglcountries/uk/surveillance/ic-terror-opnion.htm. 
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The requirement that data be retained received a boost the following 
year when the European Union issued a directive regarding the processing 
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector. Echoing Article 8 of the ECHR, Article 1 5( 1 )  
allows for the information to b e  archived in the interests of national 
security, defense, or public security, or the prevention or detection of 
criminal offences.674 
The ATCSA, however, retains considerably more information than is 
necessary, while it remains relatively easy for individuals committed to 
anonymity on the Internet to dodge state grasp. Although traditional email 
systems include the name of the sender and the receiver, with login and 
password information, it is entirely possible for other people to access these 
accounts. Various email systems, such as Earthlink:, Hotrnail, and Yahoo! 
allow individuals to obtain accounts under aliases. A user can access these 
via public terminals, thus remaining anonymous. Individuals surfing the 
web can use sophisticated browsers that cover their trail .  Guardster.com 
"offers free anonymous internet web surfing to everyone.,,675 Other sites, 
such as Anonnymizer.com, the-cloak. com, and anonymous. com offer 
similar services. Special programs, such as Anonymity 4 Proxy, allow a 
user to scan servers and confirm their anonymity.676 Users can obtain fake 
IP addresses, block cookies, and change their browsers to masque any 
personal information. It is unlikely that those engaged in terrorism will 
forego these relatively accessible tools to ensure that their communications 
escape state grasp. This introduces concerns about whether the measures 
introduced are proportionate. 
The concern regarding proportionality becomes even more pronounced 
when examined in light of the ability to introduce statutory instruments 
under RIP A to expand the number of entities who can demand the stored 
communications to include non-national-security-related public authorities. 
Leading and Junior Counsel from Matrix Chambers advised the Information 
Commissioner, upon being approached for analysis: 
There is, in Counsel's view, no doubt that both the retention of communications data 
on behalf of a public authority, and the disclosure of such data to a public authority 
674 See Council Directive 2002/581EC, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37-47 (E.C.), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-Iex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/1_ 201/1_2012002073 1 en003 70047. pdf 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector). 
675 Welcome to Guardster, http://www.guardster.com (last visited June 9, 2006). 
676 See Anonymity 4 Proxy (A4Proxy)-Web Anonymizing Software for Surfing with 
Privacy, http://www.inetprivacy.com/a4proxy/ (last visited June 9, 2006). 
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constitute an interference with the right to respect for private life and correspondence 
enshrined in Article 8(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights.677 
Indeed, the European Court has found that "states do not enjoy unlimited 
discretion to subject individuals to secret surveillance or a system of secret 
files. The interest of a State in protecting its national security must be 
balanced against the seriousness of the interference with an applicant's  right 
to respect for his or her private life." The court continued, 
there has to be at least a reasonable and genuine link between the aim invoked and the 
measures interfering with private life for the aim to be regarded as legitimate. To 
refer to the more or less indiscriminate storing of information relating to the private 
lives of individuals in terms of pursuing a legitimate national security concern is . . .  
'd I bl . 678 eVI ent y pro ematlC. 
The European Court also reads the convention to require that the new 
measures be necessary. However, the 2001 ATCSA, introduced nine 
months after the 2000 Terrorism Act came into effect, could hardly be said 
to have addressed a serious gap in the law. There simply wasn't enough 
time to establish this, and certainly no evidence to this effect has been made 
public since.679 
C. ANONYMITY AND SURVEILLANCE IN PUBLIC SPACE: CCTV 
Just as the United States, understandably, is taking advantage of new 
technologies to expand its surveillance powers, so too is the United 
Kingdom. The country leads the world in the concentration cif public 
surveillance devices.68o Eight years ago the British government 
appropriated £ 1 53 million to develop a closed circuit television ("CCTV") 
network.68 1  By 2003, two and a half million, or roughly ten percent of the 
globe's  total CCTVs operated on British soil.682 According to National 
677 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 200 1 :  Retention and Disclosure of 
Communications Data Summary of Counsels' Advice, supra note 673, '11 1 5 . 
678 Walker & Akdeniz, supra note 666, at 1 74 (citing Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 
28,341195, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 92 (Wildhaber, J., concurring)). 
679 The only cases made available in an attempt to convince Internet companies to retain 
records cited instances in which records more than fifteen months old were sought in non­
national security-related investigations. See Stuart Miller, Internet Providers Say No to 
Blunkett, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 22, 2002, at 9. 
680 The cameras were first introduced into the U.K. in 1 956. Quentin Burrows, Scowl 
Because You 're on Candid Camera: Privacy and Video Surveillance, 3 1  VAL. U. L. REv. 
1 079, 1 080 ( 1997). 
68 1  COUSENS, supra note 565, at 59-60. 
682 Mark Townsend & Paul Harris, Security Role for Traf ic Cameras, THE OBSERVER 
(U.K.), Feb. 9, 2003, at 2. 
. 
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Geographic, in 2004, this number topped four million.683 The net effect is  
substantial: Each person traveling through London is caught on film 
approximately three hundred times per day.684 These devices do not just 
watch and record; some use facial recognition technology to scan the public 
against a database of persons sought by the state.685 In East London alone, 
approximately three hundred cameras incorporate this technology. 
The system aims at deterring and detecting ordinary crime-and 
increasing residents' sense of security. But statistics are not available to 
evaluate how effective the cameras have been in meeting these goals. Until 
recently, CCTV had not yielded the capture or conviction of a single 
terrorist.686 Following the King's  Cross bombing in July 2005, however, 
police review of CCTV tapes played a significant role in piecing together 
the events leading up to the attack and helped to identify a suspected 
handler. 
London is not alone in its surveillance efforts. Scotland maintains 
approximately ten thousand cameras to monitor traffic speed and parking 
structures.687 Some seventy-five cities in total have public CCTV systems, 
with a number of private actors following suit.688 The cameras have 
overwhelming support: approximately ninety-five percent of all local 
governments regard it as a viable means to enforce the law.689 In Newham, 
England, for instance, where thirty million dollars went into installing the 
devices, police claimed an eleven percent drop in assaults, a forty-nine 
percent drop in burglary, and a forty-four percent drop in criminal damage 
through the end of 1 994.690 These statistics, however, are not without 
683 David Shenk, Watching You, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. Nov. 2003, at 1 6. 
684 Privacy vs. Security: Electronic Surveillance in the Nation 's Capital: Hearing before 
the Subcomm. on the D.C of the Comm. on Government Reform, 1 07th Congo 2 (2002) 
(statement of Rep. Constance A. Morella, Chairman) [hereinafter Privacy vs. Security 
Hearing]. 
685 Facial recognition technology is form of biometric ID. Algorithms map relationships 
between facial features, can ID from live video or still images, up to a thirty-five degree 
angle, and compensates for light conditions, glasses, facial expressions, facial hair, skin 
color, and aging. Find Criminals, Missing Children, Even Terrorists in a Crowd Using Face 
Recognition Software Linked to a Database, PRNEWSWIRE, Nov. 1 6, 1998. 
686 Privacy vs. Security Hearing, supra note 684, at 2 .  
687 Joyce W. Luk, Note, Identifying Terrorists: Privacy Rights in the United States and 
United Kingdom, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 223, 229 n.33 (2002) (citing Alastair 
Dalton, Controls Urged on Big Brother 's All-Seeing Eyes, SCOTSMAN, July 23, 1 998, at 9). 
688 These private cameras have given rise to a voyeuristic industry, with footage from 
toilet cams, gynocams, and dildocams tending to end up on the Internet. See Luk, supra note 
687, at 229. 
689 See Luk, supra note 687, at 228 (citing Burrows, supra note 680, at 1099). 
690 See Luk, supra note 687, at 228 (citing John Deane, CCTV Boost Follows Crime-
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controversy. Some suggest that the drop in crime experienced by these 
cities could be due to a host of factors, undertaken at the same time, as well 
as part of a general trend in decreased crime even in areas where cameras 
are lacking. 
The legal regime that governs the use of CCTV centers on the 1998 
Data Protection Act. This section briefly considers this statute and the 
phenomenon of CCTV in the context of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. It concludes with a brief consideration of the proliferation 
of these devices in the United States. 
1. Data Protection Act 1 998 
The primary legislation governing CCTV is the 1 998 Data Protection 
Act ("DP A"). The statute incorporates rights of access to information and 
regulates data controller behavior. It also provides special exceptions, 
among which is national security.69 1 
Data controllers, in this case, those overseeing CCTV, must act in 
accordance with eight principles: fair and lawful processing, the acquisition 
of information only for specific and lawful purposes, and the processing of 
information only in a manner compatible with that purpose. The 
information gathered must be proportionate to the purpose for which it is 
processed, and those obtaining the data may not hold the information any 
longer than necessary for the stated purpose. The legislation grants targets 
of surveillance particular entitlements-such as the right to know when a 
controller is processing their personal data, and the ability to prevent the 
information from being used for direct marketing. The statute requires that 
no significant decision impacting the information be made solely via 
automation. The target has the right to require the destruction of inaccurate 
information. And the legislation allows subjects to go to court to remedy a 
breach of the measure. 
In keeping with RIP A 2000, the Chief Commissioner recommended 
that where CCTV is to be used at a crime hotspot, if it is likely that private 
information will be gathered, the police apply for directed surveillance. 
The Commissioner's assumption is that a judge will go easier on public 
authorities where they have sought a warrant. 692 
Fighting Success, PRESS ASS'N NEWSFILE, Oct. 1 3 ,  1 995). 
691 Data Protection Act 1 998, c. 29, § 1 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uki 
ACTS/acts 1 998119980029.htm. 
692 CHIEF SURVEILLANCE COMMISSIONER, supra note 652 (statement by the Rt. Hon. Sir 
Andrew Leggatt). 
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2. European Courts 
While the European Court has not adjudicated the general presence of 
the cameras, it ruled against Britain's use of footage. In Peck v. United 
Kingdom, the facts of which occurred prior to the 1 998 Human Rights Act, 
CCTV caught the applicant wielding a knife in preparation for suicide. The 
police immediately went to the scene and prevented the applicant from 
hurting himself. Although the police did not charge the applicant with a 
criminal offence, the local council later released the tape to the media, 
which aired footage of him with the knife (but not the actual suicide 
attempt) on national television. The government also used a photograph of 
the applicant as part of a public relations exercise to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the cameras. The state did not mask the applicant's  identity 
when it released the information to the public. 
When the applicant' s  efforts to seek relief through the domestic 
judicial system failed, he appealed to the European Court. The British 
government asserted that because the event occurred in public, the state's  
action had not compromised the applicant's  Article 8 right to a private life. 
The Court noted that the applicant was not a public figure and not attending 
a public event. Rather, in a state of considerable distress, he was walking 
late at night. Although disclosure had a basis in law,693 was foreseeable, 
and sought to uphold public safety and the prevention of crime, it failed on 
the grounds of proportionality. The council could have tried to mask the 
applicant's identity, or it could have sought his consent. Advertising the 
effectiveness of the system did not present a compelling enough reason to 
violate Peck's  rights under Article 8. It also determined the lack of 
domestic remedy to be a violation of Article 13 .  In 2003, the Court 
awarded Peck €1 1 ,800 for non-pecuniary damages, and € 1 8,705 for 
expenses.694 
In handing down its decision, the Court emphasized the importance of 
recording the information: had the cameras simply been observation 
devices, the monitoring of public space would not give rise to privacy 
concerns. The recording of the information, however, even though it was a 
public arena, mattered, and the dissemination of the material meant that a 
much broader audience than would otherwise be witness to the action 
became aware of it. 
693 The High Court had held that under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1 994, 
x. 1 63, the local council could use CCTV to prevent crime; and through the Local 
Government Act 1 972, s. I l l ,  could distribute the footage. See COUSENS, supra note 565, at 
56. 
694 Peck v. United Kingdom (44647/98), 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003); see also R v. 
Brentwood BC [ 1998] EMLR. 697 (U.K.). 
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3. CCTV in the United States 
Similar CCTV systems are beginning to spring up in the United States, 
but no legislation even approximating the Data Protection Act exists on this 
side of the Atlantic. Washington, D.C., for instance, plans to take 
advantage of more than one thousand video cameras "all linked to central 
command station accessible to not only the District police but the FBI, the 
Capitol Police, the Secret Service, and other law enforcement agencies.,,695 
The public only learned about the placement of these devices, and plans for 
expanding the system, after the initial group had been put into place. What 
began as thirteen cameras owned by the Metropolitan Police Department 
became linked to several hundred cameras in schools and public 
transportation. 696 The National Park Service, in turn, spent some two to 
three million dollars to install cameras at major memorial sites on the mall. 
In 2002, at the first congressional hearings to be held into the matter, 
Chief of Police Charles Ramsey said that the department only made use of 
the cameras twenty-four seven during heightened alert or large scale 
events.697 The National Park Service, as of the time of the hearings, had yet 
to decide how long to keep the recordings. The associate regional director 
of the National Capital Region, National Service, John Parsons, tied the 
existence of these cameras to the terrorist threat: "We are convinced by 
studies and consultants that these icons of democracy are high targets for 
terrorist activities. And that is the sole reason that have [sic] made the 
decision to go forward with planning for these cameras.,,698 
Chicago presents an even more extreme case. As of the time of 
writing, police have the ability to monitor some two thousand cameras.699 
By 2006, the city will have added another 250.700 What makes these 
numbers even more significant than Washington, D.C. is the technology 
attached: software programs will cue the cameras, which are trained on sites 
considered terrorist targets, to alert the police automatically when anyone 
wanders in circles, lingers outside, pulls a car over onto a highway 
shoulder, or leaves a package and walks away.701 The camera immediately 
highlights the people so identified. The city consciously modeled the 
695 Privacy vs. Security Hearing, supra note 684, 1 (statement of Rep. Constance A. 
Morella, Chairman). 
696 Id. at 1 -2. 
697 !d. at 2 1  (statement of Chief of Police Charles Ramsey). 
698 Id. at 48. 
699 Stephen Kinzer, Chicago Moving to 'Smart ' Surveillance Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
2 1 , 2004, at A18 .  
700 !d. 
701 Id. 
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system after London, as well as systems in place in Las Vegas and currently 
being used by Anny combat teams.702 When implemented, it will be one of 
the most sophisticated in the world, particularly with respect to its ability to 
monitor the thousands of cameras in motion. Dispatchers who receive the 
image will have the ability to magnify the image up to four hundred times. 
And the total cost to the city? $5. 1  million for the cameras, and another 
$3.5 million for the computer network.703 Mayor Daley boasted, "[t]his 
project is a central part of Chicago's response to the threat of terrorism, as 
well as an effort to reduce the city's crime rate." But he also 
acknowledged, "[i]t . . . subjects people here to extraordinary levels of 
surveillance. Anyone walking in public is liable to be almost constantly 
watched.,,704 Discussing plans to place cameras on public vehicles, such as 
street sweepers, Daley defended the eye of the state: "We're not inside your 
home or your business. The city owns the sidewalks. We own the streets 
and we own the alleys.,,705 
As of the time of writing, more than sixty urban centers in the United 
States use CCTV for law enforcement purposes.706 Baltimore has perhaps 
the most extensive system.707 But it is not just large cities that have jumped 
on the train. Yosemite Airport, for instance, combines CCTV with facial 
recognition technology to scan for terrorists.708 These systems make it 
increasingly difficult for individuals to retain their anonymity as they move 
through public. 
There are legitimate law enforcement interests in such surveillance, 
such as to prevent and detect crime, reduce citizens' fears, and aid in 
criminal investigations. Yet even electronic surveillance companies admit 
that, "[0 ]verall, it is fair to say that no jurisdiction is currently keeping the 
kind of statistical data that can be analyzed in such a way to demonstrate the 
effect of CCTV.,,709 
702 Id. 
703 Id. 
704 Id. 
705 Id. 
706 Luk, supra note 687, at 227 (citing Mark Boal, SpyCam City, VILL. VOICE, Oct. 6, 
1 998, at 3 8). Some of these have become incorporated into the infotainment industry, with 
footage appearing on reality programs such as COPS. Id. at 227. 
707 See id. (citing Mark Hansen, No Place to Hide, 83 A.B.A.J. 44, 44-45 ( 1997)). 
708 Pelco News Release, Oct. 26, 200 1 ,  available at http://www.pelco.com/ 
company/newsreleases/200 111 0260 1 .aspx. 
709 Privacy vs. Security Hearing, supra note 684, at 107 (statement of Richard Chace, 
Executive Dir., Sec. Indus. Ass'n (SlA), which represents over 400 electronic secuirty 
manufacturers, distributors, service providers). 
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Having looked at surveillance authorities and programs on both sides 
of the Atlantic, we turn now. to a brief discussion of the risks of doing 
nothing and, with these in mind, policy options that present themselves. 
A. RISKS 
Alan Westin, in his seminal work on privacy, predicted that advancing 
technologies would give the government unprecedented power.7IO Early 
computer science entrepreneurs shared Westin's concern. In 1 96 1 ,  for 
instance, Richard Benson warned that when all the data could be collected 
together, the state could control citizens' lives: "Where information rests is 
where power lies, and . . . concentration of power is catastrophically 
dangerous.,,7 1 1  In 1 962, Richard W. Hamming, of Bell Telephone Labs, 
asked what safeguards could be introduced to prevent information from 
being used for purposes other than intended.7 12 
Articles on privacy began to appear in academic journals, and in 1 965, 
the Gallagher Subcommittee in the House of Representatives announced its 
intent to look into the issue of data surveillance. (The final report, however, 
did not look at digital surveillance.) When a 1 965 Social Science Research 
Council  ("SSRC") committee report suggested that the federal government 
create a National Data Center for socio-economic information, the public 
went ballistic.7 13 The issue that the SSRC was trying to address was how to 
provide services more efficiently. Senator Long responded to the report 
with a series of hearings. He concluded: 
The files of the Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration, the 
Veterans'  Administration, the Defense Department, the Federal Housing 
Administration, and the Agriculture Department, to name but a few, already contain 
about all there is to know on almost every American. To store all this information in a 
710 
[T]he increased collection and processing of information for diverse public and private purposes, 
if not carefully controlled, could lead to a sweeping power of surveillance by government over 
individual lives and organizational activity. As we are forced more and more each day to leave 
documentary fingerprints and footprints behind us, and as these are increasingly put into storage 
systems capable of computer retrieval, government may acquire a power-through-data position 
that armies of government investigators could not create in past eras. 
WESTIN, supra note 1 6, at 158 .  
7 1 1  Id. at 299, n. l (citing N.Y. POST, Apr. 1 6, 1 961) .  
7 1 2  Id. at 299, n.2 (citing Man and the Computer, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 1 ,  1962). 
7 13 Id. at 3 1 7. 
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computer where it could be collected and retrieved at a moment's notice gives rise to 
. . I . . 7 1 4  senous questIons re attve to pnvacy. 
Senator Long turned out to be wrong: the intervening years have 
proven that the information then available, far from being "all there is to 
know on almost every American," turned out to be but a drop in the bucket. 
The range of information available in digital form eclipses that which could 
be amassed in the 1 970s: voting records, medical information (genetic 
vulnerabilities, past and current illnesses or disorders, infectious diseases), 
commercial and consumer data (on-line banking, E-commerce, credit cards, 
travel, food, entertainment), business records, scholastic achievement, 
library materials, newspaper and magazine subscriptions, electronic 
communications, and a host of other types of material can now be collected. 
The number and extent of projects designed to harvest this data is nothing 
short of staggering. 
It is important to have information on terrorist organizations. 
However, granting the state the power to collect data beyond individualized 
suspicion, making a broad range of public and personal information 
unrelated to criminal charges available to the government, and engaging in 
data mining, eliminate anonymity and move the state from physical and 
data surveillance and into the realm of psychological surveillance. This 
shift, enabled by counterterrorism claims, raises issues that go beyond 
terrorist threats and are of consequence to conservative and liberal alike. 7 1 5  
Unfortunately, in calculating such costs, the analysis frequently stops at 
"security or freedom." A more accurate picture would examine the host of 
interrelated rights and state mechanisms affected by, and the unintended 
consequences that follow from, these measures. They raise substantive 
concerns and have far-reaching effects on the political, legal, social, and 
economic fabric of the state. 
1. Substantive 
At a substantive level, perhaps the most important consideration is the 
possibility of inaccurate information becoming part of an individual' s  
permanent digital record. Here, concerns can be raised about the extent to 
which systems on either side of the Atlantic include within them adequate 
safeguards. The lack of openness, absence of public access, and denial of 
due process mean that individuals on whom information is gathered have 
714 Id. at 3 1 8  (citing Invasions of Privacy (Government Agencies) Hearings Before 
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the S. Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 
1 6 1 3  ( 1965) (temporary transcript)). 
7 1 5  Compare, e.g., William Satire, Privacy in Retreat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1 0, 2004, at 
A27, with STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra note 503. 
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little opportunity to confront their digital accusers. The use of multiple 
sources of information also raises issues related to records matching-a 
problem that has come out in spades in the operation of the "No Fly" list 
post-9/1 1 .  
Substantive difficulties also arise when one takes into account third 
party collection points. Systems are only as good as the entity gathering the 
information. Yet a host of possibilities, from deliberate entry of false 
information and the acquisition of data under circumstances of duress (e.g., 
torture), to simple mistake, could corrupt the data, making its use in further 
analysis somewhat of a moot point. But many of the current systems 
neither ensure accuracy in third party collection, nor identify the collection 
point to allow later users of the data to go back to verify the information­
much less to ensure the same does not happen as data transfers through the 
system. Moreover, as noted above, the target rarely knows the data has 
been gathered, making challenges unlikely. This danger becomes even 
more pronounced when one considers the possibility that hackers may 
deliberately penetrate data systems to alter or retrieve information. 
In the United States, some question exists as to whether inaccurate 
data could be used to convict individuals of criminal offences. The 
Supreme Court has found, for instance, that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply to errors made by court employees.716 In his dissent, Justice Stevens 
admonished that the court's position "overlooks the reality that computer 
technology has changed the nature of threats to citizens' privacy over the 
past half century.,,7 17 Justice Ginsburg, also dissenting, referred to the 
"potential for Orwellian mischief' represented by increasing reliance on 
technology.7 18 We do know that many mistakes are made. Twenty years 
ago, the FBI conducted a study which revealed that approximately twelve 
thousand inaccurate reports on suspects wanted for arrest were being 
transmitted daily. Databanks have since increased in size.719 The problem 
of mistake is not limited to American shores: As Part II discussed, the 
United Kingdom's annual reviews of surveillance powers are replete with 
observations about basic errors committed by the police and intelligence 
services. 
One final consideration in regard to the substantive data issues centers 
on a contextual data merger. Here lie concerns about taking information 
gathered for one specific purpose and applying it to another purpose. 
7 1 6  Arizona v. Evans, 5 1 4  U.S. 1 ( 1995). 
717 !d. at 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
7 1 8  Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 
1994), rev 'd, 5 14 U.S. 1 ( 1 995» . 
7 1 9  STRUM, supra note 89, at 1 33 .  
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Different meanings may emerge in this process, with conclusions that may 
bear little or no resemblance to reality. Problems arise here particularly 
when real consequences for individual rights follow. 
Not only is there a problem with the transfer of the wrong information, 
but the shadow of too much information also looms large. As one Privy 
Counsellor Review committee commented: 
The East Gennan Government may have had files on a quarter of their popUlation, but 
it failed to predict or prevent its own demise. If there is too much infonnation, it can 
be difficult to analyse effectively and so can generate more leads than can be followed 
. " I I 720 up or tngger too many Ia se a anns. 
These substantive concerns plague the collection of large swathes of 
information. 
2. Political 
The political impact of the power to obtain such a broad range of 
information ought not be underestimated. The concentration of this power 
in the executive influences the balance in power between the different 
branches of government. 721 In the past, such accumulations of power have 
been used for political reasons, ensuring the dominance of the sitting 
government. From Hoover to Nixon, and beyoild, private information 
became an instrument of control. The veil drawn over access to this 
information may become an impenetrable wall, with the Judiciary--or the 
Legislature-loath to second-guess those responsible for ensuring national 
security. Executive privilege and access to confidential information may 
prove sufficient to convince the other branches (and, indeed, the public writ 
large) of the truth of national security claims. Assertions regarding the 
presence of WMD in Iraq, by both the United States and United Kingdom, 
provide only the latest example in a long series. In Korematsu v. United 
States, the Judiciary deferred to executive claims regarding privileged 
information to allow the widespread detention of Americans of Japanese 
decent during World War 11.722 The secret materials turned out not to exist. 
In the United Kingdom, the "S" Plan, waved in front of Parliament in 1 939, 
allegedly detailed a communist link with Irish republicanism. This 
document became the basis on which extreme counterterrorist measures 
swept through Westminster. 
720 Note that KPMG criticized the SAR regime for just this reason: the low signal to 
noise rati% ver-reporting. PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW COMM., supra note 665, at 25-26. 
721 See also Roger Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN COMPUTING 1 0  (c. Dunlop & R. Kling eds. ,  1 99 1 ), available at 
http://www.anu.edu.aulpeoplelRoger.ClarkeIDV/CACM88.html. 
722 332 U.S. 2 1 3  ( 1944). 
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History also demonstrates, particularly in the American context, the 
widespread use of these powers not just to counter national security threats, 
but to prevent dissent. In the United States, the witch hunt against 
Communists resulted in actions being taken against civil rights leaders, the 
women's movement, and various political parties that disagreed with the 
status quo. Such an atmosphere may discourage citizens from engaging in 
public discourse, impacting the democratic nature of the state. It may also 
prevent academics, or those who comment on public policy, from doing so 
publicly. This means that bad policies may go unexamined, undermining 
the ability of the state to operate in the most efficient and effective manner 
possible. 
One of the technologies developed under TIA was the ability of the 
state to scan a crowd for deviant behavior-as an early indicator of 
terrorism. Liberalism, however, is founded on the idea of individual 
expression, and tolerance for diversity. These undoubtedly would be 
affected once such a plan is put into place. Added to these considerations is 
the possibility that information gathered for one purpose will be used for 
other reasons. In Redwood City, California, for example, in late 1 995 the 
police began installing listening devices to detect gun fire. The police later 
admitted that these microphones enabled . them to listen in to conversations 
in private dwellings.723 With surveillance information masked from public 
scrutiny, it becomes more difficult to uncover the misuse of such 
capabilities. More specifically, counterterrorist provisions that allow the 
gathering of such data rarely include strictures on the manner in which it 
can be used. 
3. Legal 
The widespread collection of information also impacts the legal 
system. It shifts the burden in proof. No longer must the state demonstrate 
individualized suspicion in order to target individuals and invade their 
privacy; instead, everyone in society becomes suspect, forced to defend 
themselves when the state reaches its (potentially entirely mistaken) 
conclusions. The Data Encryption provisions of Britain's RlPA provide a 
good example: if an individual does not provide the keys upon request, 
rather than the state having to show that the individual has access to the 
information sought, the person must prove that his or her memory has 
failed. And the consequence, up to two years imprisonment, is substantial. 
Broader legal issues are felt in both the American and English 
constitutions. In the United States, these provisions provide a way for the 
723 STRUM, supra note 89, at 1 34. 
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state to dodge the requirements of the Bill of Rights. Instead, the Executive 
acts under Article II considerations, claiming considerable leeway in 
implementing its decision. In the United Kingdom, the national security 
exception, and the blending of crime, terrorism, and national security, alter 
individual entitlements. While rights related to physical interference with 
property might continue to be protected in a manner commensurate with the 
British constitutional tradition, the interception of communications is 
different in kind. Orders of magnitude more information can so be 
garnered, with significantly greater inroads into privacy, giving the state 
greater entree into the psychology of persons in the United Kingdom. 
4. Social 
Perhaps the greatest impact of the loss of anonymity and movement 
into psychological surveillance is felt in the social sphere. The widespread 
collection of information creates an atmosphere of suspicion. This is not a 
new phenomenon.724 The problem is that surveillance powers reside in the 
hands of state officials, are exercised in secret, the extent of their impact is 
unknown, and no reasonable opportunity to object presents itself. This 
leaves much to speculation, such as the degree to which private rights are 
invaded, and whether such powers are necessary. Where information is 
made public, however, such as in the United Kingdom in 1 844, or again in 
1 957, public concern abates. The significant expansion in technology, and 
broader state access to private information, again has raised concerns. As 
the United Kingdom's Interception of Communications Commissioner 
wrote in 2001 ,  "[m]any members of the public are suspicious about the 
interception of communications, and some believe that their own 
conversations are subject to unlawful interception by the security, 
intelligence or law enforcement agencies.'.725 In light of the secrecy that 
surrounds the collection of such information, the Commissioner's 
subsequent assurance, "I am as satisfied as I can be that the concerns are, in 
fact, unfounded," carries little weight. 
724 In 1 844, a secret Committee of the House of Commons noted "the strong moral 
feeling which exists against the practice of opening letters, with its accompaniments of 
mystery and concealment." BIRKETT REpORT, supra note 568, � 1 33 .  The committee added, 
/d. 
[t]here is no doubt that the interception of conununications . . .  is regarded with general disfavour 
. . . .  Whether practised by unauthorized individuals or by officials purporting to act under 
authority, the feeling still persists that such interceptions offend against the usual and proper 
standards of behaviour as being an invasion of privacy and an interference with the liberty of the 
individual in his right to be 'let alone when lawfully ell gaged upon his own affairs. ' 
725 INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONER, 200 1 ,  supra note 600, at 2-3. 
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The United States proves no exception to the rule. The public appears 
somewhat less than enamored with the sweeping powers contained in the 
USA PATRIOT Act. Resolutions against this legislation have been passed 
in 401 cities and counties in forty-three different states, including five state­
wide declarations.726 Cities that have condemned the broader surveillance 
measures include New York City and Washington, D.C.-the targets of the 
9/1 1  attacks. The federal legislature, picking up on this sentiment, had 
introduced by the end of 2003 nearly a dozen amendments to mitigate some 
of the more egregious provisions. From left to right, privacy advocates 
voiced their concern: in October 2002, House Majority Leader Dick Armey 
referred to DOJ as "the biggest threat to personal liberty in the country." 
House Judiciary Committee Chairman, Representative James 
Sensenbrenner, threatened to subpoena the Attorney General to get answers 
to questions about DOJ's use of the powers. Conservative commentators, 
such as William Safire, found themselves in the same camp as liberal icons, 
such as Senator Edward Kennedy. And strange bedfellows began 
emerging. Conservative leader Bob Barr, for instance, became a formal 
advisor to the ACLU-which invited the head of the National Rifle 
Association to address its annual membership conference. 
These developments forced Ashcroft to go on the offensive. He 
initiated a speaking tour in 2003 to defend the USA PATRIOT Act. 727 The 
DOJ launched a website called "Preserving life and liberty," which 
defended the government's  use of the legislation.728 In an irony that 
appears lost on DOJ, the home page defending the expansive surveillance 
provisions includes a "privacy policy," which reads: 
If you visit our site to read or download information, we collect and store the 
following information about your visit: 
The name of the Internet domain (for example, 'xcompany.com' if you use a 
private Internet access account, or 'yourschool.edu' if you are connecting from a 
university's domain) and the IP address (a number that is automatically assigned to 
your computer when you are using the Internet) from which you access our site; 
The type of browser and operating system used to access our site; 
726 American Civil Liberties Union, List of Communities That Have Passed Resolutions, 
http://www.aciu.orgiSafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfrn?ID=1 1294&c=207 (last visited June 9, 
2006). 
727 See, e.g. , Jeff Johnson, Congressional Opponents Lash Out at PATRIOT Act, 
Ashcroft, CNSNEWS.COM, Sept. 25, 2003, http://www.cnsnews.comlViewNation.asp?Page 
=%5CNation%5Carchive%5C200309%5CNAT20030925a.html; Learning Activity, CNN 
STUDENTNEWS, Sept. 8, 2003, http://www.cnn.coml2003/fyi/news/09/07Ilearning.patriot. 
act. ! 0 1 1. 
728 U. S. Oep't of Justice, Preserving Life and Liberty, http://www.1ifeandliberty.gov/ 
(last visited June 9, 2006). 
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The date and time you access our site; 
The Internet address of the Web site from which you linked directly to our site; 
and 
Th . .  d h 
. c ·  729 e pages you VISit an t e mlonnatlOn you request. 
The web site continues, "In certain circumstances . . . we may take 
additional steps to identify you based on this information and we may share 
this information, including your identity, with other government 
agencies.'mo The government's "privacy policy" appears to be to invade it. 
Outside of undermining the population's confidence in the state writ 
large, the social impact reverberates in the relationship of the population to 
law enforcement. Creating adversarial relationships may have lasting 
effects on the state's ability to provide basic services. A startlingly good 
example here comes from the United States, where the TIPS program 
sought to train first responders and firefighters to report on "suspicious" 
behavior. Pressure also mounted on the police to begin collecting and 
reporting information relating to immigrant communities. These 
professions have access to private residences and so are in a better position 
to gather information otherwise masked from state view. The problem, of 
course, is that if people think that firefighters, or police for that matter, are 
coming to spy on them and possibly to turn them in to the authorities, 
people will not call them. It will create an adversarial relationship, making 
the provision of basic services-which have nothing to do with terrorism 
and perhaps everything to do, amongst other things, with health, fire, and 
domestic abuse-that much more difficult. 
Another risk centers on the impact of widespread psychological 
surveillance on social control. In the 20th century, the United States 
undertook a wide range of programs to try to get inside peoples' heads and 
to find ways to control them.731 Despite, or perhaps because of, the outright 
729 Id. 
730 Id. 
731 In Project CHATTER, run from 1 947- 1953, the Navy administered "truth drugs" 
(Anabasis aphylla, scopolamine, and mescaline) to people in the United States and overseas. 
Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, run by the CIA from 1 950 to 1 956, investigated "the 
possibility of control of an individual by application of special interrogation techniques." 
Here, hypnosis and sodium pentothal provided the means of choice. MKUL TRA, overseen 
by the CIA from 1950 to the late 1960s, attempted to manipulate human behavior through 
chemical and biological weapons, as well as "additional avenues to the control of human 
behavior . . .  [such as] radiation electroshock, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and 
anthropology, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitary devices and materials." 
Church Committee Vol. 5, supra note 98, at 390. The Anny undertook extensive LSD 
testing towards the same ends. These projects began as efforts to defend the United States, 
but this purpose soon became subordinate to perfecting techniques, "for the abstraction of 
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violations of individual rights that occurred, intelligence agencies made 
deliberate efforts to prevent citizens from even knowing about these 
programs. The CIA Inspector General wrote in 1957:  
Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations from exposure to enemy 
forces but also to conceal these activities from the American public in general. The 
knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have 
serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be detrimental to 
h I· hm f '  
. .  732 t e accomp IS ent 0 ItS mission. 
It would be somewhat naIve to assume that similar efforts to get inside 
terrorists heads so as to prevent them from acting before they do so (a self­
stated aim of TIA, as well as the 2002 National Security Strategy) could 
avoid similar issues related to social control and secrecy, with significant 
effects on the social structure of the state. 
The impact that surveillance programs may have on the equality of 
privacy further compounds the issue. Not all citizens will be subject to 
psychological profiling, but, once certain traits are identified (likely linked 
to age, religion, country of origin, nationality, or ethnicity), only certain 
portions of the population will lose degrees of privacy otherwise afforded 
the majority. Feelings of inequality and claims of injustice may make these 
groups less prone to participate in civic structures and less able to take 
advantage of state services when needed. 
Still other social concerns present themselves. Perhaps one of the 
most serious is that past transgressions may become a scarlet letter, 
emblazoned on citizens' chests, "visible to all and used by the . . .  powerful 
. . .  to increase their leverage over average people.,,733 This would make the 
concept of paying one's  dues-and then moving forward with a fresh 
start-somewhat obsolete. Another way to see this is through the lens of 
self-realization; Westin notes, "[p ] art of the value of privacy in the past was 
that it limited the circulation of recorded judgments about individuals, 
leaving them free to seek self-realization in an open environment.,,734 The 
relentless collection, storage, and recall of such information may make it 
difficult for people to overcome the past and to see themselves in a different 
light. 
information from individuals whether wiling or not." Id. at 393. 
732 Id. at 394. 
733 STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra note 503, at 14. 
734 WESTIN, supra note 16, at 323. 
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5. Economic 
On the economic front, extensive surveillance may have the effect of 
discouraging innovation or harming commercial activity. 735 Encryption, for 
example, is an essential part of commercial security, allowing companies to 
develop strategies, make bids, and price parts and services, without their 
competitors' knowledge.736 The interception of this information, 
particularly in finance, where money ends up simply a matter of "bits and 
bytes," may be devastating.737 It may also raise difficult diplomatic issues: 
European alarm about Echelon rests in part on concern about economic 
espionage.738 
Limits on the development of encryption may hurt domestic security 
firms' abilities to compete on the international market. In recent 
congressional hearings, Sam Gejdenson, the ranking member of the House 
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, suggested that 
the current situation mirrors Dick Cheney's efforts, when Secretary of 
Defense, to prevent the Secretary of Commerce from lifting controls on 286 
computers-at a time when any civilian could buy a 386 at Radio Shack in 
Beij ing.739 He added, "[t]here is a recent New York Times story of a 
German company basically sending its appreciation to the American 
Government and the restrictions we placed on encryption because we are 
about to make them really rich.,,74o 
Encryption demands may also harm national security interests writ 
large. As John Gage of Sun Microsystems related to Congress: 
[O]ur concern is that the systems we use for air traffic control, controlling of the 
power grid, control ofthe trading floors where $1  trillion a day is traded in New York, 
in Tokyo, even a momentary disruption there brings chaos to world fmancial markets. 
735 This is not to say that good reasons for a state to want to have access to encrypted 
data do not exist: Aum Shin ri Kyo, for instance, used encryption to mask computer files that 
contained plans to carry out a biological attack on the United States. Dorothy E. Denning & 
William E. Baugh, Jr., Encryption in Crime and Terrorism, in CYBERWAR 2.0: MYTHS, 
MYSTERIES AND REALITY 1 67 (Alan D. Campen & Douglas H. Dearth eds., 1998). Rarnzi 
Yousef, a member of al Qaida partially responsible for the 1 993 attack on the World Trade 
Center, encrypted files that detailed plans to bomb eleven planes over the Pacific Ocean. 
Hearings on Encryption Before the H. Comm. on International Relations, 1 05th Congo 
( 1997) (testimony of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh). 
736 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 2 15 ,  at 42. 
737 /d. 
738 See supra notes 406-409. 
739 Encryption: Individual Right to Privacy vs. National Security: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on 
International Relations, 105th Congo ( 1 997) [hereinafter Encryption Hearing]. 
740 Id. at 3. 
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. . .  [I]t is real world stuff. And what do we have today? We have insecure operating 
systems, insecure networks, and a wonderful 1 976 invention?4 1 
Tom Parenty, the Director of Security at Sybase Corporation, added, 
"[t]he broad use of cryptography in U.S.  software products is indispensable 
in protecting all of the infrastructures upon which all of our lives 
depend.,,742 It does seem that the claims of law enforcement and the 
intelligence community have been a bit overstated. In the United States, 
federal and state officials are required to report when electronic surveillance 
encounters encryption.743 In 2000, twenty-two state cases and zero federal 
cases encountered masked material. In no case was an investigation 
inhibited.744 Overseas, the reason Part III of RIP A is not yet in effect is 
precisely because it has not become an issue. 
B. OPTIONS 
A common charge levied against articles that discuss surveillance 
centers on the "perilous times" argument: "[W]hat would you have us do 
when faced by a significant threat-particularly from terrorism?" While it 
is not the intention of this article to provide an exhaustive analysis of the 
policy options available, this section briefly sketches six alternatives that 
merit further discussion: ( 1 )  the creation of a property right in personal 
information; (2) the regulation of access, transfer, use, and retention of data 
with remedies for violations; (3) the scaling back of existing powers; (4) 
delimiting what constitutes "national security"; (5) providing safeguards 
and oversight functions; and, (6) eliminating sunset provisions. The 
combination of these would minimize intrusiveness, maximize fairness, and 
still allow the state to respond in an effective manner to terrorist challenge. 
Perhaps the most intriguing option centers on the creation of a property 
right in personal information. An idea put forward in the mid-20th century 
by Alan Westin, this would amount to the "right of decision over one's 
private personality.,,745 The handling of that information by another would 
create certain duties and liabilities: "With personal information so defined, 
741 [d. at 48. Gage went on to surf the Internet in front of the committee, showing them 
strong encryption programs available from Finland, Croatia, Sweden. [d. ; see also OFFICE 
OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE OTA-BP-ITC-149, GP 
STOCK #052-003-01 4 1 8- 1 ,  at 25-26 ( 1 995), available at http://www.askcalea.comldocs/ 
digitalage.pdf; DIFFIE & LAUDAU, supra note 2 1 5, at 23; 
742 Encryption Hearing, supra note 739, at 33. 
743 18 U.S.C. § 25 1 9(2)(b) (2000). 
744 STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2000 WIRETAP REpORT 1 1  
(2001 ), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/2000Jeportl2000wttxt.pdf. 
745 WESTIN, supra note 1 6, at 324. 
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a citizen would be entitled to have due process o f  law before his property 
could be taken and misused by government or by agencies exercising such 
enormous public power that they would be held to the same rules as 
government.,,746 Thus, whenever certain systems obtain data, the individual 
would have an opportunity to examine it, to challenge its accuracy (possibly 
in an administrative proceeding, with judicial oversight), and to answer 
such allegations as might be made. Upon administrative and judicial 
direction, the answer may either be appended to the information or, if found 
convincing, prevent the original data from being retained. 
At a minimum, it would seem an opportune moment to reconsider the 
state of privacy law writ large, particularly in the United States. Regulating 
the collection, transfer, and retention of data, while providing a remedy for 
violations of existing law, would go some way towards addressing many of 
the concerns this article raises raise. Different interested parties advocate a 
number of guidelines to this effect. Without going through each, I present 
those that I find most compelling. 
First, no personal information should be collected in the first place 
without the explicit permission of the individual involved, or without the 
entity seeking the information clearly identifying its purpose in doing so. 
Only those authorized to enter data into the system may do so, with their 
traceable identity linked to the data throughout its life. This will allow for 
later challenge should the data be used in a manner detrimental to the rights 
of the subject. Second, unless the target so consents, no personal 
information can be shared with other institutions or organizations (either 
public or private) for reasons other than that for which the data was 
collected. In these circumstances, both parties would provide notice that 
the sharing had occurred. Third, where the state seeks access, it would have 
to demonstrate a compelling need for the data. Here, consideration might 
be given to the role of the judiciary or an executive arbitration body in 
determining access. Fourth, those entities handling personal information 
would be required to enact security measures to prevent unauthorized 
access. Fifth, and finally, adequate enforcement mechanisms would have to 
be created to ensure the above. This would mean both oversight functions 
and a remedy for violations of the regulations. As in the United Kingdom, 
the oversight functions would include four types: independent annual 
reviews, individual audits, and complaints tribunals, as well as legislative 
oversight. Remedies may range from criminal penalties and damages to 
injunctions-including the sanction of losing access to the system. These 
746 Id. at 325. 
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mechanisms would enshrine the twin principles of transparency and 
accountability. 
Consistent with the thrust of my argument throughout this piece, that 
the United States and United Kingdom have gone too far in their 
surveillance powers, a third option centers on scaling back existing 
authorities. For the United States, this would mean limiting the expansion 
of Article II claims to cases involving suspected terrorists. It would mean 
taking a hard look at the growing role of the Department of Defense in 
domestic information-gathering and analysis. It would also mean not 
creating a third category somewhere between criminal law and national 
security to deal with the terrorist challenge. This proposal reflects an 
approach taken by the Bush Administration in the Draft Enhancing 
Domestic Security Act of 2003. The Judiciary, however, reluctant to 
intrude in the Article II powers, may find it equally difficult to assert its 
authority over some sort of hybrid category. The United States also could 
move to a system that requires individualized suspicion for the collection of 
information-instead of drawing on broad data mining powers to place the 
entire population under surveillance. In the United Kingdom, scaling back 
the powers would include preventing the introduction of Part III of the 
ATCSA-a section already deemed unnecessary in the current 
technological environment. Efforts could be made to return the burden of 
proof to the state and to require individualized suspicion for the use of 
surveillance powers. 
Another option that could be considered is an effort by the Legislature 
to delimit what falls within the remit of national security. During the 
Second Reading of the 1 989 Security Service Act, which, it will be recalled, 
placed MIS on a statutory footing, the Home Secretary said, "[b]y its very 
nature, the phrase (national security] refers and can only refer to matters 
relating to the survival or well being of the nation as a whole, and not to 
party political or sectional interests.,,747 What falls within the gamut of 
matters related to the well-being of a state, however, can be rather broad. 
The House of Lords, for instance, does not consider it to be limited to direct 
threats to national security.748 Lord Slynn warned against introducing a 
statutory definition, saying, "[t]he question of whether something is ' in the 
interests' of national security is not a question of law. It is a matter of 
judgement and policy." Indeed, the European Commission noted in 1993 
747 143 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (1988) 1 1 05 (U.K.) (statement of Douglas Hurd). 
748 Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Rehman [2001 ]  UKHL 1 1  (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (U.K.). 
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that no precise definition of what is in the interests of "national security" 
exists. 749 
What makes the breadth of this conception of import is the repeated 
expansion of state powers where "national security" is at stake. David 
Feldman, writing about the incorporation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights into British law, argued that the courts should adopt a 
proportionality test.750 Some rights, regardless of the national interests 
claimed, remain exempt from incursion. For others, a careful balance 
between the interference with rights and the threat posed by not engaging in 
the activity matters. Feldman concedes that while courts may be 
comfortable adjudicating in some areas, in others the Judiciary will be less 
inclined to intervene; nevertheless, they ought to still be able to examine the 
issue through the lens of proportionality. 
Another approach that may yield more satisfactory results would be to 
limit the ends for which information is sought by including certain crimes 
in the definition of "national security." Again, this article is not the correct 
venue to pursue this idea in depth, but it offers one way to prevent the 
misuse of executive power. 
What is interesting in the United Kingdom is that the structure adopted 
to authorize the use of extraordinary powers in some sense gets at the 
undefined nature of national security: MI5 and GCHQ, for instance, are 
more likely to be seeking what most would consider national security ends 
than, say, the public health authorities. Here, the secretive nature of these 
organizations is of the utmost importance. 
As Baroness Hilton, speaking in the House of Lords, noted, 
MI5 does not have a system of clear accountability . . .  it is a secret organization; its 
budget is secret; its members and resources are secret. It is accorded special 
privileges by the courts: for example its internal paperwork is protected from 
disclosure; and its members can be given anonymity as witnesses. So its proceedings 
are not open. It has no public complaints system . . . .  75 1 
To counter this secrecy and to ensure that surveillance powers are 
being properly directed, Parliament created four Commissioners and a 
complaints tribunal. The effectiveness of these mechanisms, however, 
remains less than clear. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner for 
Northern Ireland, for instance, does not make any public reports. Those 
issued by the Interception Commissioner (who does not address the 
749 COUSENS, supra note 565, at 86 (citing Esbester v. United Kingdom, 1 8  EUR. H. R. 
REp. 72 ( 1 993) (Court decision)). 
750 See id. at 87 (citing DAVID FELDMAN, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 
( 1998, 1 999)). 
751 572 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) ( 1996) 401 (U.K.) (statement of Baroness Hilton). 
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operation of surveillance authorities in Northern Ireland) lack important 
details. They have yet to report on external warrants, and they consciously 
do not discuss warrants issued by the Foreign Office. The Commissioners 
themselves do not look at the number or extent of warrantless interceptions; 
nor do they consider each warrant. Instead, the practice of successive 
Commissioners has been to select and inspect warrants randomly (with the 
exception of counter-subversion activities, in which case the Commissioner 
inspects each one.) Only a fraction of the complaints submitted to the 
seven-member Investigatory Powers Tribunal are investigated (3 out of 22 
in 2000, 7 1  of 1 02 in 200 1 ,  and 67 out of 1 3 0  in 2002.) Their policy is to 
neither confirm nor deny whether surveillance had actually taken place. 
Without notice, however, how are individuals going to be able to take the 
security services to task? When British subjects do suspect that they are 
under surveillance, the provision of evidence to the Tribunal is voluntary, 
and hearsay can be accepted. Following on the tradition of the Interception 
of Communications Tribunal (established in 1 986 and superseded by the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal), the Tribunal has yet to uphold a single 
complaint.752 Legislation, moreover, specifically exempts Commissioners 
and the Tribunal from judicial oversight. 753 
During the Parliamentary debates on the 1 997 Police Bill, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson expressed his alarm at the use of executive warrants: 
We have no written Constitution. We do not enjoy specific constitutional rights 
against the state. Our freedom depends . . .  only, on the fact that no Minister, no 
administrator and no member of the police has any greater power or any greater right 
than any other citizen to enter our property or to seize our person. In particular, the 
state and its officers have no power to enter our houses or workplaces or to seize our 754 property. 
The use of prior authorization and independent Commissioners served 
as a sort of compromise; but these bodies still report within the executive 
branch, exempt from judicial scrutiny and oversight. The standard used, 
moreover, is weak: reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. 
As was previously noted, British law as currently written does not 
allow intercepted communications to be used in judicial proceedings. 
Where the other policy recommendations look at ways to minimize 
752 The Intelligence Services Commissioner looks at activItIes of the Intelligence 
Services, officials of the Ministry of Defence and HM Forces outside of Northern Ireland. 
COUSENS, supra note 565, at 198-99. 
753 See, e.g. ,  Interception of Communications Act 1 985, § 7(8), Schedule � 3(2) (Scot.); 
Police Act 1 997, ch. 50, § 9 1 ( 1 0) (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.ukiacts/ 
acts 1 997/97050-j.htm#91 .  
754 575 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th Ser.) ( 1996) 8 1 0  (U.K.). 
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surveillance, greater use of intercepts in the judicial system may result in 
stronger procedural controls being introduced to ensure a minimum amount 
of intrusion into the sphere of privacy. Review committees have 
consistently called for legalization of intercepted communications to make 
it possible to prosecute more terrorist crimes.755 
What minimal forays have been made in the United States in this 
direction leave something to be desired: The President's Board on 
Safeguarding Americans' Civil Liberties provides a good example of what 
not to do. The Deputy Attorney General chairs the organization and sets 
the agenda. All twenty members come from the same agencies using the 
surveillance powers. Almost all are either presidential appointees or senior 
staff members who serve appointees. The board can only advise. They act 
under no obligation to provide either information or findings to the public. 
The body, moreover, does not act in an ombudsperson role.756 In the 
renewal of the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress introduced some mechanisms 
to provide enhanced oversight of the surveillance authorities. But the 
reporting requirements are limited, and only address some of the powers 
granted to the Executive since 9/1 1 .  Here, only depending on the hearings 
being called is insufficient: such inquiries offer snapshots, not ongoing 
regulation of the use of such powers. They also leave gaps in the scrutiny 
afforded. While the House and Senate both held hearings on the NSA 
surveillance program, for instance, neither has inquired systematically into 
either NSLs or the DOD's changing domestic role. Control of the executive 
and legislative branches by the same political party, moreover, may make it 
difficult for such hearings to even be called. Furthermore, relying on the 
suspension of funds does not appear to have the intended effect; the amount 
of discretionary funding available means that programs can continue. TIA 
and TIPS provide two ready examples. Actions such as creating 
independent review bodies, introducing an audit process, establishing an 
effective ombudsperson, and providing for regular congressional review, 
deserve further discussion. 
The final option to highlight is the possibility of eliminating sunset 
provisions altogether. The argument here is that temporary powers rarely 
turn out to be so; instead, they simply become a baseline, on which further 
powers are built. Part of the difficulty is that as soon as the provisions 
become law, the rationale shifts: those wanting to repeal the measures must 
demonstrate that in withdrawing them more violence will not occur--or 
that some level of violence is acceptable. The former is impossible to 
755 PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW COMMITIEE, supra note 637, at 8-9. 
756 See Exec. Order No. 1 3,353, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,585 (Sept. 1 ,  2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesI2004/08/2004082 7-3 .html. 
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show, and the second is politically unpalatable. And so temporary 
measures quickly become a permanent part of the state response, with more 
measures introduced following the next attack. They thus function simply 
to make inroads into individual rights somehow more palatable. But this 
fiction does long-term damage to the state. Eliminating sunset provisions 
may force legislatures to consider the long-term impact of broader 
surveillance powers beyond the immediate threat posed by terrorism. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In 1 948, George Orwell's novel 1984 captured the corrosive impact of 
broad state surveillance. The main character, Winston Smith, a citizen of a 
state called Oceania (coincidentally, a fictional representation of the United 
States and United Kingdom), lived under the all-seeing eye of Big Brother. 
Nearly two decades later, Vance Packard echoed his concerns in The Naked 
Society. Alan Westin's Privacy and Freedom subsequently generated 
increased attention to the issue. In 1 984, Congress, finally alarmed by the 
growth of technology, held hearings on the subject. Glenn English opened 
the proceedings: 
I don't think that anyone . . .  can seriously argue that in 1 984 we've realized George 
Orwell's vision of a totalitarian world of constant fear, repression, and surveillance. 
What is important is that the technology that would enable Mr. Orwell's vision to 
become a reality already exists. The issue that we must face is how to control the 
technology before it controls us.757 
At that time, only forty-five percent of the public knew how to use 
computers, but sixty-nine percent expressed concern that an Orwellian 
society was at hand.758 This paper has essentially argued that, sped by 
claims of national security and the need to fight terrorism, 1984 approaches. 
In the United States, where no general right to privacy exists, two sets 
of authorities have emerged. The first, largely the realm of criminal law, 
evolved from trespass doctrine and the exclusionary rule to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; where such exists, outside of a handful of 
exceptions, law enforcement must obtain prior judicial authorization for 
physical searches to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Title 
III sets an even higher standard for wiretapping and electronic bugs. 
The second set of authorities, the same ones claimed by the current 
administration to defend the NSA's domestic surveillance program, 
centered on national security, not criminal law. Here, largely unfettered by 
judicial requirements, the Executive claims Article II authority. The 20th 
757 Privacy and 1 984, supra note 213 ,  at 2. 
758 !d. at 4, 7. 
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century witnessed the state's first use-and misuse---of these powers in 
peace time. FISA scaled back the Executive, while still granting it domain 
over national security concerns. The Executive, however, almost 
immediately began chipping away at the restrictions. CALEA, the USA 
PATRIOT Act, the weakening of the attorney general guidelines, and post-
9/1 1 surveillance operations represent the latest-and most radical­
expansion of this realm. The growth of military involvement here is of 
note, as are the many data mining operations underway. TIA, ADVISE, 
MATRIX, and other efforts represent a fundamental shift in the type of 
surveillance in which the state can engage. 
Like the United States, the United Kingdom does not recognize a 
general right to privacy. Instead, the state historically addressed conditions 
that implicated particular privacy interests. In 1998, the Human Rights Act 
introduced a broader right to privacy. This legislation, however, only 
required that other statutes be read as far as possible in a manner consistent 
with the ECHR. The Convention, moreover, includes a specific exception 
for matters related to national security. This does not mean that the 
Convention had no affect on British law relating to counterterrorism and 
surveillance. On the contrary, the European Court repeatedly found the 
lack of legislation authorizing specific surveillance mechanisms, and the 
absence of effective oversight, to be a breach of the ECHR. Each time the 
United Kingdom acted to address these concerns, however, the government 
seems to have expanded the underlying state. The system for warrants 
remains entirely within the executive domain; and the standard employed­
reasonable suspicion-relatively weak. 
Outside of counterterrorism, the development of technology has 
propelled the amount of data that can be obtained, analyzed, and shared 
forward at a dizzying rate. The information revolution, the growth of 
digital record-keeping, and the development of public identification, search, 
and tracking systems have played a central role. In both societies, 
anonymity is being lost, and what started as physical or data surveillance 
has moved into the realm of psychological surveillance. Perhaps nowhere 
is this clearer than in data mining operations such as TIA and MATRIX. 
Substantive risks attend, as do political, legal, social, and economic fabric 
concerns. 
While it is not the intention of this article to provide a complete 
analysis of the policy options available, six possibilities deserve greater 
attention: creating a property right in personal information, regulating the 
access, transfer and retention of data while providing remedies for 
violations, scaling back the existing powers, more narrowly defining 
"national security," creating effective safeguards, and eliminating clauses 
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that allow for such powers to be "temporary." Whichever of these, or other 
policy options, are adopted by the states, the time is ripe to consider the 
effect of counterterrorism and advances in technology on surveillance in the 
United States and United Kingdom. Both countries now face something 
different in kind-not degree-than what has come before. 
